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Abstract
Essays in Financial Economics and Applied Macroeconomics
by
Marius Mihail Mihai
Adviser: Professor Sebastiano Manzan
This dissertation consists of three chapters that cover topics in finance and macroeconomics.
Chapter 1 - Do Credit Booms Predict U.S. Recessions? This paper investigates the
role of bank credit in predicting U.S. recessions since the 1960s in the context of a bivariate
probit model. A set of results emerge. First, credit booms are shown to have strong positive
effects in predicting declines in the business cycle at horizons ranging from six to nine
months. Second, by isolating the effect of credit booms, I identify their contributions to
recession probabilities which range between three and four percentage points at a horizon of
six months. Third, the out-of-sample performance of the model is tested on the most recent
credit-driven recession, the Great Recession of 2008. The model performs better than a more
parsimonious version where we restrict the effect of credit booms on the business cycle in
the system to be zero.
Chapter 2 - Credit Fluctuations and Neglected Crash Risk in U.S. Bank Returns
Using U.S. quarterly data from 1960, the paper studies the interaction between bank stock
returns and aggregate credit fluctuations on a set of economic dimensions. I investigate the
source of neglected crash risk in U.S. bank returns using a new deviation measure of aggregate
loans per capita called ltd . A one standard deviation increase in ltd decreases bank stock
returns by 5%, and their dividend growth by almost 6% over the following year. This variable
vembeds important information about both future returns (discount rate news) and cash flow
growth (dividend news); yet a decomposition of future unexpected bank returns shows a
higher incremental effect associated with the variance of news about the discount rate. The
structure of the news is also highly dependent on the size of the financial institution with
small commercial banks being more vulnerable than large ones to changes in the credit cycle.
I interpret the size of neglected crash risk in the context of a regime-switching model where
the outcome of a small probability of disaster can impact bank cash flows in either state
exposing investors to an additional shock originating in the aggregate loan market.
Chapter 3 - News shocks across countries: An empirical investigation We esti-
mate the role of news shocks to total factor productivity, foreign interest rates and commodity
terms of trade in explaining the variance of output and other macro aggregates in a large
sample of countries. To correct for the small-sample bias of the variance decomposition es-
timates we develop a Bootstrap-after-Bootstrap method. We find that the mean difference
of variance share of output explained by news shocks between developing and developed
countries is: I) Negligible for news shocks to total factor productivity. II) Positive for news
shocks to foreign interest rates (6 p.p.) and to commodity terms of trade (8.3 p.p.). Using
cross-sectional data, we find that countries with less financial development have a larger
share of output variance explained by news shocks to foreign interest rates, and countries
with higher total trade of commodities to output ratio and less developed financial markets
exhibit a larger share of output variance explained by news shocks to commodity terms of
trade. These results suggest that to study the role of news shocks in the economy, one-
sector models with only shocks to total factor productivity are not adequate, and that there
must be a structural distinction regarding financial markets’ development when modeling
developing countries as opposed to developed in a general equilibrium framework.
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Chapter 1
Do Credit Booms Predict U.S.
Recessions?
1.1 Introduction
An important area of research in empirical macroeconomics is concerned with understanding
and predicting the business cycle. This is of special importance to households, corporations
and governments to ensure the right measures are taken in the event of an unexpected reces-
sion. Business cycle turning points are usually associated with increases in unemployment
and large declines in output and investment. Early detection models of such severe events
are of utmost significance and can help place the economy in a favorable position to guard
to some extent against some of the negative effects mentioned above. In that regard, there
has been a considerable number of academic papers in the past two decades or so that took
various approaches to predicting U.S. recessions. The majority of work on this topic involved
the use of univariate probit models to determine macroeconomic and financial variables that
are significant in predicting recessions. For example, Estrella and Mishkin (1996) find that
interest rate spread (10 year T-bond less three month T-bill) along with the three month
treasury bill are useful predictors of turning points in the business cycle. In another paper,
Estrella and Mishkin (1998) extend their analysis and test the predictive power of the stock
market and other money supply indicators in addition to the term spread. They find that
stock prices are useful at a horizon of one to three quarters. Later on, Wright (2006) shows
1
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that after including the term-spread, controlling for the fed-funds rate gives a better in-
sample fit and a better performance out-of-sample. Kauppi and Saikkonen (2008) introduce
a dynamic component in the model and find that lagging the probability of a recession vari-
able can yield superior results compared to a more classic static probit model. In more recent
work, Liu and Moench (2016) revisits the classic leading indicators previously proposed in
other papers and reassesses the performance of these models through receiving operating
characteristic (ROC) curves. 1
The last decade has brought a plethora of macroeconomic and financial data available for
researchers to work on and design more sophisticated modeling approaches. One good exam-
ple in this sense is the free dataset from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (FRED). As
a result, it became possible to shift from estimating simple probits with just leading macro
and financial indicators to more complex models that include static or dynamic factors built
from these larger datasets. The purpose of these newer techniques was to induce models
to capture more macroeconomic information that would have been omitted otherwise. One
of the first papers to introduce this approach was Chen et al. (2011) who estimated U.S.
business cycle turning points by making use of common factors and showed in real-time
simulations the advantages of such methods. A similar paper is Fossati (2015) which also
builds dynamic factors that summarize interest rate, output and stock market variables from
FRED and shows that factor-augmented probit models have a better fit compared to the
more parsimonious models with only leading indicators. Taking a comparable econometric
approach, Christiansen et al. (2014) finds that sentiment variables offer a higher predictive
power for U.S. recessions in addition to other important macro factors. Bayesian approaches
have been adopted by Fornaro (2016) who uses a methodology with shrinkage in the param-
eters to collapse all available macro data and estimate an augmented probit model that does
1The list of other important papers on this topic also include Chauvet and Potter (2005), Dueker et al.
(1997), Hamilton (2011), Kim and Nelson (1998), Ng (2014), and Ng (2012)
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well compared to a more simple specification.
In light of the most recent global financial crisis, another branch of empirical macroeconomics
has started to question the effects of financial deepening and excess credit on the health of
the world economy. This triggered economists to look specifically at the role of bank credit
in business cycles and financial crises. Mendoza and Terrones (2012) identify credit booms
in a panel of 61 emerging and industrial economies over the 1960-2012 period and find that
recessions and financial crises have a higher probability of happening as a result of a pro-
longed credit expansion. More evidence of how booms influence recessions is presented in
Jorda` et al. (2013) who show that credit-intensive expansions tend to be followed by deeper
recessions and sluggish recoveries. Within the credit boom literature, researchers have also
analyzed the importance of housing markets alongside bank credit. Mian and Sufi (2011)
showed that borrowing against the increase in home equity by homeowners lead to a high
number of defaults between 2006 and 2008. Anundsen et al. (2016) proves empirically in a
panel of 16 OECD countries how important house prices and credit are in the likelihood of
a financial crisis. More recently, Ponka (2017) estimates a static probit model augmented
with macro factors and various credit variables to show the importance of credit spreads in
forecasting recessions.
What I propose to do in this paper is to build on these two strands of literature and esti-
mate a model that tests the usefulness of credit booms in predicting U.S. business cycles.
While there has been a considerable amount of evidence to provide motivation as to why
it is important to monitor credit booms in both emerging and industrialized countries, the
role of credit in forecasting U.S. business cycles has not been analyzed extensively. My
contribution is different since I propose to study credit booms and recessions jointly in a
bivariate-autoregressive probit system. These types of models have been initially proposed
in Kauppi and Saikkonen (2008) and extended to a bivariate case in Nyberg (2014). Modeling
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business and credit cycles together allows for a more in depth analysis of their contempo-
raneous relationship, and also takes into account any interdependence that could be useful
in predicting crises. My results suggest that credit booms are a significant predictor of
recessions in the United States at the six- and nine-month horizon; overall, the bivariate
model gives a better in-sample fit compared to a more parsimonious model where we do not
consider the effect of credit booms or the housing market. Furthermore, the bivariate model
does a better job at forecasting out-of-sample the most recent credit-driven recession than
its univariate counterpart. Another interesting exercise is to compute the partial effects that
quantify the contribution of credit booms on U.S. recessions. Thus, I am able to trace the
impact of excess credit on economic downturns over time and identify the recessions where
credit booms played a more influential role. All models point towards the fact that credit
booms alongside the housing market became more valuable indicators over the past two re-
cessions in the United States. The model suggests that on average, a credit boom occurring
six months prior increases the probability of recession by about three points.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 discusses the identification of re-
cessions and credit booms in the United States. Section 1.3 establishes the estimation and
interpretation of macro factors. In Section 1.4 I introduce the autoregressive bivariate model
and parameter estimation. Section 1.5 discusses the in-sample and out-of-sample results.
Finally, Section 1.6 concludes.
1.2 Identification of U.S. recessions and credit booms
Identification of credit booms has been thoroughly discussed in Mendoza and Terrones
(2012), and Schularick and Taylor (2012). Other relevant papers in this area are Dell’Ariccia
et al. (2012), Dell’Ariccia et al. (2014), and Crowe et al. (2013). Most researchers would
agree that booms are periods of extraordinary credit growth, or deviations from a long-term
CHAPTER 1. DO CREDIT BOOMS PREDICT U.S. RECESSIONS? 5
trend. This definition is closely dependent on the method applied to detrend the data which
in most cases was assumed to be a two- or one-sided HP filter. Since credit booms have
been for the most part studied in the context of panel of industrial or emerging market
economies, most papers relied on bank-credit to GDP as their main measure of liquidity. To
study cross-country comparisons in credit cycles, normalization by GDP was necessary.
Since the purpose of this paper is to study credit cycles and business cycles jointly in the
United States, I adopt a novel identification methodology as in Richter et al. (2017). Since
my concern is with identifying credit booms only in the U.S. and not to compare across coun-
tries, I did not normalize the measure of credit by GDP. Thus, real private bank-credit per
capita represents the main credit variable. Bank-credit data was from the H.8. database of
the Board of Governors of the Fed, and it includes all types of credit ranging from consumer
loans, to commercial and industrial loans and real estate loans. The CPI data was from the
Bureau of Labor Statistics under the identification code ”CPIAUCSL”. All series are sea-
sonally adjusted on a monthly basis ranging from January 1960 to December 2012. Denote
the log of real private credit per capita as lt, where lt = log(
CREDITt
CPIt
∗ 100), where Creditt
is the sum of commercial, industrial and real estate loans. A breakdown of these loans is
shown in Figure 3.1. Hamilton (2017) argues that regressing a non-stationary variable at
time t + h on its four most recent values and then computing the residuals is a viable way
to extract the cyclical component for any process. Most booms are considered to be upward
deviations from trend. The trend can be thought as a linear process or a linear expectation
of real-private bank credit per capita lt made at time t − h about its future value at time
t. In order to extract the cyclical component or deviations from trend, I employ a rolling
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estimation of (1.1)2:
lt = α0 + α1lt−h + α2lt−h−1 + α3lt−h−2 + α4lt−h−3 + νt (1.1)
The value for h can be selected based on how far ahead expectations are formed. Similar
to Richter et al. (2017) I fix h = 36 months that corresponds to forming expectations about
future values of bank-credit three years ahead. Figure 3.2 shows the results of the regression
where the expected values (fitted) are plotted against the actual values. Credit booms
tend to form when the actual realization of real private-credit per capita is higher than its
expected counterpart. Thus, the higher the gap between the lines, the higher the chance of
credit booms forming. As noted in Mendoza and Terrones (2012) the occurrence of booms
in bank-credit coincides with big events such as the Bretton Woods collapse or the energy
crises in the 1970s and the sub-prime loan crisis in late 2007. Moreover, a lot of these booms
appear to be reaching a peak prior to the months where recessions start as indicated by the
shaded gray bars. Hence, it is natural to wonder what is the contribution of these booms in
the occurrence of each turning point in the business cycle and if we can use that information
for predictive purposes. Once the regression in (1.1) is estimated, I save the residuals and
standardize them. The residuals (νˆt) from the regression represent the de-trended real bank
credit per capita. According to Hamilton (2017), the residuals should be stationary3. As in
Richter et al. (2017), I define a credit boom as follows:
Ct = I
(
νˆt
σ(νˆt)
≥ k
)
2By adding more lags to the equation, the results don’t change at all. Hamilton (2017) argues that such
modifications are completely unnecessary for the goal of extracting a stationary component, and have the
significant drawback that the more parameters estimated by regression, the more the small-sample results are
likely to differ from the asymptotic predictions. In addition, the aggregate bank loan series is deseasonalized,
hence there is no need for that additional step.
3This was easily verified by applying a Dickey-Fuller test. Results are available upon request.
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where k represents the threshold or the number of standard deviations above the mean. The
default value I choose is k = 0.75, but the value can be flexible based on how far one would
want to set the deviation from the trend in order to identify a credit boom. Thus Ct = 1 if
the standardized value of the residual in (1.1) exceeds k, and 0 otherwise. Figure 3.3 shows
the normalized real bank credit per capita. For the initial threshold of k = 0.75, strong
sequences of credit booms can be noticed especially before the 1973 and 2008 recession.
While other booms were developing in the mid 1980s and late 1990s, it is not obvious that
they continued until the start of the recessions. In fact, successive fed-funds rate hikes in
the last part of the 1980s and then in the early 2000’s triggered an overall de-leveraging in
the U.S. economy. As a result, the impact of these particular credit booms on the recession
of 1990 is not as clear as in the case of the 2008 recession. Recessions are defined using the
NBER dates, which may be be found on the NBER website4. Using the definition described
above, Table 3.1 shows a cross tabulation of booms and recession in the United States since
the 1960s. From the contemporaneous occurrence of credit booms and recessions together
over the length of the time series, I identify a total of 187 months when aggregate bank loans
were above the threshold. Out of that total, 168 occurred independently of recessions and
19 took place during recessionary months. Then I lagged the credit binary variable to count
the number of credit booms which occurred six and nine months before recessions. There
was a total of 29 booms that had developed six months ahead of recession episodes, and 32
booms which took place nine months ahead of recessions.
1.3 Data and Macro Factors
Estimation of macro factors from big datasets has become fairly standard in finance and
applied macroeconomics papers. For example, Stock and Watson (1988) estimate principle
4https://www.nber.org/cycles.html
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components to derive a single economic indicator that is shown to lead the business cycle.
Similarly, principal components have been widely used in forecasting models with a large
number of predictors. Examples of such models include Stock and Watson (2002a), Stock
and Watson (2002b), Stock and Watson (2006), Ng (2012) and Ng (2014).
An alternative to estimating and selecting factors from a large aggregated dataset is to divide
it into balanced panels, each including variables that describe a specific area of the economy.
Then, estimation and selection of principal components will be carried on each group of
macro variables. McCracken and Ng (2016) have put together a database from FRED,
with monthly data ranging from January 1960 onward. The complete database is shown in
Appendix 1.6. I consider four of their panels of indicators and estimate static factors from
each one separately: 1) an output factor comprised of output and sales variables denoted
PC1t− [output]; 2) a labor market factor that includes labor market variables, PC2t− [empl];
3) a housing factor, PC3t− [housing]; 4) a money and credit factor , PC4t− [money/credit].
While principal components that relate to output, income and employment have proven
useful in predicting business cycles as in Fossati (2015) and Christiansen et al. (2014), we
need to also consider predictors that drive credit booms. Richter et al. (2017) show that
money stock variables such as M1 or M2 and housing prices contain significant predictive
power in the formation of credit booms. In that regard, I estimate principal components
from the money and credit panel and also from the panel that includes housing variables
such as housing starts and permits (complete list is in Appendix 1.6). In principle, these two
factors should be the main drivers of credit expansions since a large proportion of bank loans
consist of real estate loans. Estimation of principal components is done in a fairly standard
way. For each group, I estimate a static factor. Let Xit be a panel of dimension TN with
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i = 1, 2, . . . , N and t = 1, 2, . . . , T that takes the factor structure
Xit = λiFt + it (1.2)
X︸︷︷︸
TN
= F︸︷︷︸
T r
λ︸︷︷︸
r N
+ ︸︷︷︸
TN
(1.3)
where F represents a T × r matrix of static factors and Λ is a N × r of factor loadings.
The corresponding factor in F for each small panel is the eigenvector corresponding to the
highest eigenvalue of X ′X explaining the highest amount of variance in the respective panel.
Prior to estimation, each variable is transformed the appropriate way in order to ensure
stationarity5. An alternative to this methodology would have been to estimate dynamic
factors where one could have introduced some time dependence in the factor representation
or residuals in equation (1.3). Since the main focus of the paper is to evaluate the effect of
credit booms in forecasting recessions and not necessarily compare predictive performance
of dynamic against static factors, I only consider the latter representation.
1.4 Econometric Model
1.4.1 Model Description
To model business and credit cycles jointly, it is necessary to consider a multivariate system
for binary outcomes. As a result, I chose as a base model a slightly modified case of Nyberg
(2014) who initially proposed the bivariate autoregressive probit to study the transmission of
business cycle linkages from U.S. to Germany and vice versa. The two discrete time series are
represented by Rt and Ct, t = 1, 2, . . . , T . Let Rt denote the outcome of recession if equal to
1 and expansion if equal to 0; similarly, Ct will be equal to 1 if the economy is experiencing a
5I follow McCracken and Ng (2016) and apply transformations as described in Appendix 1.6 where the
codes given in the ”Transformation” column correspond to their ”tcode”.
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credit expansion (credit boom) and 0 otherwise. Identification of credit booms was discussed
in detail in section 1.2. Then, the bivariate system (Rt, Ct) conditional on the information
set Ωt−h follows a bivariate Bernoulli distribution:
(Rt, Ct)|Ωt−h ∼ B2(P11,t, P10,t, P01,t, P00,t)
where
P00,t = Pt−h(Rt = 0, Ct = 0) ;P01,t = Pt−h(Rt = 0, Ct = 1)
P10,t = Pt−h(Rt = 1, Ct = 0) ;P11,t = Pt−h(Rt = 1, Ct = 1)
and the following should hold at each time period t:
P00,t + P01,t + P10,t + P11,t = 1 (1.4)
Then the outcome probability of a recession, Rt = 1 is:
P1t = Pt−h(Rt = 1) = P11,t + P10,t (1.5)
and the outcome probability of a credit boom, Ct = 1 is:
P2t = Pt−h(Ct = 1) = P11,t + P01,t (1.6)
In order to jointly estimate the binary outcomes above we need to specify a functional
form for the two respective probabilities and choose the appropriate link function. As in
Nyberg (2014) and Kauppi and Saikkonen (2008), I chose the normal distribution. Since
later on I want to evaluate and quantify the partial effects of credit booms, taking derivatives
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of the bivariate cumulative distribution function is relatively straightforward. The joint
probabilities can be computed as follows:
P00,t = Pt−h(Rt = 0, Ct = 0) = Φ2(−pi1t,−pi2t, ρ)
P01,t = Pt−h(Rt = 0, Ct = 1) = Φ2(−pi1t, pi2t,−ρ)
P10,t = Pt−h(Rt = 1, Ct = 0) = Φ2(pi1t,−pi2t,−ρ)
P11,t = Pt−h(Rt = 1, Ct = 1) = Φ2(pi1t, pi2t, ρ)
where Φ2(.) represents the bivariate normal cumulative distribution function with zero means
and unit variances, ρ is the correlation coefficient and ranges between -1 and 1, and pijt,
j = 1, 2 is a linear projection of predictors in Xt−h. One can think of the pijt as the latent
variables in a standard probit model. However, since we need to define a mechanism process
for P1t and P2t through pi1t and pi2t, the linear model can be written as a vector-autoregressive
system of order h (VAR(h)) but without including any of the terms with lags up to h:
 pi1t
pi2t
 =
 ω1
ω2
+
A11 A12
A21 A22

 pi1,t−h
pi2,t−h
+
X ′1,t−h 0
0 X ′2,t−h

 β1
β2
 (1.7)
In matrix form, the system above can be represented as follows:
pit = ω + Apit−h +Xt−hβ (1.8)
where pit =
 pi1t
pi2t
 , ω =
 ω1
ω2
, A =
A11 A12
A21 A22
, Xt−h =
X ′1,t−h 0
0 X ′2,t−h
 and
β =
 β1
β2
.
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In this context pi1t represents a linear expression of variables in X1,t−h that drive the reces-
sion probability, while pi2t is a linear projection of the macro variables that lead the credit
cycle. The autoregressive feature of the system comes from the matrix of paramaters A.
A big advantage of this model stands in its flexibility of specification and straightforward
estimation. As noted in Nyberg (2014), by imposing certain restrictions on matrix A one
can reduce the model to either a simple autoregressive probit or even a simple probit. For
example, in the interest of estimating the effect of a credit boom on the probability of re-
cession, the sign and statistical significance of parameter A12 will be of great importance.
Similarly, by imposing A12 = 0, a comparison in the fit of the unrestricted and restricted
models can verify statistically if credit booms in the bivariate system improve the prediction
power of the model compared to its univariate counterpart.
1.4.2 Maximum Likelihood Estimation
We employ a maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) approach to compute parameters in
equation (1.8). Given θ = [ω′, vec(A)′, β′, ρ], maximization of these parameters is done over
the following likelihood function:
LL(θ) =
T∑
t=1
lt(θ) =
T∑
t=1
[
RtCtlog(P11,t(θ)) +Rt(1− Ct)log(P10,t(θ)+
(1−Rt)Ctlog(P01,t(θ) + (1− Ct)(1−Rt)log(P00,t(θ)
] (1.9)
The gradient st(θ) of the likelihood function will be the first-derivative w.r.t to all parameters
in θ. For computation purposes, I proceed as in Nyberg (2014) and divide the parameter
space θ into components θ1 and θ2, where θ1 are the parameters in the specification of
pi1t and θ2 are related to the equation of pi2t in system (1.7). The values of s1t(θ1) =[
∂lt
∂ω1
; ∂lt
∂A11
; ∂lt
∂A12
; ∂lt
∂β1
]
will be contingent upon the realizations of Rt and Ct and thus we can
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have four possible realizations. Details of the derivation of the score function are presented
in Appendix 1.6. The score function is then:
st(θ) = [s1t(θ1)
′ s2t(θ2)′ s3t(ρ)]
Under certain stability conditions, maximization of the log-likelihood function in (1.9) gives
the estimate θˆ for which
∑T
t=1 st(θˆ) = 0. The requirements of stability are very similar to
the ones of a vector-autoregressive (VAR) of lag p. Equation (1.8) can be re-parametrized
as a VAR(1) process, and the eigenvalues of the respective companion matrix F should be
inside the unit circle 6. In order for θˆ to be a feasible solution it should satisfy the first order
condition and stability requirements imposed on the companion matrix. The asymptotic
properties of the MLE estimator will hold under the stationarity property of the macro
factors discussed in section 1.3. Thus, the asymptotic distribution of θˆ is:
T
1
2 (θˆ − θ) D−−→ N(0, J(θ)−1I(θ)J(θ)−1) (1.10)
To account for possible misspecification, I follow Kauppi and Saikkonen (2008) and estimate
the covariance matrix using a Newey-West modification. To compute the robust standard
6The system in (1.8) can be written as:
pit = ω + Fpit−1 +Qβ
where pit =

pit
pit−1
pit−2
...
pit−h+1
, ω =

ω
0
0
...
0
 , F =

O2 O2 . . . O2 A
I2 O2 . . . O2 O2
O2 I2 . . . O2 O2
...
O2 O2 . . . I2 O2
 and Q =

Xt−h
O2
O2
...
O2

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errors, we replace consistent estimates of J(θ) and I(θ) in equation (1.10) with:
J(θˆ) = T−1
T∑
t=1
∂2lt(θˆ)
∂θ∂θ′
I(θˆ) = T−1
( T∑
t=1
sˆtsˆt
′ +
T−1∑
j=1
ωTj
T∑
t=j+1
(sˆtsˆ
′
t−j + sˆt−j sˆt
′)
)
where ωTj = k(
j
mT
) represents the Parzen kernel function and mT =
⌊
4( T
100
)
2
9
⌋
was selected
as in Newey and West (1987). Then the corrected standard errors are given by the sample
covariance matrix J(θˆ)−1I(θˆ)J(θˆ)−1.
1.4.3 Forecast Methodology and Evaluation
Kauppi and Saikkonen (2008) and Nyberg (2014) derive an explicit formula to compute the
h period forecast based on information available at time t − h. Since the model in (1.8)
uses the same lag order on both the endogenous variables and the explanatory variables, this
permits a direct forecasting approach. For example the prediction for all possible realizations
of the respective probabilities at t+ h given information at time t is:
Pt(y1t+h = 1, y2t+h = 1) = Φ2(pi1t+h, pi2t+h, ρ)
Pt(y1t+h = 1, y2t+h = 0) = Φ2(pi1t+h,−pi2t+h,−ρ)
Pt(y1t+h = 0, y2t+h = 1) = Φ2(−pi1t+h, pi2t+h,−ρ)
Pt(y1t+h = 0, y2t+h = 0) = Φ2(−pi1t+h,−pi2t+h, ρ)
where
pˆit+h = ωˆ + Aˆpit +Xtβˆ (1.11)
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I use the relationship in (1.11) to calculate the out-of-sample forecast. For the out-of-sample
forecast, I set a cutoff date and estimate θˆ using information up until t . That implies that
the credit boom variable Ct and recession variable Rt are only estimated until the cutoff
date. Then, the out-of-sample forecast t + h through T is generated without updating the
parameters. I only update the macro factors that are estimated recursively during each
month in the out-of-sample window.
To facilitate model comparison for the in-sample estimation, various popular criteria for
discrete choice models are evaluated. First, I consider McFadden’s pseudo-R2 which is defined
as:
R2MF = 1−
L̂L
LL0
(1.12)
where L̂L is the value of the log-likelihood at the solution θˆ and LL0 is the log-likelihood
evaluated only with constant terms. Another criterion employed is the BIC which is defined
as:
BIC = L̂L+ log
(
TK
2
)
(1.13)
where K represents the number of parameters in θˆ and T is the number of observations. The
third measure is the the quadratic probability score (QPS) calculated for both recessions and
credit booms:
QPSr =
1
T
T∑
t=1
2(Rt − P1t)2 (1.14)
QPSc =
1
T
T∑
t=1
2(Ct − P2t)2 (1.15)
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The closer the QPS is to 0, the better the performance of the respective model. The fourth
measure employed is the percentage of correct predictions denoted by CR50%. The threshold
value considered is 0.5, hence if P1t is greater than 50% then Rˆt = 1, otherwise Rˆt = 0.
Finally, I compare the performance of a subset of the models using Receiving Operation
Curves (ROC) as in Liu and Moench (2016):
1. Let Pˆ1t = Pˆ11,t + Pˆ10,t be the model probability prediction of a recession and Rt the
actual recession realization.
2. Define an interval I of evenly spaced threshold values in interval [0,1] on which we test
the prediction in the previous step. In this study, I is set to 1000.
3. For each threshold Ij, record the prediction results Rˆt according to the rule:
Rˆt =
1, if Pˆt ≥ Ij0, otherwise
4. Compute the percentage of true positives (TP) and false positives (FP) as defined
below:
TP =
1
nR
T∑
t=1
ITPt , FP =
1
nE
T∑
t=1
IFPt
where ITPt =
1, if Rt = 1, Rˆt = 10, otherwise , IFPt =
1, if Rt = 0, Rˆt = 10, otherwise , nR is the total number
or months that the economy is in a recession and nE is the number of months the economy
was in an expansion.
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1.5 Results
1.5.1 In-Sample Results
The Effect of Credit Booms on U.S. Recessions
I evaluate the model on the prediction of U.S. recessions from January 1960 to December
20127. The recession indicator Rt was determined by the turning points of the business
cycles as defined by the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER). The credit boom
indicator Ct was obtained from the regression in equation (1.1) as described in section 1.2.
The spread and the macro factors are also estimated over the same time frame using the
methodology described in section 1.3. I examine the predictability power of credit booms
and macro factors over recessions from six up to nine months ahead. For the in-sample
analysis, I consider a total of five specifications and compare their performance using the
McFadden R2 along with the QPS and the CR50%. For each forecast horizon the results are
organized in separate tables for comparison purposes. Since I am estimating the bivariate
system in equation (1.7), I need to consider regressors in X1t that directly affect the business
cycle indicator Rt, as well as regressors in X2t that impact credit booms Ct. Across all
specifications, drivers for the credit boom indicator do not change. I selected a housing
factor PC3t and a money/credit factor PC4t to be the main drivers of credit booms
8. A
strong motivation for considering the housing factor is that mortgages and loans represent
on average about 26% of all bank credit over the time period considered. The proportion
of housing loans in commercial bank credit has had considerable time variation from the
early 1960s. Figure 3.1 shows a time-series plot of mortgage loans as a percentage of total
bank credit over time. If in the 1970s and 1980s bank loans comprised around 20% of the
total bank portfolio, in the 2000s that number was getting closer to 40%. Hence, bank
7I also extended the estimation until December 2016 but no other significant results emerged.
8I tested several specification of simple probit models with just Ct and only the housing factor PC3t and
money/credit factor PC4t emerged as significant.
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loans directed towards purchases of houses have become a greater risk source for potential
credit crunches and defaults. The second factor considered, PC4t is equally significant since
variables such as money stock M1 and M2 typically grow with the expansion of various types
of loans and credit. This observation follows from previous results of Mendoza and Terrones
(2012) and Richter et al. (2017) where they identify the money supply to be a significant
predictor of credit booms in a panel of countries that includes the U.S. as well.
I generate in-sample forecasts at horizons of six and nine months which correspond to the
length of two and three quarters. While six months is a popular choice for forecasting
windows in the business cycle literature, 9 nine months has not been considered very often.
Since 12 months may be considered a little too ambitious to attempt an accurate forecast,
10 I decided to go with a more intermediate term of nine months. Table 3.2 illustrates the
results of in-sample prediction six months ahead. The first specification is in the spirit of
Estrella and Mishkin (1998) where I just considered the effect of the interest rate spread
in the system along with the money and housing factor. The coefficient is negative and
significant which is consistent with previous results in the literature. After including the
effect of credit booms, the spread continues to be a significant predictor for recessions. More
importantly, the coefficient on the credit boom A12 is positive and significant supporting
the initial claim that excess credit has an influential effect on U.S. recessions. The value
on the coefficient stays robust around 0.22 across all five specifications. In general, all
parameters in matrix A of equation (1.8) are significant with the appropriate signs. The
coefficient A11 which represents the lagged probability of recession is not only positive and
significant but also high which reinforces previous results in Kauppi and Saikkonen (2008)
and Nyberg (2014). They show that recession probabilities display a strong autoregressive
9See Kauppi and Saikkonen (2008),Ng (2012), Fossati (2015), Christiansen et al. (2014) among many
others.
10See Ng (2014) and Berge and Jorda` (2011).
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feature, which means that downturns in the business cycle don’t happen in isolation and
tend to occur in successive time periods. Additionally, A21, which represents the effect
of contemporaneous credit booms on previous recessions, is negative and significant. This
negative effect is consistent with the observation that after periods of recessions, the economy
typically deleverages and follows a period of recovery when consumers and firms are more
cautious in their borrowing habits. Thus, the probability of a credit boom occurring in
month t is lower if the economy was in a recession six (t− 6) or nine (t− 9) months before.
Finally, A22 is positive and strongly significant which indicates that credit booms also exhibit
an important autoregressive component consistent with the idea that booms don’t occur as
short-lived spikes but tend to persist across sequential time periods just as recessions. The
second specification in Table 3.2 is similar to Wright (2006) and adds the effect of a monthly
change in federal funds rate in addition to the interest spread. Since adding the effect of the
prime rate does not significantly increase the fit of the model, the effect of credit booms on
recessions continues to stay positive and significant. The spread also stays significant. In
the third specification, I included PC1t - output in addition to the spread and the federal
funds rate. Fossati (2015) finds that factor-augmented probit models are superior to simple
probits both in-sample and out-of-sample. Specifically, he finds that the output and stock
market factors in addition to more classic indicators improve the fit significantly. In the
current specification, PC1t is not significant; however, the credit boom variable maintains
its positive value and significance in the system. One possible explanation for the redundancy
of the output factor is the autoregressive feature of the model which may cancel out the effect
of this factor.
As shown in Table 3.2, inclusion of the output factor in model three does not add any
predictive power over previous specifications that include only the spread or both the spread
and the federal funds rate. For example the QPS and CR50% in model one are 0.41 and
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0.87, numbers that do not change neither in model two nor in model three. The question
that arises as a result is whether higher order moments of these large dataset factors add
predictive power to the model. An example of such an empirical attempt can be found in
Ludvigson and Ng (2007) who find that polynomial bases of macro factors are significant
in forecasting stock returns. Gorodnichenko and Ng (2017) study the effect of second-order
moments or volatility shocks and their effect on business cycles. As an application to my
paper, I experimented with the second moment of the output factor which was calculated
as the square of PC1t. In the fourth specification, the volatility of the output factor PC
2
1t is
significant and improves the Mc-Fadden R2 by over two percentage points over the first three
models. Moreover, the CR50%R goes up by about two percentage points as well. Overall, all
measures of fit in model four indicate a stronger performance. The coefficient on the lagged
credit boom remains positive and significant reinforcing once more the initial hypothesis of
the paper and proving the robustness of this effect across various empirical tests. The last
specification includes an interaction term between the output factor PC1t and labor market
factor PC2t which turns out to be important as well. The fifth specification gives the lowest
BIC and QPS amongst the rest of competing models. Figure 3.4 illustrates the plots of
the recession probability of the bivariate autoregressive model at a six month prediction
horizon. Overall, models (4), and (5) posses the best fit with the lowest BICs and QPSs and
the highest CR50%s. When increasing the estimation window to nine months (h = 9) the
results stay quite robust. This can be observed in Table 3.3 where the coefficients on the
credit boom probability continue to stay significant in all specifications, and the volatility
along with the interaction of the factors increase the fit of the models as shown previously.
Model (5) had the best prediction power among all other considered specifications. Figure 3.5
plots all specifications at a prediction window of nine months. To consolidate the idea that
excess credit along with the housing market factor are important in the prediction of U.S.
business cycles, in Table 3.4 I compare measures of fit for restricted models that do not
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account for credit booms or the housing factor against their unrestricted counterparts. I
restrict the model in two ways: first, by imposing A12 = 0 in equation (1.7) and thus not
allowing for credit booms to have a direct effect on the probability of recession, and second by
enforcing a zero in β2 corresponding to the position of PC3t or the housing factor. In terms
of fit, models that ignore the direct effect of excess loans and the housing factor generally
have a worse fit at both a six and nine month horizons. The Mc-Fadden R2 is 15 percentage
points lower on average across all specifications. Other in-sample fit measures reinforce this
finding. A graphical illustration of this finding is shown in Figure 3.6 where I plotted the
ROC curves to show the loss in fit experienced by these restricted models. The less desirable
fit present in all five specifications shows that by omitting the effect of credit booms and/or
housing factor one would run the potential risk of missing on important information, which
seemed to be the case of the Great Recession.
As an additional robustness test to verify the stability of the parameters which identify the
lead-lag relationship between business cycles and credit cycles, specifcation (2) in Table 3.2
is estimated for horizons of 3 months and up to 12 months. Results in Table 3.5 prove
that the effect of the credit boom probability stays strong at short-, medium- and long-
term horizons. The interest-rate spread, the housing factor and money/credit factor remain
significant. While the persistence of credit booms and recession probabilities decrease as the
forecast horizon h increases, my results indicate that the contribution of a financial disaster
probability in the recession probability is higher by a factor of two for prediction windows
of four months or higher.
Partial Effects Credit Booms
So far, all evidence points towards the fact that credit booms have an important effect on
U.S. recessions. Naturally, the next step would be to attempt to quantify this effect over
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the length of the time series. As a result, I computed the partial effects of the probability
of recession from equation (1.5) with respect to the lagged credit boom variable. Partial
effects can be computed as in a regular probit model by differentiating with respect to
the variables representing lagged recessions and credit booms. Derivations for the partial
derivative of the probability of recession with respect to pi1,t−h, pi2,t−h and the explanatory
variables X1,t−h, X2,t−h can be found in Appendix 1.6.
The average partial effects of excess credit can be computed by just taking a mean of the
marginal effects γˆ2t over the length of the time series:
γ2 =
1
T
T∑
t=1
γˆ2t (1.16)
The standard error of the average partial effect was calculated using the delta method. Since
γ is a function of the parameters in θ, one can take a first-order Taylor approximation of the
form
γ(θˆ) ≈ γ(θ) + ∂γ(θˆ)
∂θˆ
′
(θˆ − θ) (1.17)
It can be shown that:
√
T [γ(θ)− γ(θˆ)] D−→ N
(
0,
∂γ(θˆ)
∂θˆ
′
Σθˆ
∂γ(θˆ)
∂θˆ
)
(1.18)
In Table 3.6, for each of the models, I computed both of the average partial effects: one with
respect to the lagged probability of recession and the other with respect to the lagged prob-
ability of credit booms. Models show that on average, a credit boom occurring six months
prior increases the probability of recession by about three percentage points. Figure 3.7
traces the effect of credit booms γ2t and the housing factor PC3t across the length of the
time series. The effect of credit booms along with signals stemming from the housing market
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appear to be the strongest during the 1973-1975, 2001 and 2007-2009 recessions. Evidence
of credit booms around these periods was also found in Mendoza and Terrones (2012). The
early 1970s boom stemmed concurrently with the collapse of the Bretton-Woods system,
followed by the second half of the 1990s which also coincided with a period of excess lending
and finally the credit booms associated with the early 2000s where the focus was on excessive
mortgage lending. Moreover, to show the growing importance of signals from the credit and
housing markets in the past two recessions, I split the sample at year 2000. On average,
in years post 2000 there is an increase of about 50 basis points in the marginal effect of
these booms. More of this evidence can be seen in Figure 3.7, where one can observe clearly
how much more important excess lending along with the housing factor became in correctly
signaling the past two business cycle changes. These results reinforce previous findings of
Prieto et al. (2016) who also argue that housing shocks have become more important for the
real economy since the early 2000s. Moving forward, this suggests that greater consideration
should be given to uncontrolled credit expansions signaling downturns in the business cycle.
1.5.2 Out of Sample Results
This section examines the out-of-sample performance of the model, specifically with a focus
on the most recent recession. Similarly to Nyberg (2014), due to the limited availability of
credit and business cycles, we focus only on the last credit-driven recession that started in
early 2007. The forecast methodology was presented in sub-section 1.4.3 along with the loss
measures to be used for comparison purposes. I estimate the parameters using data until
December 2004, and then I compute the first forecast for June 2005 when h = 6 months or
for September 2005 when h = 9 months. Out-of-sample forecasts are then carried without
updating the parameters. By doing this, I implicitly assume that the state of the economy is
known at time t and we only update the data on macro factors. Table 3.7 shows the out-of-
sample results of the model when the forecast window was chosen to be six months. Similar
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to the in-sample results, models four and five deliver the best performance out-of-sample as
well. Model five which includes the interaction term between the output and labor factors
has a CR50%R of about 94%, while model four which contains the volatility of the output
factor has a CR50%R of roughly 95%. Figure 3.8 shows that the out-of-sample forecast of the
recession probability peaks right at the beginning of the recession. This is not surprising
considering the results of the partial effects carried in the prior section. The effect of the
credit boom that started in the mid 2000s reached a peak right at the beginning of the Great
Recession. This can be seen in the out-of-sample forecast particularly for specifications four
and five. When I change the forecast window to nine months, results stay fairly robust.
Figure 3.9 illustrates that models four and five continue to have the best performance with
CR50%R s of 94%, and 95% respectively. In addition these models also achieve the lowest
QPS. How would this out-of-sample forecasting exercise perform in the absence of the effect
of credit booms and the housing factor? To evaluate that, similar to the in-sample analysis
I restrict the impact of the lagged probability of credit booms on the recession probability
and the effect of the housing factor. In the in-sample part, this restriction deteriorated the
fit of all models at all prediction horizons. For the out-of-sample exercise, Table 3.8 shows a
significant deterioration in the evaluation criteria as well. When taking into account the effect
of excess credit, almost all models show higher CR50%R s by an average of seven percentage
points and lower QPSs. These results stay robust even when I change the forecast horizon
from six months to nine months. Graphically this is shown in Figure 3.10 where it can be seen
that none of the recession probabilities in the restricted models surpass the 50% threshold.
In other words, a model that omitted signals from excess lending and an overheated housing
market would not have been able to pick up correctly changes in the business cycle. When
opting for alternative starting points in the out-of-sample forecast scheme, all measures of
fit stay robust. Table 3.9 shows that regardless of the starting month, Model 1 would have
been able to pick up the Great Recession correctly around 93% of the time.
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1.6 Conclusion
This paper presents an application of how credit booms, independent of other macro factors,
can be useful signals for U.S. recessions both in-sample and out-of-sample. I compare a
variety of multivariate binary models by their goodness of fit and their ability to predict
the most recent credit-driven downturn in the business cycle, the Great Recession. Tracing
the effect of booms over time, I show that excess credit alongside a factor meant to track
changes in the housing market have had a larger impact in business cycle downturns after
2000. On average, a credit boom occurring six months before, increases the probability of
recession by about three percentage points. Furthermore, although it was not the main
question of the paper, I also find evidence that the volatility of macro factors is a useful
predictor independent of the classic macro indicators such as the spread or the federal funds
rate. These results are comparable with what was shown in the literature before. Same
as in Mendoza and Terrones (2012), Schularick and Taylor (2012), Jorda` et al. (2013), I
find that credit booms are an important predictor of recessions in the United States after
controlling for the predictive power of other significant macro variables. Similar to Anundsen
et al. (2016), the paper finds evidence of the housing market role as a potential signal for
recession probabilities. Also, multivariate models tend to perform better than univariate
models particularly in the out-of-sample portion, as documented by Nyberg (2014).
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Appendix
A. Computation of the Score Function
In this appendix, I compute the elements of the score function that is used in the maximum
likelihood estimation. Below are the partial derivatives of the likelihood function evaluated
at all realizations of binary variables Rt and Ct:
1. Rt=0 and Ct=0
∂lt(θ)
∂θ1
∣∣∣∣(Rt = 0, Ct = 0) = 1Φ2(−pi1t,−pi2t, ρ)
[
φ(−pi1t)Φ
(−pi2t + pi1tρ√
1− ρ2
)(
− ∂pi1t
∂θ1
)
+
φ(−pi2t)Φ
(−pi1t + pi2tρ√
1− ρ2
)(
− ∂pi2t
∂θ1
)]
2. Rt=0 and Ct=1
∂lt(θ)
∂θ1
∣∣∣∣(Rt = 0, Ct = 1) = 1Φ2(−pi1t, pi2t,−ρ)
[
φ(−pi1t)Φ
(
pi2t − pi1tρ√
1− ρ2
)(
− ∂pi1t
∂θ1
)
+
φ(pi2t)Φ
(−pi1t + pi2tρ√
1− ρ2
)(
∂pi2t
∂θ1
)]
3. Rt=1 and Ct=0
∂lt(θ)
∂θ1
∣∣∣∣(Rt = 1, Ct = 0) = 1Φ2(pi1t,−pi2t,−ρ)
[
φ(pi1t)Φ
(−pi2t + pi1tρ√
1− ρ2
)(
∂pi1t
∂θ1
)
+
φ(−pi2t)Φ
(
pi1t − pi2tρ√
1− ρ2
)(
− ∂pi2t
∂θ1
)]
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4. Rt=1 and Ct=1
∂lt(θ)
∂θ1
∣∣∣∣(Rt = 1, Ct = 1) = 1Φ2(pi1t, pi2t, ρ)
[
φ(pi1t)Φ
(
pi2t − pi1tρ√
1− ρ2
)(
∂pi1t
∂θ1
)
+
φ(pi2t)Φ
(
pi1t − pi2tρ√
1− ρ2
)(
∂pi2t
∂θ1
)]
Notice that pi2t is also a function of θ1 through pi1,t−h in the vector-autoregressive system
(1.7). These partial derivatives can be computed recursively:
∂pi1t
∂θ1
=

∂pi1t
∂ω1
∂pi1t
A11
∂pi1t
A12
∂pi1t
β1

=

1 + A11
∂pi1,t−h
∂ω1
+ A12
∂pi2,t−h
∂ω1
pi1,t−h + A11
∂pi1,t−h
∂A11
+ A12
∂pi2,t−h
∂A11
pi2,t−h + A11
∂pi1,t−h
∂A12
+ A12
∂pi2,t−h
∂A12
X1,t−h + A11
∂pi1,t−h
∂β1
+ A12
∂pi2,t−h
∂β1

∂pi2t
∂θ1
=

∂pi2t
∂ω1
∂pi2t
∂A11
∂pi2t
∂A12
∂pi2t
∂β1

=

A21
∂pi1,t−h
∂ω1
+ A22
∂pi2,t−h
∂ω1
A21
∂pi1,t−h
∂A11
+ A22
∂pi2,t−h
∂A11
A21
∂pi1,t−h
∂A12
+ A22
∂pi2,t−h
∂A12
A21
∂pi1,t−h
∂β1
+ A22
∂pi2,t−h
∂β1

where in the case of t ≤ h, pi1t and pi2t are initiated to their unconditional means in system
(1.8). In a similar manner, the analytic form of s2t(θ2) =
[
∂lt
∂ω2
; ∂lt
∂A21
; ∂lt
∂A22
; ∂lt
∂β2
]
can be
obtained by replacing θ1 with θ2 in the vector of s1t(θ1) and
∂pi1t
∂θ2
, ∂pi2t
∂θ2
can be derived in a
similar way as the ones above. Finally the derivative of the log-likelihood w.r.t ρ:
1. Rt = 0 and Ct = 0
s3t(ρ) =
φ(−pi1t,−pi2t, ρ)
Φ2(−pi1t,−pi2t, ρ)
CHAPTER 1. DO CREDIT BOOMS PREDICT U.S. RECESSIONS? 28
2. Rt = 0 and Ct = 1
s3t(ρ) =
φ(−pi1t, pi2t,−ρ)
Φ2(−pi1t, pi2t,−ρ)
3. Rt = 1 and Ct = 0
s3t(ρ) =
φ(pi1t,−pi2t,−ρ)
Φ2(pi1t,−pi2t,−ρ)
4. Rt = 1 and Ct = 1
s3t(ρ) =
φ(pi1t, pi2t, ρ)
Φ2(pi1t, pi2t, ρ)
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B. Computation of Partial Effects
In this section, I compute the partial effects with respect to the lagged probability of credit
booms, recessions and
γˆ1t =
∂Pt−h(Rt = 1)
∂pi1,t−h
= A11
[
φ(pi1t)Φ
(
pi2t − ρpi1t√
1− ρ2
)
+ φ(pi1t)Φ
(−pi2t + ρpi1t√
1− ρ2
)]
= A11φ(pi1t)
γˆ2t =
∂Pt−h(Rt = 1)
∂pi2,t−h
= A12
[
φ(pi1t)Φ
(
pi2t − ρpi1t√
1− ρ2
)
+ φ(pi1t)Φ
(−pi2t + ρpi1t√
1− ρ2
)]
= A12φ(pi1t)
γˆX1t =
∂Pt−h(Rt = 1)
∂X1t
= β1φ(pi1t)
[
Φ
(
pi2t − ρpi1t√
1− ρ2
)
+ Φ
(−pi2t + ρpi1t√
1− ρ2
)]
= β1φ(pi1t)
γˆX2t =
∂Pt−h(Rt = 1)
∂X2t
= 2β2φ(pi2t)Φ
(
pi1t − ρpi2t√
1− ρ2
)
CHAPTER 1. DO CREDIT BOOMS PREDICT U.S. RECESSIONS? 30
C. Macro Data List
FRED Name Variable Name Transformation Grouping
RPI Real Personal Income 5 1 - Output and Income
W875RX1 Real personal income ex transfer receipts 5 1 - Output and Income
INDPRO IP Index 5 1 - Output and Income
IPFPNSS IP: Final Products and Nonindustrial Supplies 5 1 - Output and Income
IPFINAL IP: Final Products (Market Group) 5 1 - Output and Income
IPCONGD IP: Consumer Goods 5 1 - Output and Income
IPDCONGD IP: Durable Consumer Goods 5 1 - Output and Income
IPNCONGD IP: Nondurable Consumer Goods 5 1 - Output and Income
IPBUSEQ IP: Nondurable Consumer Goods 5 1 - Output and Income
IPMAT IP: Materials 5 1 - Output and Income
IPDMAT IP: Durable Materials 5 1 - Output and Income
IPNMAT IP: Nondurable Materials 5 1 - Output and Income
IPMANSICS IP: Manufacturing (SIC) 5 1 - Output and Income
IPB51222S IP: Residential Utilities 5 1 - Output and Income
IPFUELS IP: Fuels 5 1 - Output and Income
CUMFNS Capacity Utilization: Manufacturing 2 1 - Output and Income
CLF16OV Civilian Labor Force 5 2 - Labor Market
CE16OV Civilian Employment 5 2 - Labor Market
UNRATE Civilian Unemployment Rate 2 2 - Labor Market
UEMPMEAN Average Duration of Unemployment (Weeks) 2 2 - Labor Market
UEMPLT5 Civilians Unemployed - Less Than 5 Weeks 5 2 - Labor Market
UEMP5TO14 Civilians Unemployed for 5-14 Weeks 5 2 - Labor Market
UEMP15OV Civilians Unemployed - 15 Weeks & Over 5 2 - Labor Market
UEMP15T26 Civilians Unemployed for 15-26 Weeks 5 2 - Labor Market
UEMP27OV Civilians Unemployed for 27 Weeks and Over 5 2 - Labor Market
CLAIMSx Initial Claims 5 2 - Labor Market
PAYEMS All Employees: Total nonfarm 5 2 - Labor Market
USGOOD All Employees: Goods-Producing Industries 5 2 - Labor Market
CES1021000001 All Employees: Mining and Logging: Mining 5 2 - Labor Market
USCONS All Employees: Construction 5 2 - Labor Market
MANEMP All Employees: Manufacturing 5 2 - Labor Market
DMANEMP All Employees: Durable goods 5 2 - Labor Market
NDMANEMP All Employees: Nondurable goods 5 2 - Labor Market
SRVPRD All Employees: Service-Providing Industries 5 2 - Labor Market
USTPU All Employees: Trade, Transportation & Utilities 5 2 - Labor Market
USWTRADE All Employees: Wholesale Trade 5 2 - Labor Market
USTRADE All Employees: Retail Trade 5 2 - Labor Market
USFIRE All Employees: Financial Activities 5 2 - Labor Market
USGOVT All Employees: Government 5 2 - Labor Market
CES0600000007 Avg Hourly Earnings : Goods-Producing 1 2 - Labor Market
AWOTMAN Avg Weekly Overtime Hours : Manufacturing 2 2 - Labor Market
AWHMAN Avg Weekly Overtime Hours : Manufacturing 1 2 - Labor Market
CES0600000008 Avg Hourly Earnings : Goods-Producing 6 2 - Labor Market
CES2000000008 Avg Hourly Earnings : Construction 6 2 - Labor Market
CES3000000008 Avg Hourly Earnings : Manufacturing 6 2 - Labor Market
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FRED Name Variable Name Transformation Grouping
HOUST Housing Starts: Total New Privately Owned 4 3 - Housing Market
HOUSTNE Housing Starts, Northeast 4 3 - Housing Market
HOUSTMW Housing Starts, Midwest 4 3 - Housing Market
HOUSTS Housing Starts, South 4 3 - Housing Market
HOUSTW Housing Starts, West 4 3 - Housing Market
PERMIT New Private Housing Permits (SAAR) 4 3 - Housing Market
PERMITNE New Private Housing Permits, Northeast (SAAR) 4 3 - Housing Market
PERMITMW New Private Housing Permits, Northeast (SAAR) 4 3 - Housing Market
PERMITS New Private Housing Permits, Northeast (SAAR) 4 3 - Housing Market
PERMITW New Private Housing Permits, Northeast (SAAR) 4 3 - Housing Market
M1SL M1 Money Stock 6 5 - Money and Credit
M2SL M2 Money Stock 6 5 - Money and Credit
M2REAL Real M2 Money Stock 5 5 - Money and Credit
AMBSL St. Louis Adjusted Monetary Base 6 5 - Money and Credit
TOTRESNS Total Reserves of Depository Institutions 6 5 - Money and Credit
NONBORRES Reserves Of Depository Institutions 7 5 - Money and Credit
BUSLOANS Commercial and Industrial Loans 6 5 - Money and Credit
REALLN Real Estate Loans at All Commercial Banks 6 5 - Money and Credit
NONREVSL Total Nonrevolving Credit 6 5 - Money and Credit
CONSPI Nonrevolving consumer credit to Personal Income 2 5 - Money and Credit
MZMSL MZM Money Stock 6 5 - Money and Credit
DTCOLNVHFNM MZM Money Stock 6 5 - Money and Credit
DTCTHFNM
Total Consumer Loans and Leases
Outstanding
6 5 - Money and Credit
Chapter 2
Credit Fluctuations and Neglected
Crash Risk in U.S. Bank Returns
2.1 Introduction
The evolution of aggregate credit in the U.S. has been drawing a lot more attention from
economists in the wake of the Great Recession. Excessive bank loan expansion can have
devastating consequences on the economy of a country and there is now mounting evidence
to support this claim. The first wave of empirical literature on financial deepening sought to
establish the transmission channel of negative shocks propagating from an overly unstable
banking system to the real economy. For example, Schularick and Taylor (2012) suggest
that credit booms are a strong predictor of disasters and cannot be ignored by policymakers.
In another panel of 14 advanced economies, Jorda` et al. (2013) reinforces the same idea by
showing that credit-driven recessions are associated with larger losses in output and slower
recoveries. These severe consequences of credit booms also raise other important questions
as to which other stakeholders might be affected by such extreme events. One example are
investors who hold commercial bank stocks as part of their portfolios.
Commercial bank stocks incurred very large losses at the peak of the last recession in the
U.S., and that encouraged financial economists to attempt disentangle the underlying mech-
anism responsible for such a severe correction. Since these institutions are mainly concerned
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with providing liquidity to consumers, it casts doubt on whether fluctuations in credit im-
pact their value directly. Gandhi (2018) was first to approach this question and found that
a 1% increase in yearly credit growth lowers stock returns by almost 3% over the following
year with an R2 of 14%. This negative effect is interpreted as the representative investors’
response to a small time-varying probability of a tail event that impacts banks’ cash flows.
Baron and Xiong (2017) attribute the same negative relationship in a panel of 20 advanced
economies to new evidence of investor overoptimism fueled by loose credit conditions. The
puzzle of neglected crash risk adds to a long list of puzzles in asset pricing and can be sum-
marized as investors’ lack of reaction to the increasing probability of a tail event occurring in
the future due to uncontrolled credit growth. If economic agents anticipated the possibility
of a financial crash correctly, their response would be to require a higher premium in order to
hold a risky portfolio of commercial bank stocks in the event of a financial crisis. However,
the literature suggests otherwise and finds a negative relationship between the expected risk
premium and measures of aggregate credit. My analysis tackles this relationship on a set of
different economic dimensions.
First, I confirm the presence of neglected crash risk in the returns of U.S. commercial banks
by analyzing their response to transitory deviations of aggregate credit per capita from a
long-term trend. I refer to these deviations as ltd , which are derived with a methodology
proposed by Hamilton (2018) and are shown to capture a significant amount of variation in
bank stock returns over horizons from one year up to three years. In line with results from
the literature, higher realizations of ltd predict lower stock returns for commercial banks
at forecast horizons between one and four years. A one standard deviation increase in ltd
decreases bank excess returns by almost 5% and their dividends by 6% at year-end. The
effect of aggregate credit fluctuations peaks at a three year horizon where a one standard
deviation increase in ltd decreases excess returns and growth in dividends by 9% and 13%,
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respectively. This result is shown to hold across different decomposition techniques and is ro-
bust to the degree of persistence of ltd . Furthermore, Lettau and Ludvigson (2005), Lettau
and Ludvigson (2001) and Valkanov (2003) argue that the use of overlapping returns along
with persistent predetermined regressors can significantly skew the statistical inference and
indicate predictability when there is none. I test the robustness of my findings by comput-
ing re-scaled t test-statistics as in Valkanov (2003), and bootstrapped distributions of the
coefficients and adjusted R2s. Furthermore, the effect remains strong even when adopting
a slightly modified version of Hamilton (2018)’s decomposition. Finally, since bank returns
vary with the business cycle, I test the predictive power of these deviations in the presence of
other popular macroeconomic drivers such as price-dividend ratio, cay (consumption-wealth
ratio), or industrial-production growth. The outcome of all these tests establish ltd as a
powerful forecasting factor and compelling evidence for the existence of neglected crash risk
in U.S. bank returns.
I continue my analysis by investigating the role of a loose credit environment in commercial
banks’ decisions to change their dividends. Complementing Gandhi (2018), aggregate div-
idend growth is shown to decrease in response to the same crash risk faced by investors. I
argue that ltd captures more variation of the bank loan cycle than the yearly growth rate
in aggregate credit. Hence, commercial banks respond rationally to an increased probability
of financial disaster by lowering their dividends. A one standard deviation increase in ltd
results in a 6% decrease in annual dividend growth of the commercial bank index and a 13%
drop at a two year horizon. This shows that the source of neglected crash risk triggered by
aggressive credit expansions has roots in either investors’ inattention to commercial banks’
lowering their dividends or overoptimism of high future returns bred by an aggressive ex-
pansion in the loan market.
The behavior of bank returns and dividends in the aggregate loan cycle is not simply the
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result of a system-wide alteration in the financial markets. To prove that, instead of using a
value-weighted index and aggregate dividends measured from the entire commercial banking
sector, I focus on size-sorted portfolios. Gandhi and Lustig (2015) finds size of financial
institutions to be an important factor of their returns that is orthogonal to the standard risk
factors. To study the presence of a size effect of returns’ and dividends’ behavior in aggregate
lending cycle, I split the entire commercial banking sector into three portfolios following the
methodology by Fama and French (1993). For each small, medium and large portfolio, I
compute the value-weighted returns and the corresponding dividend growth. The effect of
ltd on the size-sorted banks is indeed very different confirming two important outcomes.
First, overoptimism exhibited by investors depends heavily on the size of the commercial
bank: on average, an investor in a small portfolio of banks is twice as negligent as one in
with a large portfolio. Second, the response of management of different-sized financial in-
stitutions with respect to dividend policies is very heterogeneous. Smaller institutions are
much more risk averse than larger ones because in the event of a financial crisis they are less
likely to be bailed out. Hence, they act appropriately by slashing dividend payouts severely
by an average of 21% at a one-year horizon. Conversely, larger banks cut dividend payouts
by only 3% within same time horizon, suggesting they are much less concerned with the
effects of potential financial crisis.
Since the aggregate lending cycle embeds important information about both future returns
and dividends, the puzzle of neglected crash risk becomes a tale of two stories: excessive
overoptimism displayed by investors and the rational response of bank managers in response
to a financial crisis. Which one is a bigger culprit? Following the methodology by Camp-
bell (1991), in a series of decomposition exercises of future returns measured by either the
value-weigthed index or size-sorted porfolios, I find that the distribution of news of future
returns (overoptimism) and news about future dividends is also subject to the size of the
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financial institution. For the value-weighted index, ltd adds information to both types of
news, however there is a higher marginal effect concentrated in news about future returns.
In fact, overoptimism is a bigger factor in neglected crash risk across commercial banks of all
sizes. News about future dividends play a larger role for smaller financial institutions given
that their management is much more risk averse.
The last section of the paper discusses the size of neglected crash risk as a function of differ-
ent degrees of aggregate credit expansion and builds a regime-switching asset pricing model
with rare disasters to explain the puzzle. Conditioning ltd on a set of exogenous thresholds
to identify the intensity of credit booms, I build two conditional distributions of future re-
turns and measure the difference in means and volatilities. The two conditional distributions
evaluate the behavior of bank returns following two phases of the aggregate credit expansion:
first is the peak of the cycle and second is the expansion phase prior to the peak. I find the
average size of crash risk or the difference in the bank aggregate value-index measured in the
two states of credit expansion to be around -0.04. In addition, the conditional variance of
returns measured post peaks of the lending cycle is twice as high as the variance measured
prior those peaks. I provide a theoretical framework to explain part of the puzzle motivated
by results in subsection 2.3.2 which argue that bank management is an important factor in
generating additional risks for the bank investor. By mixing a regime-switching asset pricing
model of Ang and Timmermann (2012) with rare-disasters as in Barro (2006), I derive an-
alytical expressions for the conditional means and conditional variances and compare them
with what I found in the data. The intuition of the model is straightforward. By subjecting
the dividend process to a small disaster in a regime-switching setting where the disaster can
occur in either state, that creates an additional dynamic for returns which are now exposed
to additional shocks generated by policies of bank management. This in turn expands the
difference between the conditional distributions and generates theoretical predictions that
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are very close to the data. The model does better in explaining the average size of risk than
a parsimonious regime switching one without disasters.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses data along with the deriva-
tion and statistical properties of ltd , Section 3 presents a set of forecasting regressions of
returns and dividends of commercial banks on the variable of interest ltd , Section 4 dis-
cusses the size of neglected crash risk as a function of aggregate credit expansion along with
a rationalization by a theoretical model, and Section 5 concludes.
2.2 Data and the ltd Variable
This section describes the data used in my analysis. First, I present the main decomposition
method proposed by Hamilton (2018) used to obtain ltd followed by a discussion of the way
I build a time series of bank stock returns.
2.2.1 Trend Deviations
Bank credit data is obtained from the H.8. database of the Board of Governors of the Fed,
and it includes all types of credit such as consumer loans, commercial, industrial loans and
real estate loans. Nominal bank-credit per capita is the main credit variable and represents
the sum of all types of loans normalized by a population figure. All series are quarterly
ranging from January 1960 to December 2016. Denote the log of nominal private credit
per capita as lt. One way to detrend lt is the methodology proposed by Hamilton (2018).
He argues that regressing a non-stationary variable at time t + h on its four most recent
values and then computing the residuals is a viable way to extract the cyclical component
for any process. The trend can be thought as a linear process or a linear expectation of
nominal-private bank credit per capita lt made at time t− h and any additional lags about
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its future value at time t:
lt = α0 + α1lt−h + α2lt−h−1 + α3lt−h−2 + α4lt−h−3 + νt (2.1)
A rolling estimation of (2.1) is employed in order to identify credit regimes. The value for
h can be selected based on how far ahead expectations are formed. I fix h = 12 quarters
that corresponds to forming expectations about future values of bank-credit per capita three
years ahead. This is in agreement with Baron and Xiong (2017) who form expectations
about aggregate credit growth two and three years ahead. Then the standardized difference
between expected and actual aggregate credit per capita or ltd is:
ltd t =
νˆt
σˆν
(2.2)
Figure 3.11 shows the behavior of ltd over the period from 1960 till 2016. Credit booms
tend to form when the actual realization of nominal aggregate credit per capita is higher
than its expected value. Thus, the higher the deviation from its mean of zero, the stronger
the intensity of the credit boom. As noted in Mendoza and Terrones (2008) the occurrence
of booms stemming from bank-credit coincides with big events such as the Bretton Woods
collapse from early 1970s, the energy crisis of early 1980s, and the sub-prime loan crisis in
late 2007. Moreover, a lot of these booms appear to be reaching a peak prior to the months
where recessions start as indicated by the shaded gray bars. While ltd is a good indicator
of credit booms formation in the U.S., it is persistent with a 0.92 autocorrelation at its first
lag, 0.86 at its second lag and 0.77 at the third lag. However, it decays relatively fast and
does not display heavy signs of autocorrelation past the ninth lag. This behavior is somehow
to be expected as the residual from (2.1) is computed using a window lag of 12 quarters.
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2.2.2 Stock Returns of Commercial Banks
To compute a value weighted return of commercial banks I follow Gandhi (2018) by forming
an index of commercial banks which are publicly listed. All monthly stock return data
is collected from the Center for Research on Security Prices (CRSP), where commercial
banks are identified by Standard Industry Classification (SIC) codes between 6000 - 6199.
I compute a monthly value-weighted return for all commercial banks using data from 1960
till 2016. The mean return for commercial banks in this period is 1.39% with a standard
deviation of 5.86%. The one-month t-bill from WRDS is used as a proxy for the risk-
free asset. The mean risk-free rate return across the length of the time series was 0.38%.
Quarterly excess returns are then computed as Req1 = (1 + Rm1)(1 + Rm2)(1 + Rm3)− (1 +
Rfm1)(1 + R
f
m2)(1 + R
f
m3) where Rmi represents the monthly commercial bank returns from
the respective months in the quarter and Rfmi is the risk-free rate of return on a one month
T-bill.
Figure 3.12 plots the standardized residuals ltd and the quarterly commercial bank excess
returns Ret on the full length of the time series. One can easily notice the inverse relationship
between the two series along with multiple peaks of the aggregate credit per capita associated
with disasters in bank stock returns. These periods are not necessarily happening at the same
time as recessions in the U.S. but seem to materialize right before.
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2.3 Forecasting Regressions
2.3.1 Bank Returns Forecasting Regressions
I investigate the presence of neglected crash risk in commercial bank equity returns by a
series of forecasting regressions of ltd on investors’ risk premium:
H∑
h=1
ret+h = β0 + β1ltd t + t+H (2.3)
where ret+h represents the log of value-weighted returns of commercial banks in excess of a
one-month treasury bill rate from subsection 2.2.2, t+H is a zero-mean disturbance term,
and H represents the forecast horizon. Results for the regression above are presented in
Table 3.10. Inference was performed using Newey-West modified standard errors with a lag
of H to correct for heteroskedastic and autocorrelated disturbances.
I choose a series of forecast horizons ranging from four to sixteen quarters. At horizons
less than a year, Gandhi (2018) already showed that aggregate credit growth triggers a
negative response of bank returns. This paper is mostly concerned with studying the effect of
aggregate credit deviations at intermediate and longer-term windows. My variable captures
an important amount of variability in excess returns of commercial banks up to sixteen
quarters or four years. For example at a one year horizon, a one standard deviation increase
in aggregate credit per capita above its trend leads to a decrease in commercial bank stock
excess returns of about 5%. At a two year horizon, the same increase in ltd triggers a 9%
decrease. Aggregate loan deviations explain a maximum of 14% of the total variation in the
risk premium. As expected, the adjusted R2 has a hump-shaped pattern peaking after three
years and declining afterwards. This result is somehow expected since the effect of aggregate
credit deviations wears out at horizons higher than sixteen quarters. Not only these estimates
are statistically significant, but their magnitude also suggests that it is imperative for bank
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investors to monitor the evolution of the credit cycle as a predictor of future returns. If
the economy is experiencing a time of excess bank lending, ltd will usually be high above
the trend. Periods of credit booms and intensive loan growth coincide with larger drops
in excess returns of bank stocks. This implies that investors do not necessarily require a
higher risk premium to compensate for the increased probability of a financial crisis. Using
a new methodology to identify the state of the credit cycle through a decomposition of
aggregate loans per capita, my findings reinforce previous empirical evidence that attributes
this negative relationship to potential crash risk ignored by investors.
Control Variables
Since the time-varying bank equity premium may be driven by other macroeconomic or
financial forces as well, it is important to test the robustness of the effect of ltd by including
more controls in the original estimation equation. Thus, I extend the regression in (2.3) to
test for additional risk factors:
H∑
h=1
ret+h = β0 + β1ltd t + β2Controlst + t+H (2.4)
where Controlst represent a host of exogenous variables. The empirical asset pricing litera-
ture is vast and over time it has uncovered several variables that have been shown to contain
predictive power for excess stock returns. Fama and French (1988), Fama and French (1989),
Hodrick (1992), and Campbell and Shiller (2001) find that the dividend yield or dividend-
price ratio have predictive power for U.S. stock returns. Hence, I compute the dividend yield1
for the commercial bank value-weighted index. Lettau and Ludvigson (2001) and Lettau and
Ludvigson (2005) show that cay, a variable that indicates the deviation from a common trend
of consumption, asset wealth and income, to have forecasting power over stock returns as
1I follow Cochrane (2007) and compute the dividend yield for all commercial banks as RETRETX − 1 where
RETX represents the holding period return without dividends
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well. I consider the industrial production growth rate as an additional control for the current
state of the business cycle. Finally, to take into account market conditions, I include the
general value-weighted index from CRSP as a measure of market return.
Table 3.11 shows the results of various specifications of equation (2.4). To avoid difficulties
caused by overlapping returns, I focus only on four-quarters ahead returns. Each specifica-
tion includes ltd and a list of popular forecasting variables (e.g. dt−pt, cayt, ipgrt, mktrett)
from the literature which are introduced in the regression one at a time to bypass inference
issues arising from regressor persistence. The first column reiterates the effect of aggregate
credit fluctuations on bank excess returns at a horizon of four quarters and was solely in-
cluded for comparison purposes.
As expected, in column (2) dt − pt is positive and significant at all horizons. A 1% increase
in dividend yield increases bank excess returns by 0.12% over the following year. The coef-
ficient on the trend deviations variable is still negative and significant indicating that a one
standard deviation increase in ltd causes a decrease of 6% in excess returns of commercial
banks over the next four quarters. In terms of the magnitude, results are comparable to what
was obtained before in Table 3.10 showing further evidence in support of regression stability.
Specification in column (3) includes cay as a predictor. In Lettau and Ludvigson (2005) this
variable is shown to have strong forecasting power over stock returns at horizons ranging
from one to six years. My results indicate a similar effect of cay over bank excess returns.
Its coefficient is statistically and economically significant, indicating that a one standard
deviation increase translates into a growth of about 318 basis points in excess returns at a
horizon of four quarters. As before, ltd remains an important driver of bank returns with
a similar magnitude as in previous specifications. The last two columns account for two
more variables that are intended to control for the state of the business cycle and general
condition of the market. Consistent with intuition, at a four-quarter horizon a 1% increase
CHAPTER 2. CREDIT FLUCTUATION AND BANK RETURNS 43
in industrial production growth decreases excess returns by a little over 1%. An improve-
ment in economic conditions is equivalent to a larger positive deviation of aggregate credit
from its long term trend, hence a decrease in the bank risk premium required by investors.
Similarly, an improvement in the performance of the general market generates an identical
reaction from investors. A 1% increase in the CRSP returns translates into a reduction of 32
basis points in the commercial bank risk premium. The adjusted R2 for the last specification
is 0.23; that is 23% of the variation in bank excess returns at a horizon of four quarters is
being explained by these five factors presented above. Out of all, ltd drives about a quarter
of that variation and it has the highest coefficient in terms of magnitude. These findings
reinforce the argument of aggregate credit trend deviations to be an important determinant
of future bank risk premium.
Alternative ltd
Nominal bank credit per capita as defined in Section subsection 2.2.1 exhibits strong evidence
of a time trend. With that in mind, one would have to take into consideration the potential
effect of including such a time trend when selecting an appropriate method to extract the
cycle. The literature on alternative de-trending methods in macro is large and there is no
perfect way to do it. Recently, Atanasov and Priestley (2018) applied a quadratic and a cubic
time trend decomposition method to extract the cyclical component of personal consumption
and showed its predictive power over quarterly stock returns. Similar de-trending methods
were also adopted by Rapach et al. (2016). Since there is no theoretical basis to choose one
method over another, I modify Hamilton (2018) as originally given in equation (2.1) to also
include a linear time trend:
lt = α0 + α1t+ α2lt−h + α3lt−h−1 + α4lt−h−2 + α5lt−h−3 + ν˜t (2.5)
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where t takes values 1, 2, . . . , T . The coefficient α1 is statistically significant. By including
the time trend as above, one can ensure that any evidence of dependence across consecutive
quarters in the per capita figure was not passed onto the residuals. As before, I employ a
rolling estimation with OLS of equation (2.5) and standardize the residuals before entering
them in the predictive regressions of (2.3). Panel C of Table 3.10 shows the results are
also robust to the introduction of a time trend in the decomposition method. Deviations of
aggregate loans per capita continue to stay significant at forecast horizons up to four years.
In terms of magnitude, at a one-year horizon a one standard deviation increase in ltd reduces
bank excess returns by 4%; this figure is very similar to what I observed before.
Issues with Long-Horizon Regressions
Overlapping observations when aggregating returns as in (2.3) can severely skew statistical
inference. In spite of a Newey-West correction that was applied in order to control for serial
correlation and heteroskedasticity, Valkanov (2003) shows that t-stats in these type of mod-
els do not converge to a well-defined distribution and actually diverge at a rate of T
1
2 . He
argues that summing over a part of the sample will induce persistence in the regressor which
in turn leads to artificially ”significant” structural equations when in fact there is no true
relationship to be determined. As a result, he proposes a modified version of a t-statistic
which is t√
T
. Such re-scaled test statistics have also been used in Lettau and Ludvigson
(2005). Although the distribution of the re-scaled t-stat is well defined, it is not standard
and it depends on two parameters δ and c as defined in the original paper. The first pa-
rameter δ represents the correlation between residuals from the structural equation and the
ones from the reduced form model. The second parameter c measures deviations from the
unit root in the regressor ltd . Since these two parameters are not observed they have to be
estimated using the methodology provided by Valkanov (2003).
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In Table 3.10, the re-scaled t-statistics under the null hypothesis of no predictability are
presented in square brackets, right under the Newey-West modified t-stats. Critical values
are computed in simulations at levels of 1%, 5% and 10%. Significance at these levels is illus-
trated by the appropriate number of stars. The modified test statistics indicate significance
of the credit deviation variable at 5% for horizons up to three years. Beyond three years,
ltd loses forecasting power and that can be seen in the evolution of the modified t-stats.
Specifically, at 16 quarters ltd appears to be only weakly significant.
In addition to computing modified t-stats, I also apply a bootstrap procedure that gener-
ates empirical distributions representing both the slope coefficient in front of ltd and the
adjusted R2. This approach is common in the empirical asset pricing literature, particularly
when dealing with long-horizon forecasting exercises. For example, Lettau and Ludvigson
(2005) do a similar econometric exercise to test the robustness of cay and cdy in predicting
quarterly stock returns. More recently, Atanasov and Priestley (2018) test the significance
of consumption fluctuations on CRSP returns and build a similar sampling distribution. I
follow Lettau and Ludvigson (2005) and create 10,000 artificial samples of excess returns
and dividend growth by drawing with replacement from residuals obtained under the null
of no predictability. The assumed data generating process for the trend deviation variable
was AR(1). Then for each artificial sample, I obtain a slope parameter and an adjusted
R2 and build a sampling distribution of those estimates; the chosen forecasting horizon was
four quarters or one year. Figure 3.13 shows the corresponding empirical distributions of the
slope coefficient in front of the trend deviation variable ltd and the R2 at a horizon of one
year from simulated data. As the pictures suggests, one can easily reject the hypothesis of
no predictability as the original values of the slope parameter and the adjusted coefficient of
determination from Table 3.10 clearly fall out in the tails. Table 3.14 presents the 95% and
99% confidence intervals obtained from the sampling distributions.
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2.3.2 Bank Dividends Forecasting Regressions
Loans are the main source of earnings for commercial banks. Since there is no perfect
measure of aggregate earnings, I use corporate profits of financial firms from FRED (series
A587RC1Q027SBEA) as a proxy. The top panel of Figure 3.14 shows this quarterly time
series since early 1970s to 2016. Earnings of commercial banks have been relatively flat till
the mid 1980s when an obvious upward trend started and lasted until the early 2000s. The
first half of the 2000s saw a surge in bank profits as a result of the credit expansion sustained
by loose financial oversight, followed immediately by a significant downturn triggered by the
Great Recession.
I extract the cycle of bank earnings using (2.1) in order to investigate and compare the
magnitude of downturns throughout episodes of credit booms. The bottom panel of Fig-
ure 3.14 shows the residuals of earnings of financial firms after applying the decomposition
by Hamilton (2018). Between the red lines are disasters in cash flows that happened and
were accompanied by credit booms, and between the blue lines are disasters where there were
no credit booms. Examples of these disasters include both recessions but also other related
banking crises. Between 1980 and 1982 there were two recessions but also the emerging
market economies debt crises; these events were accompanied or preceded by credit booms.
The 2007-2009 disaster was obviously a candidate and one can see the large drop in bank
profits. On the other hand, in the last half of 1990s there were also a series of financial
crises: the East Asian crisis of 1997, the Savings and Loan Crisis in the mid 1990s, and
Long-Term-Capital-Management crisis of 1998. However, empirically there was no evidence
of booms in bank loans in the 1990s. Thus, in between the blue lines the negative shock to
bank cash flows is not as big as the one in between the red lines.
Dividends from commercial banks are paid from earnings and since disasters in cash flows
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preceded by credit booms tend to be larger, I proceed by investigating empirically how com-
mercial banks change their dividend policy in response to the same disaster risk faced by
investors. Investors respond to an overheated commercial bank loan market by requiring a
lower risk premium. By computing an aggregate dividend growth measure for the commer-
cial bank index, I test if the aggregate loans trend deviation variable has a similar effect over
dividend growth in a regression of the form:
dt+H − dt = β0 + β1ltdt + t+H (2.6)
where dt represent the log of aggregated quarterly dividends of commercial banks in the U.S.
The first column of Table 3.12 shows that one standard deviation increase in ltd decreases
bank dividends by about six percentage points within the next year. Both the Newey-West
and Valkanov (2003) modified t-stats indicate significance at 1%. The magnitude of the effect
is about the same as in the case of excess returns. At a four quarter horizon, ltd explains
about 10% of the variation in bank dividends. The pattern of R2 is an inverted U-shape with
the maximum value occurring at a window of three years, and declining afterwards. Panels
B and C of Table 3.12 show similar robustness exercises performed in the case of excess
returns. When excluding the Great Recession or considering the alternative de-trending
method described in a previous section, the results continue to remain strong. To verify the
stability of the effect in the presence of other predictors for dividend growth, I tested the
same variables shown to drive future returns. Table 3.13 shows that additional predictors
do not add significant explanatory power over ltd . Neither the bank dividend-yield nor cay
are significant in driving long-horizon commercial bank dividend growth. Only industrial
production growth is significant in the fourth specification with a positive effect. Conversely,
the aggregate loan trend deviation variable is highly significant and explains an important
amount of future variation in aggregate dividends. Hence, encountering the same financial
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crisis risk that investors face, commercial banks respond to it rationally by lowering dividend
payout. This indicates two potential sources of neglected crash risk when facing an increasing
probability of a credit crunch: one is rooted in investors’ inattention to commercial banks
lowering dividend policies and the other is higher future returns driven by overoptimism
forming under loose credit conditions.
Gandhi (2018) argues that in general, commercial banking management is very sensitive to
changes in the probability of a tail event and they respond to it by effectively raising the
discount rate used to evaluate projects. He attributes this sensitivity to high leverage and
a small amount of tangible assets that a commercial bank has in the event of a financial
disaster happening. However, he does not find any predictability of credit growth (gct ) on
bank cash flows and concludes that variation in returns arises only from tail risk. The
yearly growth rate measure in aggregate credit does not capture any variability in future
dividend growth because it is not an appropriate proxy for the bank loan cycle. Although
forward-looking, ltd measures transitory deviations from a long-term trend of aggregate
credit per capita and captures the entire length of the bank loan cycle. As a result, it has
significant predictive power over future bank cash flows at short and medium-term horizons.
The contemporaneous correlation between ltd and the yearly growth rate in aggregate credit
is about 0.6. To establish the information gain embedded in the aggregate credit deviation
variable, I extract the residuals from a regression of ltd on gct and introduce them in the
predictive regression of future bank aggregate dividend growth on gct . I find these residuals are
statistically significant and that they improve the R2s notably (e.g. by about 12 percentage
points at a one year horizon). This shows there is an important amount of information about
the bank loan cycle nested in ltd that gct does not capture. Hence, an additional source of
investor risk originates from bank management displaying a supplementary layer of caution
by lowering dividend payouts. Since bank cash flows are sensitive to credit conditions (as
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shown in Figure 3.14) that precede a financial crisis, it is reasonable for bank management
to readjust distributions ahead of a potential disaster.
2.3.3 Does Bank Size Matter
Commercial banks of various sizes can be very distinct with respect to their financial perfor-
mance in the aggregate lending cycle. In that regard, one valuable empirical exercise is to sort
banks by market capitalization and analyze portfolios as opposed to a general value-weighted
index. The advantages of creating portfolios is not merely a robustness check but it will help
uncover important facts that reinforce the effect off aggregate credit fluctuations to not just
be a predictor of a general systemic failure but an important driver of returns and dividends
of commercial banks in the U.S. Bank size is a critical factor that dictates different asset
pricing implications between small and large financial intermediaries. Gandhi and Lustig
(2015) find that average returns of the largest commercial banks are lower than small- and
medium- sized banks. Their argument revolves around the disaster recovery rate perceived
by shareholders with regard to the size of the financial institution. Since large banks are
more likely to be bailed out by the government, part of the tail risk will be absorbed in the
process thus lowering potential losses for investors. Due to this additional insurance, large
financial institutions react differently in terms of their policies to a probability of financial
crisis. Following Fama and French (1993) I sort commercial banks by size and create three
portfolios: small banks to represent the bottom 30%, medium banks are the middle 40% and
large banks are the top 30%. The sorting of financial institutions is done by their market
capitalization at the end of June in year t and value weighted returns for each portfolio are
calculated from July in year t to June in t+ 1.
To investigate the behavior of returns for different-sized banks in the aggregate lending cycle,
I run the regression in (2.3). Table 3.15 shows the effect of aggregate credit fluctuations on
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size-sorted banks. The effect of ltd decreases monotonically across sizes with small banks
reacting more aggressively than large banks. At a one year horizon, a one standard devia-
tion increase in the probability of a financial crisis triggers returns to drop by ten percentage
points for small banks, 8 percentage points for medium banks and 5 percentage points for
large banks. The difference between small and large portfolios is a factor of 2 suggesting
that neglected crash risk is larger for smaller financial institutions and much more reduced
for larger banks. Overoptimism of investors is thus disproportionate in size. It is much more
pronounced for smaller institutions indicating that investors disregard the larger probability
of financial collapse of smaller banks in the event of a financial crisis. All of the coefficients
are statistically significant as suggested by the Newey-West t-stats.
Management also responds differently in setting their dividend policies based on size. In
the same sorting exercise, I run the regression in (2.6) to explore changes in dividends in
size-sorted commercial banks. While aggregate dividend growth was shown to reduce in re-
sponse to an increase probability of a financial crisis, the effect is much larger for small- and
medium-sized institutions. Table 3.16 shows that one-year dividend growth is reduced by
21% in small banks, 8% in medium banks and only 3% in large conglomerates. The wide dif-
ference between small and large portfolios in the case of dividend adjustments suggests that
the degree of willingness to take risks is heavily disproportionate across bank management of
different sized institutions. Larger commercial banks are less concerned with adjusting their
dividend payments in response to a financial crisis due to a higher likelihood of a bailout by
the government. Small commercial banks display a much higher degree of risk-aversion and
lower dividend payments to a higher extent as they do not necessarily anticipate the same
bailout. My results are consistent with the model proposed by Gandhi and Lustig (2015)
where they model recovery rates in dividend losses to be size-dependent implying that during
banking crises larger banks have a higher probability of a collective bailout.
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2.3.4 Neglected Crash Risk - Tale of Two Stories
A Variance Decomposition of Bank Returns
Neglected crash risk is a tale of two stories. Future bank returns vary negatively with aggres-
sive credit expansions, indicating irrationality among investors’ decision to hold bank stocks.
The extent of their irrationality is also related to commercial banks’ size. The expected risk
premium of smaller financial institutions decreases by a larger factor compared to larger
commercial banks in periods of high aggregate lending. Alternatively, the same aggressive
expansion in credit is usually associated with lower dividend payouts which suggests that
managers are setting aside more capital to buffer potential future losses. Size is also a sig-
nificant factor in adjusting dividend payouts. Small commercial banks reduce payouts far
more than large banks in response to a higher likelihood of a financial crisis, indicating that
their appetite for risk is greatly reduced by a higher possibility of bankruptcy.
Thus, while investors appear to be irrational in the event of a financial crisis, managers
display more prudence by adopting a counter-cyclical dividend policy. The size of the re-
spective responses varies greatly with the size of the financial institution. Since both returns
and dividends respond to changes in the probability of a financial crisis represented by vari-
ation in the aggregate credit deviation variable, what is the exact nature of information that
ltd incorporates - is it news about future expected returns (discount rate news), news about
future expected bank cash flows/dividends or news about interest rates? In addition, does
the structure of the news change for size-sorted portfolios? To answer these questions, I
decompose the variance of unexpected returns for the value-weighted bank index and also
the sorted portfolios.
Campbell (1991) and Campbell and Shiller (1988) show that unexpected future returns can
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be decomposed as follows:
ret+1−Et[ret+1] = (Et+1−Et)
∞∑
j=0
ρj∆dt+1+j−(Et+1−Et)
∞∑
j=1
ρjrt+1+j−(Et+1−Et)
∞∑
j=1
ρjrf,t+1+j
(2.7)
where the first term of the equation represents news about future cash flows/dividends, the
second term is news about future returns/discount rates, and the third term is the revisions
in future short-term interest rates or interest rate news; ρ = 1
1+exp(d−p) is the discount rate
with d− p being the long term mean of dt − pt. Low unexpected future returns must be
driven either by low expectations of future dividends or high expectations of future returns
or risk-free rates. Hence, these three components explain the total variation. The total
variance can be decomposed as follows:
Var
(
ret+1 − Et[ret+1]
)
= V ar
(
CFnews
)
+ V ar
(
DRnews
)
+ V ar
(
Rfnews
)
−2Cov
(
CFnews,DRnews
)
− 2Cov
(
CFnews,Rfnews
)
+2Cov
(
DRnews,Rfnews
) (2.8)
I follow the literature and model the dynamics of bank expected returns into a VAR system
with state variables from previous sections which were shown to have the highest amount of
explanatory power:
Yt+1 = Φ0 + Φ1Yt + t+1 (2.9)
where Yt+1 = [rt+1, Z
′
t+1]
′ represents an N×1 array of returns and a set of predictor variables.
Φ0 is an N × 1 vector of ones, Φ1 is an N ×N matrix of coefficients and t+1 ∼ N(0,Σ) is a
vector of residuals with covariance matrix E[t+1
′
t+1] = Σ.
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The first-order VAR generates forecasts of the form:
Etrt+1+j = e
′
1Φ
j+1
1 Yt (2.10)
where e1 is an array vector with a value of 1 in the row corresponding to bank returns and
0 elsewhere. The discounted sum of revisions in forecasted returns or news about expected
discounted future returns (DRnews) is:
(Et+1 − Et)
∞∑
j=1
ρjrt+1+j = e
′
1
∞∑
j=1
ρjΦj1t+1
= e′1ρΦ1(I − ρΦ1)−1t+1
(2.11)
Similarly, news about expected future discounted dividends or CFnews is:
(Et+1 − Et)
∞∑
j=0
ρj∆dt+1+j = e
′
1t+1 + e
′
1ρΦ1(I − ρΦ1)−1t+1
= e′1(I + ρΦ1(I − ρΦ1)−1)t+1
(2.12)
And, news about interest rates:
(Et+1 − Et)
∞∑
j=0
ρj∆rf,t+1+j = e
′
2(I + ρΦ1(I − ρΦ1)−1)t+1 (2.13)
where e2 is a column vector that takes the value one for the position of the interest rate
in the VAR and zero otherwise. The variances and covariances of the two components that
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drive the total variance of unexpected future returns are:
V ar
(
DRnews
)
= e′1ρΦ1(I − ρΦ1)−1Σ(e′1ρΦ1(I − ρΦ1)−1)′
V ar
(
Rfnews
)
= e′2ρΦ1(I − ρΦ1)−1Σ(e′2ρΦ1(I − ρΦ1)−1)′
V ar
(
CFnews
)
= (e′1 + e
′
1ρΦ1(I − ρΦ1)−1 + e′2ρΦ1(I − ρΦ1)−1)Σ
(e′1 + e
′
1ρΦ1(I − ρΦ1)−1 + e′2ρΦ1(I − ρΦ1)−1)′
(2.14)
Decomposition Results
To obtain a better understanding as to what type of information is embedded in ltd , I look at
its incremental effect over the change in the variances of news that drive future bank returns
in (2.8). Therefore, the components in (2.14) are calculated first by excluding ltd from the
set of conditioning variables Zt+1 and only including popular forecasting variables tested in
subsection 2.3.1. Then, after including the aggregate credit deviation variable back into the
information set, the weights are recalculated and compared against the initial results. In
order to estimate the system in (2.9), I choose an appropriate set of variables that drive future
bank returns and an estimate for the discount rate ρ. I obtain ρ to be 0.967 which corresponds
to an average dividend yield of the commercial bank index of 3.45%. The VAR state variables
were chosen based on my in-sample forecasting results with Zt = [r
e
t , rf,t, dt − pt, termspt]
including the dividend yield dt − pt and the term-spread termspt as a proxy to the yield
curve.
The first two rows of Panel A from Table 3.17 show the resulting weights from the variance
decomposition applied to the value-weighted returns and the size-sorted portfolios. Standard
bootstrapped t-stats are in parentheses below the estimates. The difference between rows
corresponding to each panel is the inclusion of the stage of the bank lending cycle in the
second row. While cash flow news carry a larger proportion in the forecast variance of bank
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returns regardless of size, returns for large commercial banks are less exposed than small-
and mid-sized banks to news about cash flows. Interestingly, when accounting for ltd in
the information set, the proportion of variance represented by the discount rate and cash
flow news increases both for the value-weighted index and also for the size-sorted portfolios.
However, the marginal differences are dependent on the size of the financial institution. This
suggests that an investor who ignores the state of the aggregate credit cycle might overlook
information regarding both unexpected returns and commercial banks’ re-distributions in
the form of dividends.
The stage of the aggregate lending cycle embeds important information about future bank
returns and cash flow growth. In the case of the value-weighted index along with large- and
medium-sized portfolios there is a higher incremental effect associated with the variance of
news about the discount rate: 12 percentage points increase for the value-weighted index,
11 percentage points increase for large banks, and 29 percentage points for medium-sized
banks. The proportion of variance due to cash-flow news for the general index and the two
portfolios grows by only six percentage points. In contrast, estimates for small commercial
banks show a very different exposure to the structure of news. Both discount rate and
cash flow news increase significantly by 66 and 28 percentage points, respectively. This
result strongly suggests that small commercial banks are far more sensitive to changes in the
aggregate lending cycle than medium and large banks. Also, there does not seem to be much
change in returns resulting from variation of risk-free rates as this source of risk is negligible
for bank investors. Neglected crash risk is not only a story of irrational exuberance and
overoptimism of investors, but it is also a story of managers acting rationally in the face of
a financial crisis. However, investor overoptimism weighs more than their negligence with
respect to dividend policies.
CHAPTER 2. CREDIT FLUCTUATION AND BANK RETURNS 56
2.4 Size Of Neglected Crash Risk
After establishing the information gain rooted in the aggregate credit deviation variable,
this section moves on to investigating the size and statistical significance of the disaster
risk in U.S. bank returns at different stages of the aggregate credit cycle. I calculate it as
the difference between the average future expected commercial bank returns identified by
two conditional distributions: one that measures returns h quarters after a peak in ltd and
the other that measures returns h quarters following an expansion of ltd which has not
reached its peak. A similar experiment was also done by Baron and Xiong (2017) where
they analyzed the performance of bank returns conditioned upon different levels of long-
term growth in the ratio of credit over GDP. Empirically, I build the two distributions from
value-weighted returns and measure the distances of the conditional means and variances as
follows:
Et[rt+h|ltdt > k]− Et[rt+h|ltdt ≤ k, ltdt ≥ lb]
V art[rt+h|ltdt > k]− V art[rt+h|ltdt ≤ k, ltdt ≥ lb]
(2.15)
where k represents the threshold or the number of standard deviations above the mean and
lb is a lower bound that I impose to exclude extreme periods of credit busts as investors
tend to require an unusually high risk premium following financial crises. The difference in
the conditional means is the size of the loss that investors expect from holding bank stocks
h quarters post a peak in the bank loan cycle measured by parameter k. The difference in
conditional variances indicates the excess volatility of returns h quarters ahead, observed
after a peak in the aggregate credit cycle. Values chosen for k can take a wide range of
possibilities but most literature on financial deepening agrees that figures between 0.7 and
1.5 deviations could represent a valid signal that the economy is experiencing a credit boom
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episode2. When ltd is 0.7 standard deviation above its mean, the spread or difference in
the one-quarter commercial bank returns from the conditional distributions is about -205
basis points(bp). For an extreme threshold of one and a half deviations above the mean,
the one-year spread goes down to -739 bp. Thus the size of the risk varies widely with the
intensity of the credit boom set by the parameter k. In addition, the conditional variance
of one-quarter ahead returns following periods of over-lending is twice as high than normal
signaling a higher probability of crash. A graphical representation of the complete distribu-
tions of bank risk premiums are in Figure 3.15.
Is the size of the risk conditioned upon different intensities of credit expansion statisti-
cally significant? To answer this question, I use a non-parametric two-sample Kolmogorov-
Smirnov (KS) test to explore the magnitude of the distance between the empirical cumula-
tive distributions of the excess returns in the credit cycle. Define D = maxr(F (rt+h|ltdt >
k)−F (rt+h|ltdt ≤ k, ltdt ≥ lb)) where (F (rt+h|ltdt > k) is the empirical cumulative distribu-
tion function (ecdf) of bank returns following credit booms and (F (rt+h|ltdt ≤ k, ltdt ≥ lb))
is the ecdf of returns following credit expansion that has not yet reached a peak. The
hypothesis test is:
H0 : D = 0
HA : D ≥ 0
(2.16)
Figure 3.16 shows a clear picture that for almost all thresholds k that indicate the state of
bank loan supply in the economy, returns vary greatly. KS tests reject the null hypothesis
in most cases and indicate that average losses of commercial bank investors following credit
booms are significant.
2See Mendoza and Terrones (2008), Schularick and Taylor (2012), Jorda` et al. (2013)
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2.4.1 How does neglected crash risk vary with the intensity of
credit booms?
I expand the grid of thresholds k considered in the previous subsection, with a complete range
from 0.7 to 1.5 in increments of 0.1 deviations. For each of these thresholds, the expected
bank stock returns are computed conditional upon the grid. Furthermore, to examine the
statistical significance of the difference in distributions of the returns, a one tail two-sample
KS test as in (2.16) was conducted for each point in the selected interval. In general, the
null was rejected for higher thresholds at both horizons of one and four quarters. Table 3.18
shows a summary of these findings. In addition, there is excess variance associated with
expected bank returns post periods of credit booms. Table 3.19 illustrates that the risk
associated with distribution of returns following aggressive credit expansions is, on average,
twice as high when compared to a distribution of returns prior to the boom. Differences
in conditional means and variances from (2.15) vary widely with the intensity of the boom.
Figure 3.17 shows that the range of future expected returns at a one quarter horizon is wide,
and signals a higher spread corresponding to a more intense credit boom. This result holds
for one-year ahead returns as well.
2.4.2 Size of Neglected Crash: A Theoretical Framework
I reckon the difference in the conditional distributions to represent the size of crash risk which
in a regime switching model is shown to be a non-linear function of the weighted average div-
idend growth in the bank lending cycle. This section will attempt to explain two important
empirical facts shown earlier: one is the size of neglected crash risk in Table 3.18 and second
are the conditional variances from Table 3.19. Using a previous result from subsection 2.3.2
that proved empirically dividends to be an important source of risk for bank investors in
the credit cycle, my theoretical framework will explain part of the puzzle by combining two
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important features from the asset pricing literature: Markov regime-switching and rare dis-
asters.
Regime-switching models have been introduced as empirical methods to explain unobserved
state-behavior in macroeconomic data. In a seminal paper, Hamilton (1989) was first to
model changes in business cycle using this type of methodology. Its innovation at the time
was the ability to identify recessions and expansions from underlying data to match ex-post
NBER business cycle dates. In the years to come, regime-switching models became very
popular in the empirical finance literature as well. Primarily, their main use was to differ-
entiate between unobserved states of stock returns such as: bull vs. bear markets or low
volatility vs. high volatility regimes. A more complete literature of these models in financial
economics was surveyed by Guidolin (2011). Moving from the empirical application of these
models, when this type of regime-switching feature is embedded in an equilibrium speci-
fication that can generate certain dynamics for returns which can help uncover important
puzzles in asset pricing. For example, Lettau et al. (2008) incorporate regime switching in
aggregate consumption to show the role of macroeconomic risk in the decline of equity pre-
mium. Inspired by previous work of Cecchetti et al. (1988), Ang and Timmermann (2012)
derive an asset-pricing model where they allow dividends to vary based on an endogenous
switching process and show useful dynamics of these types of models such as fat tails, het-
eroskedasticity, skewness, and time-varying correlations.
On the other hand, Rietz (1988) and Barro (2006) were first to offer one of the many alter-
native ways to explain the equity premium puzzle using rare economic disasters. By allowing
asset prices to be subject to a small probability of disaster along with a corresponding disaster
size, Barro (2006) shows that he can explain important features in the data such as the high
equity premium, low risk-free rate and volatile stock returns. Gabaix (2012) contributed to
the literature by allowing disaster probabilities to be time-varying and showed these models
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can explain even more puzzles than it was believed before. Its implications started expanding
even to bond and options pricing. Tsai and Wachter (2015) survey recent uses of disaster
models in the asset pricing literature. More recently, Guo and Wachter (2019) offered a new
perspective on the equity premium puzzle where they introduce rare disaster pricing in the
dividend process thus making investors superstitious and generating important implications
for puzzles in financial economics. These type of modeling techniques are also beneficial
in explaining neglected crash risk in commercial bank returns. By adding a rare-disaster
component to a Markov-switching dividend process in a classical asset pricing model with
power utility, I help explain state-dependent returns and variances observed in the aggregate
bank loan cycle. Just as business cycles, credit cycles are examples of transitory events that
induce asymmetry in expected returns. Particularly stocks of commercial banks are more
sensitive because they have more leverage. In the event of a financial disaster preceded by
an aggressive credit expansion, losses incurred by financial institutions tend to be larger.
Hence, their stock prices are not only subject to business cycle shocks but also additional
shocks originating in the aggregate bank lending cycle. Thus, a disaster can occur in either
state of the credit cycle with certain probability, however the magnitude of the shock will
be greater if the disaster coincides with credit booms going bust3.
The theoretical framework extends Ang and Timmermann (2012) by including a rare-disaster
feature as in Barro (2006). The appeal of combining elements of the two models lies in its
ability to introduce an additional shock that allows dividend and returns to follow different
dynamics that offer a potential explanation as to why investors expect lower returns following
credit boom periods. I consider a representative investor with a power utility function:
U(Ct) =
C1+θt
1 + θ
(2.17)
3Jorda` et al. (2013) shows that losses in output are larger in credit-driven disasters
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where −θ is a constant coefficient of relative risk aversion. The Euler equation associated
associated with this classic Lucas Jr (1978) economy is:
1 = βEt
[
U ′(Ct+1)
U ′(Ct)
Pt+1 +Dt+1
Pt
]
(2.18)
Following Cecchetti et al. (1988), Lettau et al. (2008), Ang and Timmermann (2012) which
argue for regime-switching behavior in either consumption of dividends, I assume equity pays
out dividend Dt that changes in mean and volatility and is also subject to an additional
disaster shock ωt that can occur with a small probability p in each time period:
Dt+1
Dt
= exp(µSt+1 + σSt+1t+1 + ωt+1) (2.19)
Dividend growth follows a two-regime process with St = (0, 1) that is independent of t.
Investors are assumed to know the value of St but not the value of St+1, thus they will set
prices conditional on the current regime and also by taking into consideration the probability
of a disaster that can occur in either of the two states. The shock ωt+1 follows Barro (2006)
and can trigger an additional loss b in either state and is independent of t+1 ∼ i.i.d N(0, 1):
ωt+1 =

b, probability p
0, probability 1− p
(2.20)
I assume that in each period Ct = Dt and the Euler equation becomes:
1 = βEt
[(
Dt+1
Dt
)θ+1
Pt+1 +Dt+1
Pt
]
(2.21)
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Conditioning expected dividend growth in the first state St = 0:
Et[Dt+1|St = 0] =
∑
St+1
∑
ωt+1
E[Dt+1|St+1]P (St+1|St = 0)
= Dtexp
(
µ0 +
σ20
2
)
p00(1− p) +Dtexp
(
µ0 + b+
σ20
2
)
p00p+
Dtexp
(
µ1 +
σ21
2
)
(1− p00)(1− p) +Dtexp
(
µ1 + b+
σ21
2
)
(1− p00)p
(2.22)
Similarly, conditioning expected dividends growth in the second state St = 1:
Et[Dt+1|St = 1] =
∑
St+1
∑
ωt+1
E[Dt+1|St+1]P (St+1|St = 1)
= Dtexp
(
µ0 +
σ20
2
)
(1− p11)(1− p) +Dtexp
(
µ0 + b+
σ20
2
)
(1− p11)p+
Dtexp
(
µ1 +
σ21
2
)
p11(1− p) +Dtexp
(
µ1 + b+
σ21
2
)
p11p
(2.23)
Equation 2.22 and Equation 2.23 are very straightforward to interpret and are also consistent
with the empirical dividend process seen in the data. Since bank cash-flows are subject to
state-dependent losses, it matters what is the stage of the bank-loan cycle when the potential
disaster occurs. Suppose regime St = 0 with low volatility, high-mean (e.g. µ0, σ0) and St = 1
with high-volatility, low-mean (e.g. µ1, σ1); thus µ0 > µ1 and σ0 < σ1. The probability
disaster p stays constant in either regime as well as the size of the disaster b.
If a future contraction occurs with full certainty (p = 1) given the previous regime being
St = 0 and the old regime stays constant by not switching to a disaster state, the new mean
in t + 1 is µ0 + b. An example of such a disaster is a recession that originates outside of
the financial system and the decrease in dividends is just the result of a general depreciation
in market conditions. If however the shock has its origin in the financial system with one
such example being episodes of credit booms gone wrong then the new mean reflects the
larger magnitude of the shock and becomes µ1 + b. Likewise if you are in a disaster phase
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with St = 1 and there are additional shocks in the financial system that trigger the disaster
state to prevail such that St+1 = 1, the new mean becomes µ1 + b. As the economy starts
recovering and switch back to the low-volatility regime, the new mean reverts to µ0 + b and
will eventually return to full equilibrium at µ0. Since p cannot be exactly one, dividend
growth across regimes will be weighted-averages of investors’ expectations not only across
the Markov-states but also across additional disaster states imposed by the aggregate lending
cycle.
To solve the model, I follow Cecchetti et al. (1988), Ang and Timmermann (2012) and
assume that the equity prices will be a function of dividends:
Pt = γ(St)Dt (2.24)
Inserting this into the equlibrium relationship in Equation 2.21, the Euler equation becomes:
γ(St) = βEt
[(
Dt+1
Dt
)θ+1
(1 + γ(St+1))
]
(2.25)
Since St = (0, 1), solving the system of equations analytically I can derive the prices as
functions of dividends in the two states from Equation 2.25:
γ(0)
γ(1)
 = β0
δ
1− β0αp11 β0α(1− p00)
β0(1− p11) 1− β0p00

p00 + α(1− p00)
(1− p11) + αp11
 (2.26)
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where
β0 = β0(1− p) + β0p
β0 = βexp
(
(1 + θ)(µ0 + b) +
σ20(1 + θ)
2
2
)
β0 = βexp
(
(1 + θ)µ0 +
σ20(1 + θ)
2
2
)
α = exp
[
(1 + θ)(µ1 − µ0) + (1 + θ)
(
σ0(σ1 − σ0) + (σ1 − σ0)
2
2
)]
δ = (1− β0p00)(1− β0αp11)− β
2
0α(1− p11)(1− p00)
The persistence of the two regimes will be dictated by the degree of concavity of the utility
function. Equilibrium prices will depend non-linearly on state means and volatility. The
returns are straightforward to compute given the analytical solution of the model:
Rt+1 =
Pt+1 +Dt+1
Dt
=
(γ(St+1) + 1)
γ(St)
Dt+1
Dt
(2.27)
Variation in returns will be amplified due to the additional uncertainty about disasters that
could occur in dividend-growth regardless of the current state. Thus, if regimes are persistent
and the parameters for state mean and volatility are different enough, that could generate
large swings in equilibrium returns and variances which offer a potential explanation as to
why commercial bank investors expect a lower return following periods of excessive lending.
Thus, rare disasters could represent an elegant solution for another puzzle in empirical asset
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pricing: neglected crash risk. Deriving the returns in the two regimes:
Et[Rt+1|St = 0] =
∑
ωt+1
Et
(
1 + γ(St+1)
γ(St)
Dt+1
Dt
∣∣∣∣St = 0)
= p00
γ(0) + 1
γ(0)
exp
(
µ0 +
σ20
2
)
(1− p) + p00γ(0) + 1
γ(0)
exp
(
µ0 + b+
σ20
2
)
p
+(1− p00)γ(1) + 1
γ(0)
exp
(
µ1 +
σ21
2
)
(1− p) + (1− p00)γ(1) + 1
γ(0)
exp
(
µ1 + b+
σ21
2
)
p
(2.28)
and
Et[Rt+1|St = 1] =
∑
ωt+1
Et
(
1 + γ(St+1)
γ(St)
Dt+1
Dt
∣∣∣∣St = 1)
= p11
γ(1) + 1
γ(1)
exp
(
µ0 +
σ20
2
)
(1− p) + p11γ(1) + 1
γ(1)
exp
(
µ0 + b+
σ20
2
)
p
+(1− p11)γ(0) + 1
γ(1)
exp
(
µ1 +
σ21
2
)
(1− p) + (1− p11)γ(0) + 1
γ(1)
exp
(
µ1 + b+
σ21
2
)
p
(2.29)
Likewise, I derive the conditional variances in the two states:
V ar(Rt+1|St = 0) = Et
[(
1 + γ(St+1)
γ(St)
Dt+1
Dt
)2∣∣∣∣St = 0]− [Et(Rt+1|St = 0)]2 (2.30)
and
V ar(Rt+1|St = 1) = Et
[(
1 + γ(St+1)
γ(St)
Dt+1
Dt
)2∣∣∣∣St = 0]− [Et(Rt+1|St = 0)]2 (2.31)
Equation 2.28, Equation 2.29, Equation 2.30, Equation 2.31 are the relationships of interest
I will use to compare the means of the empirical conditional distributions of returns and
variances in the bank lending cycle from Table 3.18 and Table 3.19 with the theoretical
predictions of the model. In order to facilitate this comparison, I calibrate some parameters
and estimate others from data. Table 3.20 discusses all the parameters in the model: β was
calibrated at 0.997 as in Lettau et al. (2008), risk aversion θ = 2, probability of disaster
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p = 0.02 and disaster size b = 0.33 were all calibrated as in Barro (2006). Conditional
means and variances along with the switching probabilities for the dividend growth process
were estimated by a Markov-Switching model that changes both in means and volatility.
Such models are relatively straightforward to estimate by maximum likelihood methods
as in Hamilton (1989). Thus regime 0 was identified as high mean and low volatility for
bank dividend growth with µ0 = 0.03 and σ0 = 0.11 while regime 1 was low mean and
high volatility with µ1 = 0.004 and σ1 = 0.22. Also the probabilities of staying in state 0
was 0.93 with an average duration of 16 quarters and the probability of staying in state 1
was 0.90 with an average duration of 10 quarters. This suggests that an economic regime
characterized by lower bank dividend growth in the U.S. lasts about two and a half years
on average. Conversely, economic regimes with high dividend growth last a little over four
years on average.
Table 3.21 discusses the comparison between the prediction of the theoretical model and the
empirical counterparts. On average, the size of neglected crash risk in U.S. bank returns
is about -0.04: the difference between average returns of 0.006 in peaks of the aggregate
credit cycle and average returns of 0.043 in the normal expansion phase of the credit cycle
that has not yet reached a peak. Similarly the empirical conditional variances for the two
states are 0.020 and 0.011. To compare, I fit two models: one is the asset pricing model with
regime switching and rare disasters presented earlier in subsection 2.4.2 and second is just
the simple model with only regime switching by Ang and Timmermann (2012). The model
with disasters does an almost perfect job at matching the state-dependent returns with the
data. The one without disasters overstates both conditional state-dependent returns by
about 160 basis points suggesting that there may be additional risk that bank returns are
subjected to not captured by a simple regime-switching model. Both models do a fairly good
job at explaining the variance of returns in credit booms, however it appears there is some
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overstatement of the conditional variance in the second state.
While overoptimism remains a major driver of the neglected crash risk puzzle in bank returns,
regime-switching models with disasters were shown to explain well why investors expect lower
returns following periods of aggressive aggregate credit expansion. Disasters can occur with
some probability in either state subjecting returns of commercial banks to additional shocks
that can originate in the banking sector. One such example is when credit bubbles burst. The
transmission of these shocks is done through banks’ management readjusting the dividend
process in a rational way and thus exposing investors to additional risks from the aggregate
bank lending cycle. Hence, the neglected crash risk puzzle in bank returns as introduced
by Baron and Xiong (2017) can also be added to the long list of other puzzles explained by
asset pricing models with rare disasters.
2.5 Conclusion
In this paper, I build a new variable ltd that measures aggregate credit per capita devia-
tions from a long-term trend and investigate its predictive power over an index that tracks
bank returns and a measure of aggregate bank dividends. A one standard deviation in ltd
decreases bank excess returns by 5% and dividend growth by 6% over the next year. On one
hand, these findings reconfirm the presence of irrational behavior among bank investors that
Gandhi (2018) initially found and Baron and Xiong (2017) defined it later as neglected crash
risk. On the other hand, it adds new results to this literature showing how bank managers
display a rational behavior in the anticipation of a financial crisis by lowering distributions
to investors. Furthermore, I show that while all bank management is sensitive to the stage
of the aggregate loan cycle, small commercial banks display more risk aversion than large
commercial banks in their decisions to set dividends. To disentangle the contribution of
ltd in the prediction of bank returns, I decompose the forecast variance into news about
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cash flows and news about discount rates. After examining the marginal contribution of the
aggregate credit deviation variable, I find that by including it in the forecast it generates a
higher contribution to discount rate news rather than news about future cash flows. Hence,
overoptimism of investors weighs more than the rationality managers in fueling the puzzle
of neglected crash risk. The structure of these news is also highly dependent on the size
of the financial intuitions with small banks being much more sensitive to changes in the
credit cycle. Finally, I offer a theoretical explanation that solves part of the puzzle and show
that the size of the neglected crash risk can be interpreted as the outcome of a probability
of disaster of a certain size that impacts the bank-dividend process in either state of the
business cycle.
The relationship between bank equities and aggregate credit is complex with plenty of re-
search avenues left to be pursued. The presence of information asymmetry between com-
mercial bank managers and investors with respect to their ability to anticipate financial
crises raises a whole new set of interesting economic questions. One example is to examine
and compare the degree of asymmetry in their actions. The imbalance could have poten-
tial macro-financial implications that in real-time may indicate signals of instability in the
financial markets.
Chapter 3
News shocks across countries: An
empirical investigation
3.1 Introduction
The study of the role of news shocks (i.e. anticipated changes to the future state of fun-
damentals) to total factor productivity (TFP) and other variables in explaining business
cycle fluctuations has been, with a few exceptions, mainly focused on the U.S. economy.
Even though the literature of news shocks can be traced back at least to Pigou (1927), their
study recently became relevant with the seminal work of Beaudry and Portier (2006), who
developed an identification scheme using a vector error correction model where shocks to
TFP are orthogonal to shocks to stock prices. Motivated by them, Barsky and Sims (2011)
developed an alternative identification method that relies on less restrictions than Beaudry
and Portier (2006) to identify news shocks to TFP using a vector autoregression (VAR)
framework. On the structural side, Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2012), Khan and Tsoukalas
(2012), among others, use Bayesian methods to estimate a medium-scale DSGE model for
the U.S. economy and gauge the role of news shocks in explaining the variance of output
and other macro aggregates. All these studies have the common finding that the share of
output variance explained by news shocks is sizable at different horizons (ranging from 15
to 50 p.p.)1. Regarding the role of news shocks in other countries, Zeev et al. (2017) use a
1See Beaudry and Portier (2014) for a thorough literature review on the study of news shocks.
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methodology similar to the one in Barsky and Sims (2011) to identify commodity terms of
trade (CToT) news in a small set of emerging economies, and find that news shocks of this
type explain a sizable fraction of output variance at different horizons. In the same line,
Kamber et al. (2017) used a method akin to Beaudry and Portier (2006) to identify news
shocks to TFP in a small set of developed small open economies, and show that news shocks
to TFP are an important driver of business cycles in those countries. Departing from the
time-series identification approach, Arezki et al. (2017) identify giant oil and gas discover-
ies as news shocks about future production of oil and gas; and find that for a large panel
of countries such announcements generate important movements in current macroeconomic
aggregates.
Despite those efforts to quantify the role of news shocks in explaining the variance of macroe-
conomic variables, several questions remain in terms of the scope and outreach of the data
used for the previous studies: What is the variance share of output and other macro aggre-
gates explained by news shocks to TFP across a large set of countries? How relevant are
other type of news shocks in those countries? Are there any differences in the role of differ-
ent type of news shocks on the economy between developing and developed countries? If so,
what are the main possible reasons of such differences? Furthermore, there is an important
methodological question for time-series frameworks: How can we correct for the small-sample
bias of the variance decomposition of news shocks identified using VAR methods?
In this paper we aim to answer those questions2. For this purpose we use the method de-
veloped by Barsky and Sims (2011) to identify news shocks to TFP, foreign interest rates
2An important discussion regarding news shocks in the economy is about whether these type of shocks
can drive business cycles. Theoretically, a simple RBC model generates a recession in response to good news
about future TFP. Jaimovich and Rebelo (2009) propose a model for closed economies where positive news
about TFP generate a boom, which is applied to small open economies in Jaimovich and Rebelo (2008).
Nonetheless, we depart from this discussion and focus on the contribution of news shocks to explain the
variance of output and other macro aggregates.
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and CToT in a large number of countries, and estimate the share of variance in output and
other variables explained by the aforementioned news shocks. Since the time series for cross-
country macroeconomic data are relatively short, it is well known that OLS-VAR estimates
of a system based on these data are usually prone to small-sample bias (Ferna´ndez et al.,
2017). We develop a simple Bootstrap-after-Bootstrap correction method to correct for the
small sample bias of the estimates. Then, based on our (bias-corrected) country-by-country
sequential estimation of the the variance share of different macroeconomic aggregates ex-
plained respectively by news shocks to TFP, foreign interest rates and CToT, we explore the
differences among developing and developed countries. Finally, we perform a simple cross-
country OLS estimation to determine, for each share of output variance explained by each
type of news shock, what drives the differences found between the two types of countries.
Our main findings are that the difference in output variance explained by news shocks to
TFP between developing and developed countries is negligible, whereas the same differences
for news shocks to foreign interest rates and CToT are both positive. Based on cross-country
estimations using a wide set of variables, we found that the differences of variance shares
of output explained by news shocks to foreign interest rates and CToT between developing
and developed countries depend, respectively: Negatively on the level of financial develop-
ment and positively on the average net foreign asset position, and positively on both the
commodities total trade to GDP ratio and the level of development in financial markets.
Our results suggest that standard one-sector closed economy business cycle models with only
shocks to TFP are insufficient to study the role of news shocks in the economy, and that
foreign variables seem to be appealing sources of news shocks. However, differences on the
share of output variance explained by news shocks between developing and developed coun-
tries arise mainly due to financial markets development and incompleteness, suggesting that
models used to study the effects of news shocks—especially in developing countries—should
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not abstract from those features.
The rest of the document is organized as follows: Section 2 explains the empirical strategy,
consisting on the identification method and the small-sample bias correction method. Sec-
tion 3 describes the data we use and shows the results for the estimated variance share of
output explained by news shocks across countries. In section 4 we estimate cross-country
regressions to explain what determines the differences of the role of news shocks in explaining
output variance between developing and developed countries, and provide a short discussion
of the results. Section 5 concludes.
3.2 Empirical Strategy
To identify news shocks we follow closely the econometric strategy developed by Barsky
and Sims (2011), where the news shock is identified as the the shock orthogonal to the
innovation in current TFP that best explains variation in future TFP. The underlying idea
behind this procedure is due to Uhlig (2004), who aimed to identify the lowest possible
number of structural shocks that could explain the majority of the k-step ahead prediction
error variances in real GNP for horizons up to five years. As mentioned above, the first
ones to develop an empirical methodology to identify news shocks were Beaudry and Portier
(2006). However, our choice of using the method of Barsky and Sims (2011) relies on the fact
that, as explained by them and mentioned by Kurmann and Otrok (2013), this methodology
has embedded the conditions needed for Beaudry and Portier’s identification to be valid and
it is less restrictive with the data. This implies that we can estimate the system in levels
without imposing any type of cointegration relation on the variables.
In our case, we identify news shocks to three different variables: TFP, foreign interest rates
and CToT. These are variables that have been identified as relevant business cycle drivers in
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the international economics literature (see, among others, Shousha 2016 and Ferna´ndez et al.
2018). TFP is usually assumed to be exogenous to a set of standard macroeconomic variables
such as consumption, hours, output and trade balance. Likewise, foreign interest rates
and CToT are usually considered exogenous to each country’s macroeconomic aggregates.
However, those three variables could be endogenous among them. For instance, there is
evidence that commodity prices are inversely related with foreign interest rates (Ferna´ndez
et al., 2017), and with country spreads in developing countries (Drechsel and Tenreyro, 2018);
as well as evidence that in economies with financial frictions TFP and foreign interest rates
might be inversely related (see Neumeyer and Perri 2005 and Uribe and Yue 2006). Thus, we
perform a sequential estimation for each country, where the most exogenous variable in the
VAR system is only one of the three aforementioned variables per estimation. This means
that for each country we identify the news shock to each variable by sequentially replacing
them in the system (first TFP, then foreign interest rates instead of TFP and then CToT
instead of foreign interest rates). For the purpose of describing the identification methodology
we refer to either TFP, foreign interest rates, and CToT simply as the exogenous variable.
The exogenous variable is characterized by a dynamic process driven by two shocks. The first
one is the surprise shock which has a contemporaneous effect on the level of the exogenous
variable. The second one is the news shock which is observed h years in advance and it is
not allowed to have a contemporaneous effect on the exogenous variable. As pointed out by
Barsky and Sims (2011), a system with one endogenous variable and two structural shocks
is underidentified, which makes it impossible to extract and analyze the effect of news. This
implies that news shocks must originate from other macroeconomic drivers other than the
exogenous variable. Hence, our system must be a vector autoregression with the exogenous
variable ordered first, where the news shock is identified as the linear combination of reduced
form innovations orthogonal to the exogenous variable’s innovation which maximizes the
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share of variance of the exogenous variable at a finite horizon not explained by its own
(contemporaneous) innovation.
3.2.1 Methodology
We define xt to be the k × 1 main vector of macroeconomic variables of length T . Let the
VAR be specified as follows:
xt = A0 + A1xt−1 + A2xt−2 + . . .+ Apxt−p + t = A(L)t (3.1)
Where p represents the number of lags, A0 is a vector of constants, and Σ = E(t
′
t) is the
variance-covariance matrix of the reduced-form innovations. The structural moving average
representation of the VAR is:
xt = B(L)et (3.2)
Here B(L) are k × k matrices representing moving average coefficients, and et is an array
of structural shocks. The linear mapping between innovations t and structural shocks et is
given by:
t = W0et (3.3)
Where B(L) = A(L)W0 and et = W
−1
0 t. We use a Choleski decomposition of the innovation
covariance matrix Σ = W0W
′
0 to determine W0. The share of forecast error variance of
variable i due to structural shock j at horizon h is:
Ωi,j(h) =
∑h
τ=0Bi,τW0γγ
′W ′0B
′
i,τ∑h
τ=0Bi,τΣB
′
i,τ
(3.4)
The term γ is the j − th column of all possible orthonormal D representing matrices that
span the permisible set of all orthogonalization choices, W0γ represents the k × 1 impulse
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vector, and Bi,τ selects the i-th row of the matrix of moving average coefficients. Since
we are interested in identifying news shocks to TFP, foreign interest rates, and CToT, we
have to order each of this exogenous variables first in their respective VAR system. As the
exogenous variable is driven by two structural shocks it must be that the surprise shock and
news shock drive all of its variation:
Ω1,1(h) + Ω1,2(h) = 1 (3.5)
Such that Ω1,1(h) is the share of variance explained by the surprise shock, and Ω1,2(h) is
the share of variance explained by the news shock. Since the relationship above cannot be
expected to hold at all horizons h when adding more variables to the system, the idea is
to bring it as close to one as possible by choosing a γ∗ that maximizes the contribution of
the news shock in the variance decomposition of Equation 3.4. Therefore, the optimization
problem is:
γ∗ = max
H∑
h=0
Ω1,2(h) =
H∑
h=0
∑h
τ=0Bi,τW0γγ
′W ′0B
′
i,τ∑h
τ=0Bi,τΣB
′
i,τ
s.t. γ′γ = 1
γ(1) = 0
W0(1, j) = 0
(3.6)
Where the first constraint ensures that γ has unit length (such that it belongs to an or-
thonormal matrix), and the other two do not allow for a contemporaneous effect of the news
shock on the exogenous variable. Details on solving the above optimization problem can be
found in the appendix of Uhlig (2004). The solution resumes to the identification of γ∗ as
the first principal component of the observed exogenous variable orthogonalized with respect
to its own innovation.
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3.2.2 Small sample bias correction
Due to the small-sample nature of macroeconomic time series (specially at yearly frequencies,
which is our case), OLS estimates of VAR coefficients are prone to small sample bias. As a
result, estimated impulse responses and variance decomposition at any horizon inherit the
same issue.
We develop a bias correction algorithm which is based on the Bootstrap-after-Bootstrap
method developed by Kilian (1998). This method was originally applied to correct for
small sample bias in impulse responses. Since the share of variance due to news shocks in
Equation 3.4 depends directly on the estimated impulse response at horizon h, this method
can be easily applied to obtain a bias corrected estimate of Ω1,2. Kilian (1998) shows how
this method outperforms standard Bootstrap or Monte Carlo correction methods3. Even
in VAR systems with potentially cointegrated and non-stationary variables, where standard
bootstrap methods are not considered to be valid, multiple simulations show that Kilian’s
method is better than its competitors when it comes down to correcting the small sample
bias. This last feature is, for our case, the main advantage of the Bootstrap-after-Bootstrap
method and it is the main reason of basing our algorithm on it, because the methodology
developed by Barsky and Sims (2011) has the advantage that it can be estimated for VARs
in levels without imposing any cointegration restrictions. The algorithm is the following:
Step 1.
1A. Estimate the VAR in Equation 3.1: xt = A0 + A1xt−1 + A2xt−2 + . . . + Apxt−p + t.
Define Aˆp as the matrix of OLS coefficients for lag-p variables, and ˆt as the OLS es-
timated vector of standard errors at period t. Use these estimates to generate a time
3As Kilian (1998) mentions, standard Bootstrap methods are not valid in models with exact unit root.
Kilian and Lu¨tkepohl (2017) provide an extensive treatment of Bootstrap correction methods for VAR
systems, they show how standard methods are not valid for VARs in levels.
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series for xt of size T (the number of periods in the data) by predicting xt as: xˆt
B =
Aˆ0 + Aˆ1xt−1 + Aˆ2xt−2 + . . .+ Aˆpxt−p + ˆBt . Where xˆt
B is the bootstrap-predicted value of xt
using the OLS coefficients in Aˆ, ˆBt is the the vector of bootstrapped standard errors (ˆt) for
every t = 1, 2...T obtained by resampling (with replacement).
1B. Use the predicted series xˆt
B to re estimate the VAR as follows: xˆt
B = A0
B +A1
Bxt−1 +
A2
Bxt−2 + . . . + ApBxt−p + Bt . Which yields the matrix of estimated coefficients Aˆ
B =
[Aˆ0
B
Aˆ1
B
......Aˆp
B
]. Store AˆB as Aˆj
B
.
1C. Repeat steps 1A and 1B 1000 times, then calculate Aˆ∗ =
∑1000
j=1 Aˆj
B
/1000. The theoret-
ical bias term is Ψ = E(Aˆ− A), thus the bias estimate is E(Ψˆ) = E(Aˆ∗ − Aˆ), which means
that the bias estimate is: Ψˆ = Aˆ∗ − Aˆ
Step 2.
2A. Define mod(Aˆ) as the absolute value of the maximum eigenvalue of the companion matrix
of Aˆ. If mod(Aˆ) > 1, then the bias corrected estimate of A is A˜ = Aˆ− Ψˆ(1− 0.01i), where
i = 1, 2, 4... is the ith iteration such that mod(A˜) ≤ 1. If after 100 iterations mod(Aˆ) > 1,
then pick A˜ with the minimum mod(Aˆ) among all iterations. If mod(Aˆ) ≤ 1, then the
corrected bias estimate of Aˆ is A˜ = Aˆ − Ψˆ = 2Aˆ − Aˆ∗. This step avoids getting explosive
estimates in further iterations.
2B. Use A˜ to re estimate the standard errors such that xt − A˜xt = BB, where BB denotes
the re estimated standard errors.
2C. Use A˜ and BB to build xBBt by standard resampling (with replacement), this is the
Bootstrap-after-Bootstrap new series for xt.
2D. Estimate again the VAR model in Equation 3.1, and store the matrix of coefficients as
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A˜BBk . Repeat steps 2C and 2D 2000 times.
Step 3.
3A. For each matrix A˜BBk re calculate the bias, such that the new Bootstrap-after-Bootstrap
bias is now: ΨBBk = A˜
BB
k −A˜. Use this result to calculate Bootstrap-after-Bootstrap corrected
estimates of coefficients (BBC): A˜BBCk = 2A˜− A˜BBk
3B. For k = 1, 2, ...2000 plug each A˜BBCk coefficient into the VAR model to compute the
BBC estimates of the standard errors, BBCk , and their respective variance-covariance matrix,
ΣBBCk .
3C. For k = 1, 2, ...2000 use the methodology from Barsky and Sims (2011) described in
subsection 3.2.1 to estimate the BBC share of variance explained by both the surprise shock,
ΩBBC1,1,k , and the news shock, Ω
BBC
1,2,k .
3D. Calculate the mean BBC estimate of the share of variance explained by news shocks:
Ω¯BBC1,2 =
∑2000
k=1 Ω
BBC
1,2,k /2000
3.3 Estimation
3.3.1 Data
We put together a comprehensive data set for a large number of countries. For this purpose
we start by gathering data on output, Yt, aggregate private consumption, Ct, trade balance
to GDP ratio, TBt, and labor Ht. The time subscript t has a yearly frequency, and all series
are available from 1950 to 2017. Aside from TBt, which is a ratio, all the macroeconomic
variables are in real PPP terms (except for Ht which is the size of the labor force). We
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obtain these series from the 9.1-Version of the Penn World Table (Feenstra et al., 2015)4.
We use our small-sample biased correction algorithm to estimate the share of variance of the
aforementioned variables explained, separately, by three exogenous variables: TFPt, R
∗
t , and
CToTt. For the total factor productivity, TFPt, we use the country-by-country estimates
from the Penn World Table. For the foreign interest rate, R∗t , we build an ex-post real
interest rate series using the 2-year American T-Bill and the CPI (this series is common for
all countries). For the commodity terms of trade, CToTt, we use the comprehensive data set
developed by Gruss and Kebhaj (2019), who built a country-by-country commodity terms
of trade series for 182 countries covering the period 1962-2018. Finally, to classfy countries
between developed and developing, we use the World Bank’s income classification system.
Countries consider high-income economies are considered developed, the rest are considered
developing.
We only consider time series that start at the latest in the year 1970. Due to having different
sources of data, and considering that the Penn World Table lacks of a TFP estimate for
a few countries since 1970 (or before), the number of countries available to perform the
estimation is not the same for each exogenous variable. Table 3.22 summarizes, for each
exogenous variable (first column), the total number of countries available for estimation and
the number of countries by our two categories of study (developed and developing). For
TFP we have 83 countries, 42 developed and 41 developing; for the foreign interest rate we
have 106 countries, 46 developed and 60 developing; and for CToT we have 103 countries,
43 developed and 50 developing.
4The Penn World Table provides a unique comparable source for all variables, even though the frequency
is yearly and not quarterly.
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3.3.2 VAR system
We build a 5-variable VAR system as the one described in Equation 3.1, where xt =
[Et, Ct, Ht, Yt, TBt]
′. The exogenous variable comes from the vector Et = [TFPt, R∗t , CToT
∗
t ]
′.
The first four variables are the same as in Barsky and Sims (2011) (though they only use
TFP as exogenous variable in their estimation), and we include TBt to factor in the current
account dynamics, which is crucial to understand business cycles in open economies. We
sequentially apply the identification technique described in subsection 3.2.2 to identify news
shocks to TFP, foreign interest rates, and CToT, and estimate the forecast error variance
decomposition (FEVD) for each variable at a 5-year horizon5. As usual in VARs at yearly
frequencies using macroeconomic data, the number of lags is 1. The order of the VAR is the
same as the order of the variables in xt
6.
3.3.3 Results
We report our results focusing on the (bias-corrected) share of output variance explained by
news shocks to each exogenous variable, ΩBB1,2 , in developed and developed countries. First,
in Table 3.23, we report the size of the small sample bias. There, for each type of country,
we report in the third column of the table the cross-country mean share of output variance
explained by news shocks to each exogenous variable estimated using the regular Barsky
and Sims’ method, Ω1,2. In the fourth column of the table we report the boostrap-after-
bostrap bias corrected estimate, ΩBB1,2 . In the last column of Table 3.23 we report the mean
cross-country small sample bias for each exogenous variable: ΩBB1,2 − Ω1,2. From Table 3.23
there are two results that are worth noticing: 1) The small sample bias for each exogenous
5Our results are similar across 1-year and 3-year horizons.
6In terms of ordering the variables, the only thing that matters is that Et is the first one, which is
standard given that TFP, foreign interest rates and CToT are assumed to be exogenous in the business cycle
literature. The order of the other variables in the VAR is irrelevant for the FEVD with respect to the news
shock.
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variable by each type of country is not symmetric (albeit for TFP is very similar). While
for TFP, foreign interest rates and CToT, it is respectively (in p.p.) 1.9, 5.8, and -4.9; for
developed countries it is respectively 2.6, 2.3 and -1.1. Since our focus is the difference of the
importance of news shocks in explaining output variance between developing and developed
countries, the heterogeneity in the bias matters towards quantifying this difference. 2) As
observed in the bias of CToT for both types of countries, the direction of the bias is not
necessarily positive. Ferna´ndez et al. (2017) mention an upward small-sample bias in variance
decomposition estimates of VAR models; however in our case from Equation 3.4 there is no
guarantee that the bias must have one unique direction. This result stresses even further the
importance of correcting for small-sample bias when analyzing differences among the two
types of countries.
Second, for each exogenous variable and type of country, we report in Table 3.24 both
the mean (third column) and median (last column) Bootstrap-after-Bootstrap bias corrected
estimates of the share of output variance explained by news shocks, ΩBB1,2 , as well as the differ-
ence between developing and developed countries. Notice that the share of output variance
explained by news shocks to foreign interest rates and CToT is sizable, and always greater
than the estimates for TFP. The mean differences of ΩBB1,2 for TFP, foreign interest rate, and
CToT are respectively (in p.p.) 0.9, 6 and 8.3. The median differences are respectively -0.8,
4.7 and 12 p.p. Figures 3.18, 3.19 and 3.20 show the cross-country Kernel densities of the
mean ΩBB1,2 for each shock in each type of country. From Figure 3.18 we can observe that the
mean difference of share of output variance explained by news shocks to TFP is negligible,
and the densities of both developed and developing countries are similar. However, in Figures
3.19 and 3.20 the result is different, supporting the findings on Table 3.24. In Figure 3.19
the difference in means for the share of output variance explained by foreign interest rates
between developing (dashed line) and developed countries is that the distribution of ΩBB1,2 in
developing countries has higher excess kurtosis and a fatter right tail than the density for
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developed countries. This means that there is a group of developing countries that drives
this difference in spite of the distribution for developed countries also having a relatively
long right tail. In Figure 3.20, the difference of output variance explained by news shocks
to CToT is driven also by a fatter right tail in the density of developing countries. It is
worth noticing the long right tail for developed countries in Figure 3.20 which suggests there
is a group of developed countries with high share of output explained by news shocks to
CToT. In absence of these, the gap among developing and developed countries for ΩBB1,2 with
respect to CToT would be even wider, as shown by the difference in medians documented
in Table 3.24 (12 p.p.).
From these set of results we summarize our main findings as: 1) The share of output vari-
ance explained by shocks to foreign interest rates and CToT is considerable when contrasted
to the estimates for TFP. 2) The difference between developing and developed countries of
the share of output variance explained by TFP is negligible. 3) The mean difference between
developing and developed countries of the share of output variance explained by foreign in-
terest rates is 6 p.p. 4) The difference between developing and developed countries of the
share of output variance explained by CToT is 8.3 p.p. We show in the appendix that these
patterns regarding the differences of share of variance explained by news shocks between
both types of countries hold also for aggregate consumption, and the trade balance to GDP
ratio; but do not hold for labor7.
3.4 Explaining the Relevance of News Shocks
It is well known in the business cycle literature that developing countries have a more volatile
business cycle than developed countries. Our findings in the previous section suggest that
7In the appendix we provide a plausible explanation of why the difference of the share of variance in labor
explained by news shocks between developed and developing countries does not follow the same patterns than
the rest of the macroeconomic variables. We also report the country by country Boostrap-after-Boostrap
bias corrected estimates ΩBB1,2 for each exogenous variable.
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news shocks to foreign interest rates and CToT have an active role in driving output variance
to a higher extent in developing countries than in developed. Therefore, in this section we
attempt to shed light on what determines the share of output variance explained by both
news shocks to foreign interest rates and CToT. In other words, we dig one layer deeper into
understanding what measures of economic development lie behind the relevance such type
of news shocks8. We estimate the following cross-country regression:
ΩBB,i1,2 = β
i
0 + β
i
1D +
J∑
j=2
βijZ
i
j + u
i (3.7)
Where i ={Foreign interest rate, CToT}, ΩBB,i1,2 is the share of output variance explained
by news shocks to variable i, βi0 is the intercept, D is a dummy variable that takes the value
of 1 if the country is developing and 0 if it is developed, βi1 is the coefficient of D, β
i
j is the j
th
coefficient corresponding to the independent variable Zij for the regression with independent
variable i. The last term, ui, is the normally distributed mean-zero disturbance. For each i
we run different regressions, with different independent variables that vary within and across
each variable.
To choose the vector of dependent variables, Zi, that will be part of different regressions
within each i we use a set of possible dependent variables that capture the level of financial
development, financial constraints, commodities trade, institutional quality and structural
change of each country. In the appendix we provide details on the sources of these data.
After trying out different variables we report regressions with those coefficients that turned
out significant, which are: 1) For news shocks to the foreign interest rate, Z1=[Net foreign
assets/GDP, Domestic credit provided by financial sector/GDP]. The first variable repre-
sents the country average between 1970 and 2017 of net foreign assets to GDP ratio. The
8Since there are no differences between developed and developing countries in the share of output variance
explained by news shocks to TFP, we do not explore the determinants of these type of shocks.
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second variable represents the 1960 to 2017 country average of domestic credit provided by
the financial sector to GDP ratio. 2) For news shocks to CToT, Z2=[Commodities total
trade/GDP, Stocks market cap/GDP]. The first variable is the 1960 to 2017 country average
total trade of commodities (i.e. exports plus imports) to GDP ratio. The second variable is
the 1960 to 2017 country average stock market capitalization to GDP ratio9.
For both types of news shocks, we try four different regressions where the intercept is al-
ways assumed to be different than zero. In the first regression (Reg 1) we assume that only
β1 6= 0. In the second regression (Reg 2) we assume that only β1 6= 0 and β2 6= 0. In the
third regression (Reg 3) we assume that all coefficients are different than zero. In the fourth
regression (Reg 4) we shut down the dummy, such that we assume β1 = 0, and explore the
effect of the other coefficients without it.
3.4.1 Determinants of output variance explained by news shocks
to foreign interest rates
Table 3.25 shows the results for each of the four regressions above in the case where the
independent variable is the share of output variance explained by news shocks to foreign
interest rates. We report the coefficients with their associated level of significance and (in
parenthesis) their correspondent robust standard errors. In the first column we have D
and the variables in Z. The last row shows the R squared for each regression. In the first
regression (second column of the table) we can see, as expected based on the results in the
previous section, that the coefficient of D is positive, significant at a 5% level and virtually
equal to the difference in mean ΩBB1,2 between developing and developed countries reported
in Table 3.24. The results of the second regression show that D remains significant at a
9For each variable that we averaged during the full available period in their original set there is cross-
country heterogeneity on the first period from when data is available. We use the maximum number of
periods available for each country.
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5% level but now the average net foreign assets to GDP ratio is significant and positive.
This can be interpreted as lower levels of net external debt imply higher relevance of news
shocks to foreign interest rates in explaining output volatility. This can be related to the
literature of sudden stops and overborrowing, where countries that have more net foreign debt
exhibit financial collateral constraints and less average capital mobility (see Mendoza 2010
and Bianchi 2011) than less constrained economies. Countries where there is more financial
mobility, due to less levels of foreign indebtedness, seem to react more to news shocks to
foreign interest rates. The third regression, shown in the third column of Table 3.25, shows
that once we include the domestic credit provided by the financial sector to GDP ratio,
not only it is not a significant variable at any standard level of significance, but also D
is not significant anymore. Thus, we run the fourth regression (fifth column), where we
assume that β1 = 0. In this case the net foreign assets to GDP ratio remains significant but
now the new variable is also significant at a 5% level. Its coefficient is negative, meaning
that less financially developed countries are expected to react more in terms of output to
news shocks to foreign interest rates. This corroborates the fact that the financial frictions
channel is relevant to explain business cycles in developing countries, and that an important
part of shocks transmissions in less financially developed economies is through the effect of
news shocks10. Since removing the dummy variable generated a significance of the domestic
credit provided by the financial sector to GDP ratio, we suspect that the latter is a good
predictor of the former (i.e. there could be high colineality between those two variables).
Therefore, we regress D with respect to the last variable of the model, and report the result
in the last column of the table. The coefficient is significant at all standard levels, and
the R squared is relatively high, confirming that high levels of financial development are
10See Neumeyer and Perri (2005), Uribe and Yue (2006), and Chang and Ferna´ndez (2013) for referents
in the literature regarding the role of financial frictions and business cycles.
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related lower probability of being a developing country11. This result is standard in the
development literature. In other words, the difference of output variance explained by news
shocks to foreign interest rates between developing and developed countries stems mainly
from the level of financial development.
3.4.2 Determinants of output variance explained by news shocks
to CToT
Table 3.26 shows the result for each of the four regressions when the dependent variable
is the share of output variance explained by news shocks to CToT. The structure of the
table is the same than the one in Table 3.25. As in the case of foreign interest rates,
regression 1 yields a coefficient that is significant at a 5% level and its value is the same as
the difference in Ω1,2 between developing and developed countries for CToT. Adding the total
trade of commodities to GDP ratio does not change the relevance of D in the estimation.
This ratio is also significant at the 5% level and supports the hypothesis that countries
with more trade of commodities are affected more by shocks to commodity prices12. Even
though this result is not novel, it does shed light on two important issues: First, not only
news shocks to commodities terms of trade are important drivers of the business cycles in
developing countries (in line with the findings of Zeev et al. 2017), but they are also relevant
for developed countries. Second, some studies focus on gauging the role of commodity terms
of trade shocks in explaining the business cycle in commodity exporting economies, while
we find that also factoring imports of commodities is of high relevance (for instance in
Singapur, news shocks to commodity terms of trade explain 33% of the variance in output,
even though the country is a net importer of commodities). In regression three the stock
11In this regression the dependent variable is a dummy, so the estimated model by OLS is standard a
linear probability model.
12See Shousha (2016), Ferna´ndez et al. (2018), and Drechsel and Tenreyro (2018).
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market capitalization to GDP ratio is significant at the 5% level, but now D is not, which
makes us suspect that the effect of the variation in the latter is being annulled by the one in
the former. When removing D, regression 4 shows that both remaining dependent variables
are significant (at 1% and 5% levels respectively). Regressing D with respect to the stock
market capitalization to GDP ratio yields a significant coefficient at the 5% level, which now
shows that the level of development explains differences if the role of news shocks to CToT
between developing and developed countries through the degree at which financial markets
are developed. Considering that trading commodities (specially oil) is usually related with
trade of financial instruments, having more developed financial markets brings about more
possibilities of hedging against market risk. Borensztein et al. (2013) show sizable welfare
gains for commodity exporters by hedging against changes to commodity prices in financial
markets. Our results point out to the same direction, but focused on the role of news shocks.
Indeed, news shocks to CToT would theoretically have zero effects on output in a world with
fully complete markets, thus getting closer to a scenario where more developed financial
markets facilitate the trade of commodities which could in principle lead to a lower share of
output variance explained by news shocks to CToT.
3.5 Conclusion
News shocks to commonly known drivers of the business cycle have been studied in the
literature for a small set of countries, focused mostly on news shocks to TFP, are prone
to small-sample bias, and have not been compared in terms of their importance to the
business cycle between developing and developed countries. We contribute to the literature
by addressing these issues. We develop a simple Bootstrap-after-Bootstrap bias correction
method to estimate the role of news shocks to TFP, foreign interest rates and CToT in
explaining output (as well as other macroeconomic aggregates) variance for a large sample
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of countries. We show that while the importance of news shocks to TFP in explaining
the business cycle is similar between developing and developed countries, it is higher for
news shocks to foreign interest rates and CToT in developing countries than in developed.
The main drivers of these differences are, for foreign interest rates, the level of financial
development and net foreign indebtedness; and for CToT, the total trade of commodities to
GDP ratio and the degree to which financial markets (i.e. stock markets and those others
related to them) are developed. From a theoretical perspective, our results suggest that
studying the role of news in business cycles with one-sector models with only TFP shocks
may fall short in gauging correctly their importance. Moreover, for developing countries,
when studying news shocks to foreign interest rates and CToT, financial frictions and market
incompleteness are relevant features that should generate endogenously a higher relevance of
news shocks to these variables than in developed countries. Understanding to what degree
news shocks contribute to higher output and consumption volatility, especially in developing
countries, through these channels in a general equilibrium setting could probe useful to
quantify welfare implications of smoother business cycles in those economies.
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Appendix
A. Estimation of ΩBB1,2 for the other variables in the VAR system.
Here we report the results in Table 3.24 extended to the share of Bootstrap-after-Bootstrap
bias corrected estimates of the share of variance in, respectively, consumption, labor and
trade balance, explained by each type of news shock.
Table 3.27 shows these results, where the structure is the same as in Table 3.24 but for each
of the macro aggregates in the VAR aside from the exogenous variable. For consumption
and trade balance the difference of output variance explained by news shocks to exogenous
variables between both types of countries remains qualitatively similar to that for output.
However, it is worth noticing that for the trade balance, news shocks to CToT seem to have
the same effect on developed than developing countries.
Contrary to what happens with the aforementioned aggregates and output, for labor (H)
the mean share of variance explained by news shocks in all variables is higher in developed
countries than in developing. This is aligned with the view that labor supply has a higher
elasticity in developed countries than in developing countries. Also, for news shocks to
generate comovements in the aggregates the wealth effect over labor supply is crucial (see
Jaimovich and Rebelo 2009). When such effect is relatively high, positive news about TFP
generate a recession. Our results suggest that ad-hoc shut downs of this effect in models
to study news shocks in developed countries might artificially lead to inadequate impulse
responses to news shocks; and support conducting prior estimation of the elasticity of labor
supply with respect to wealth before performing counter factual exercises with the model.
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B. Country-by-country estimates of ΩBB1,2
In this section we report the country-by-country estimates of ΩBB1,2 for each endogenous
variable in the VAR system to news shocks in each exogenous variable. Table 3.28, Table 3.29,
and Table 3.30 report, respectively, the results for news shocks to TFP, foreign interest rates
and CToT. The second column of each table shows the income classification according to
the World Bank, where the highest possible value is 4 and this is equivalent to being a
developed country in our classification. The other income classifications, 1-3, are categorized
in our estimations as developing countries. The last five columns of each table represent,
respectively, the share of variance of the exogenous variable, consumption, labor, output and
trade balance (as a share of output) that is explained by the news shock to the exogenous
variable.
C. Details on the data for the Cross-Country regression.
We have a set of candidate variables, starting with those related to financial development
measures: Domestic credit provided by the financial sector as a share of GDP, net foreign
assets as a share of GDP, stocks market capitalization as a share of GDP, and net stock
of derivatives as a share of GDP. For commodities trade we use total trade (exports plus
imports) in commodities as a share of output. For institutional quality we use the Doing
Business score. For variables of structural change we use the share of value added in industry
and service sectors.
The net foreign assets to GDP ratio for each country is taken from the data set developed by
Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2018). To calculate the commodities total trade to GDP ratio we
use the United Nations Comtrade database. From it we calculate the share of commodities
trade (identified as those commodities that have an international price reported in the World
Bank Pink Sheet) over total trade of goods and services. We use the SITC classification.
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Then, for each country c, we calculate the share of total trade in commodities over total trade
as αc =
∑N
i=1 EXP
c
i +IMP
c
i
EXP c+IMP c
, where EXP ci and IMP
c
i are exports and imports of commodity
i, and EXP c + IMP c is the total trade in country c, and then the share of total trade
in commodities to GDP ratio in country c as: Commodities total tradec/GDPc = αc ∗
EXP c+IMP c
GDP c
. We calculate the average total trade of commodities to GDP ratio between 1960
(or later depending on the country) and 2017 for each country. The rest of the variables are
taken from the World Bank Development Indicators.
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FIGURES 99
Figure 3.1: Types of Bank Loans
FIGURES 100
Figure 3.2: Actual vs. Expected Real Bank Credit per Capita for the U.S.
Notes: This figure provides the deterministic(expected) component of real bank credit per capita
represented by the dashed line and actual values of real bank credit per capita represented by the solid
line. The shaded grey areas represent formations of credit booms along the length of the time series.
FIGURES 101
Figure 3.3: Normalized Real Bank Credit per Capita
Notes: This figure shows the normalized residuals of real bank credit per capita from (1.1). The dashed
red line represents the 0.75 deviations limit above zero which signals the potential formation of a sequence
of booms in bank loans.
FIGURES 102
Figure 3.4: Results of the bivariate probit autoregressive model at six months
(a) Model 1 (b) Model 2
(c) Model 3 (d) Model 4
(e) Model 5
Notes: This figure shows the in-sample results of estimating the system in (1.8) at a forecasting horizon of
h = 6 months. For predictors in X1: Model 1 includes the spread, Model 2 includes the spread and ∆FFt,
Model 3 includes the spread, ∆FFt and PC1t, Model 4 includes the spread, ∆FFt and PC
2
1t, Model 5
includes the spread, ∆FFt and PC1t ∗ PC2t. Predictors in X2 are PC3t and PC4t across all models.
FIGURES 103
Figure 3.5: Results of the bivariate probit autoregressive model at nine months
(a) Model 1 (b) Model 2
(c) Model 3 (d) Model 4
(e) Model 5
Notes: This figure shows the in-sample results of estimating the system in (1.8) at a forecasting horizon of
h = 9 months. For predictors in X1: Model 1 includes the spread, Model 2 includes the spread and ∆FFt,
Model 3 includes the spread, ∆FFt and PC1t, Model 4 includes the spread, ∆FFt and PC
2
1t, Model 5
includes the spread, ∆FFt and PC1t ∗ PC2t. Predictors in X2 are PC3t and PC4t across all models.
FIGURES 104
Figure 3.6: ROC Curves Unrestricted vs. Restricted Models
(a) Model 1 (b) Model 2
(c) Model 3 (d) Model 4
(e) Model 5
Notes: This figure provides a comparison between restricted and unrestricted models at a forecast horizon
of 6 months. The red line is the ROC curve for the restricted model (without credit booms and the housing
factor) while the black line is the unrestricted model. For predictors in X1: Model 1 includes the spread,
Model 2 includes the spread and ∆FFt, Model 3 includes the spread, ∆FFt and PC1t, Model 4 includes
the spread, ∆FFt and PC
2
1t, Model 5 includes the spread, ∆FFt and PC1t ∗ PC2t. Predictors in X2 are
PC3t and PC4t across all models.
FIGURES 105
Figure 3.7: Partial Effects
(a) Model 2 (b) Model 3
(c) Model 4 (d) Model 5
Notes: These are partial effects computed in Appendix 1.6 traced over time. The red dotted line represents
the sum of the partial effects of the recession probability P1t w.r.t ∆FFt and the spread; the blue dotted
line is the sum of partial effects of the recession probability w.r.t the credit boom probability pi2t and the
housing factor PC3t - housing. For predictors in X1: Model 2 includes the spread and ∆FFt, Model 3
includes the spread, ∆FFt and PC1t, Model 4 includes the spread, ∆FFt and PC
2
1t, Model 5 includes the
spread, ∆FFt and PC1t ∗ PC2t. Predictors in X2 are PC3t and PC4t across all models.
FIGURES 106
Figure 3.8: Out-Of-Sample Forecast at six month horizon
(a) Model 1 (b) Model 2
(c) Model 3 (d) Model 4
(e) Model 5
Notes: This figure shows the out-of-sample results of estimating the Great Recession. The parameters in
model (1.8) were estimated until December 2004 without any subsequent updating. Principal components
are updated recursively in the out-of-sample window. For predictors in X1: Model 1 includes the spread,
Model 2 includes the spread and ∆FFt, Model 3 includes the spread, ∆FFt and PC1t, Model 4 includes
the spread, ∆FFt and PC
2
1t, Model 5 includes the spread, ∆FFt and PC1t ∗ PC2t. Predictors in X2 are
PC3t and PC4t across all models.
FIGURES 107
Figure 3.9: Out-Of-Sample Forecast at nine month horizon
(a) Model 1 (b) Model 2
(c) Model 3 (d) Model 4
(e) Model 5
FIGURES 108
Figure 3.10: Out-Of-Sample Forecast Restricted Vs. Non-Restricted Models
(a) Model 1 (b) Model 2
(c) Model 3 (d) Model 4
(e) Model 5
Notes: This figure shows a comparison of out-of-sample results estimation of the Great Recession.
Restricted models were estimated by imposing A12 = 0 in model (1.8) and forcing a zero in β2
corresponding to the position of PC3t.
FIGURES 109
Figure 3.11: Normalized Residuals Nominal Aggregate Bank Credit Per Capita
Notes: The residuals in the graph above are the normalized ltd from equation (2.2). It represents the
difference between actual and expected nominal bank credit per capita from the regression in (2.1). The
red dotted line represents the 0.75 deviations above the mean 0, indicating the formation of credit booms.
FIGURES 110
Figure 3.12: Banks Excess Returns and Aggregate Credit Trend Deviations
Notes: Both trend deviations and bank excess returns are standardized to unit variances. The sample
spans the first quarter of 1960 till the fourth quarter of 2016. A negative correlation is straightforward to
spot along with multiple peaks of aggregate deviations associated with disasters in excess returns of the
commercial banks.
FIGURES 111
Figure 3.13: Bootstrap Results
Notes: The graph illustrates the results of the bootstrapping procedure in the first panel of Table 3.14 for
the full sample. 10,000 artificial samples were generated for either excess returns or dividend growth under
the null of no predictability and using draws with replacement of residuals under the null. The DGP for ltd
was assumed to be AR(1). The resulting sampling distribution of the slope coefficient is in Panel A, and of
the adjusted R2 is in Panel B. The shaded grey area represent 99% confidence intervals, and the dotted
lines represent the actual parameter values obtained in first column of Panel A in Table 3.10.
FIGURES 112
Figure 3.14: Bank Profits
Notes: The top panel represents the quarterly FRED series ”Corporate Profits, Domestic Industries:
Financial” as a proxy to commercial bank earnings. The bottom panel shows the results from the Hamilton
(2018) decomposition in (2.1) applied to the series in the top panel. Vertical red lines represent disaster in
cash flows preceded by booms in bank credit while vertical blue lines capture downturns in bank cash flows
that were not lead by credit booms. Shaded grey areas represent periods of excessive aggregate loan growth.
FIGURES 113
Figure 3.15: Empirical distribution of returns across the credit cycle
Notes: These are empirical distributions of bank returns at a one quarter horizon dependent on the
current stage of the bank loan cycle. The blue line represents the distribution following credit booms,
f(rt+1|ltdt > k); while the black line is the distribution of bank returns in the expansion phase of the credit
cycle prior to its peak, f(rt+1|ltdt ≤ k, ltdt ≥ lb). The intensity of the credit boom is given by parameter k.
FIGURES 114
Figure 3.16: Cumulative Empirical distribution of returns across the credit cycle
Notes: These are cumulative empirical distributions of bank returns at a one quarter horizon dependent
on the current stage of the bank loan cycle. The blue line represents the distribution following credit
booms, F (rt+1|ltdt > k); while the black line is the distribution of bank returns in the expansion phase of
the credit cycle prior to its peak, F (rt+1|ltdt ≤ k, ltdt ≥ lb). The intensity of the credit boom is given by
parameter k.
FIGURES 115
Figure 3.17: Bank returns spreads across the credit cycle
Notes: The graph above shows estimates of the size of neglected crash risk in U.S. bank stock returns at
horizons of one and four quarters conditional upon different levels of credit boom intensity as indicated by
the threshold k.
FIGURES 116
Figure 3.18: Cross-country mean distribution ΩBB1,2 for TFP by type of country
Notes: The figure shows the cross-country Kernel distributions of, respectively, the share of
output variance explained by news shocks to Total Factor Productivity in both developed
and developing (dashed-line) countries. Vertical bars represent the mean of each
distribution.
FIGURES 117
Figure 3.19: Cross-country mean distribution ΩBB1,2 for Foreign Interest Rate by type of
country
Notes: The figure shows the cross-country Kernel distributions of, respectively, the share of
output variance explained by news shocks to the Foreign Interest Rate in both developed
and developing (dashed-line) countries. Vertical bars represent the mean of each
distribution.
FIGURES 118
Figure 3.20: Cross-country mean distribution ΩBB1,2 for CToT by type of country
Notes: The figure shows the cross-country Kernel distributions of, respectively, the share of
output variance explained by news shocks to Commodity Terms of Trade in both developed
and developing (dashed-line) countries. Vertical lines represent the mean of each
distribution.
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TABLES 120
Table 3.1: Cross-tabulation of credit booms and recessions
Recessions
Rt = 0 Rt = 1
Credit Boom
Ct = 0 387 71
Ct = 1 168 19
Recessions
Rt = 0 Rt = 1
Credit Boom
(lagged)
Ct−6 = 0 397 61
Ct−6 = 1 152 29
Recessions
Rt = 0 Rt = 1
Credit Boom
(lagged)
Ct−9 = 0 400 58
Ct−9 = 1 146 32
Notes: Credit booms are identified using the methodology proposed by Hamilton (2017) and
Richter et al. (2017). I set a threshold level k = 0.75.
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Table 3.2: Estimation of the Bivariate Autoregressive Model at six months
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
A11
0.84
(35.83)
0.84
(37.57)
0.82
(30.89)
0.89
(39.41)
0.89
(39.25)
A12
0.22
(4.57)
0.22
(4.57)
0.22
(4.67)
0.24
(4.76)
0.21
(4.60)
A21
-0.15
(-4.08)
-0.15
(-4.05)
-0.15
(-4.27)
-0.10
(-3.19)
-0.11
(-3.63)
A22
0.72
(19.89)
0.72
(19.93)
0.71
(18.98)
0.67
(17.75)
0.69
(19.83)
X1 - Recession Drivers
Spread
-0.38
(-7.91)
-0.38
(-7.88)
-0.42
(-7.15)
-0.38
(-8.01)
-0.36
(-7.55)
∆FFt
0.01
(2.01)
0.01
(0.29)
0.01
(0.28)
0.03
(1.05)
PC1t - output
-0.25
(-1.41)
PC21t
-1.33
(-3.80)
PC1t ∗ PC2t -1.71(-4.78)
X2 - Credit Boom Drivers
PC3t - housing
0.53
(7.25)
0.53
(7.26)
0.52
(7.03)
0.62
(8.01)
0.61
(7.98)
PC4t - money/credit
6.34
(6.21)
6.33
(6.21)
6.98
(7.84)
5.99
(6.42)
6.37
(6.97)
ρ
-0.19
(-1.17)
-0.18
(-1.17)
-0.15
(-0.93)
-0.25
(-2.10)
-0.23
(-1.89)
Measures of Fit
Log-likelihood 360.23 360.22 358.71 348.91 344.14
R2 - Mc Fadden 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.40 0.41
BIC 392.01 395.18 396.84 387.05 382.28
QPS-r 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.15 0.14
QPS-c 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24
QPS 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.39 0.38
CRR50 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.89 0.89
CRC50 0.84 0.84 0.83 0.81 0.81
Notes: The Newey-West corrected t-stats are given in parentheses. Parameter estimation is carried
through MLE. Principal components are computed using a 16 month moving average.
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Table 3.3: Estimation of the Bivariate Autoregressive Model at nine months
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
A11
0.73
(17.31)
0.73
(17.42)
0.72
(14.15)
0.78
(22.12)
0.79
(21.50)
A12
0.29
(4.43)
0.29
(4.43)
0.29
(4.39)
0.31
(4.56)
0.29
(4.65)
A21
-0.24
(-4.03)
-0.24
(-4.03)
-0.24
(-3.99)
-0.18
(-3.06)
-0.19
(-3.45)
A22
0.49
(7.70)
0.49
(7.71)
0.49
(7.36)
0.44
(6.98)
0.45
(7.66)
X1 - Recession Drivers
Spread
-0.46
(-7.09)
-0.47
(-7.05)
-0.48
(-6.17)
-0.46
(-7.54)
-0.45
(-7.44)
∆FFt
-0.02
(-0.56)
-0.02
(-0.51)
-0.02
(-0.66)
-0.01
(-0.28)
PC1t - output
-0.09
(-0.35)
PC21t
-1.42
(-3.13)
PC1t ∗ PC2t -1.98(-4.21)
X2 - Credit Boom Drivers
PC3t - housing
0.84
(6.56)
0.84
(6.56)
0.84
(6.53)
0.95
(7.61)
0.94
(7.60)
PC4t - money/credit
8.28
(7.78)
8.31
(7.91)
8.47
(8.29)
8.03
(7.61)
8.32
(8.18)
ρ
-0.18
(-1.10)
-0.18
(-1.11)
-0.17
(-1.07)
-0.22
(-1.56)
-0.23
(-1.65)
Measures of Fit
Log-likelihood 365.90 365.86 365.76 358.34 354.07
R2 - Mc Fadden 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.38 0.39
BIC 397.66 400.79 403.86 396.45 392.18
QPS-r 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.16 0.16
QPS-c 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.24 0.24
QPS 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.40 0.40
CRR50 0.87 0.88 0.87 0.89 0.89
CRC50 0.84 0.83 0.84 0.82 0.83
Notes: The Newey-West corrected t-stats are given in parentheses. Parameter estimation is carried
through MLE. Principal components are computed using a 16 month moving average.
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Table 3.4: Measures of Fit Bivariate Autoregressive Model at horizons of six and nine months
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Measures of Fit Restricted Models (h=6)
R2 - McFadden
(Unrestricted Model)
0.23
(0.38)
0.23
(0.38)
0.25
(0.38)
0.23
(0.40)
0.23
(0.40)
QPS-r 0.19 0.19 0.18 0.20 0.20
QPS-c 0.33 0.33 0.32 0.32 0.32
QPS
(Unrestricted Model)
0.52
(0.41)
0.52
(0.41)
0.50
(0.41)
0.52
(0.40)
0.52
(0.40)
CRR50
(Unrestricted Model)
0.87
(0.87)
0.87
(0.87)
0.86
(0.87)
0.86
(0.90)
0.86
(0.89)
CRC50 0.73 0.73 0.76 0.75 0.74
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Measures of Fit Restricted Models (h=9)
R2 - McFadden
(Unrestricted Model)
0.23
(0.37)
0.23
(0.37)
0.24
(0.37)
0.23
(0.38)
0.23
(0.39)
QPS-r 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.20 0.20
QPS-c 0.33 0.33 0.32 0.32 0.32
QPS
(Unrestricted Model)
0.52
(0.41)
0.52
(0.41)
0.51
(0.41)
0.52
(0.40)
0.52
(0.40)
CRR50
(Unrestricted Model)
0.87
(0.87)
0.86
(0.88)
0.86
(0.87)
0.86
(0.89)
0.87
(0.89)
CRC50 0.73 0.73 0.75 0.74 0.73
Notes: Measures of Fit are for the restricted models where A12 = 0 and there is
no housing factor by enforcing a zero in β2 corresponding to PC3t.
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Table 3.5: Autoregressive Model at h=3:12 months
Model 2
H=3 H=4 H=5 H=6 H=7 H=8 H=9 H=10 H=11 H=12
A11
0.92
(59.62)
0.90
(43.05)
0.87
(54.63)
0.84
(37.57)
0.80
(26.91)
0.76
(21.79)
0.73
(17.42)
0.71
(17.32)
0.68
(12.89)
0.63
(8.72)
A12
0.11
(2.82)
0.13
(2.79)
0.17
(4.93)
0.22
(4.57)
0.26
(4.50)
0.27
(4.39)
0.29
(4.43)
0.27
(4.28)
0.27
(4.05)
0.30
(4.01)
A21
-0.07
(-2.70)
-0.11
(-2.75)
-0.13
(-4.71)
-0.15
(-4.05)
-0.17
(-4.02)
-0.21
(-4.01)
-0.24
(-4.03)
-0.33
(-4.09)
-0.37
(-3.76)
-0.37
(-3.69)
A22
0.87
(32.50)
0.83
(24.93)
0.78
(30.38)
0.72
(19.93)
0.67
(14.80)
0.63
(11.91)
0.49
(7.71)
0.50
(7.99)
0.39
(5.17)
0.27
(2.81)
Spread
-0.21
(-6.11)
-0.27
(-6.1)
-0.33
(-9.15)
-0.38
(-7.88)
-0.43
(-7.75)
-0.45
(-7.35)
-0.47
(-7.05)
-0.49
(-6.75)
-0.45
(-6.03)
-0.45
(-5.65)
∆FFt
-0.04
(-1.25)
0.02
(0.55)
-0.04
(-1.27)
0.01
(2.01)
-0.04
(-0.63)
-0.00
(-0.05)
-0.02
(-0.56)
0.07
(0.98)
0.16
(2.12)
0.07
(0.83)
PC3t - housing
0.27
(5.31)
0.35
(5.37)
0.44
(8.15)
0.53
(7.26)
0.59
(6.87)
0.66
(6.22)
0.84
(6.56)
0.84
(6.43)
0.99
(6.44)
1.11
(5.99)
PC4t - money/credit
3.63
(3.38)
5.43
(3.62)
6.53
(7.47)
6.33
(6.21)
7.18
(6.12)
8.68
(7.53)
8.31
(7.91)
11.39
(8.40)
11.07
(8.99)
10.05
(7.73)
ρ
-0.18
(-0.74)
-0.18
(-0.73)
-0.17
(-1.07)
-0.18
(-1.17)
-0.17
(-1.05)
-0.19
(-1.11)
-0.18
(-1.11)
-0.11
(-0.61)
-0.19
(-1.22)
-0.23
(-1.68)
Log-likelihood 357.73 351.23 351.77 360.22 361.99 360.36 365.86 353.94 365.30 379.19
Notes: The Newey-West corrected t-stats are given in parentheses.
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Table 3.6: Average partial effects
Pre 2000 Post 2000 All years
Forecast Horizon of six months (h=6)
A.P.E
pi1,t−h
A.P.E
pi2,t−h
A.P.E
pi1,t−h
A.P.E
pi2,t−h
A.P.E
pi1,t−h
A.P.E
pi2,t−h
Model 1
0.1155
(13.25)
0.0299
(5.02)
0.1305
(17.28)
0.0338
(2.48)
0.1194
(15.82)
0.0310
(2.27)
Model 2
0.1155
(13.27)
0.0299
(5.03)
0.1307
(17.19)
0.0338
(2.49)
0.1195
(15.72)
0.0309
(2.28)
Model 3
0.1089
(12.58)
0.0292
(4.77)
0.1300
(16.23)
0.0348
(2.66)
0.1145
(14.30)
0.0307
(2.35)
Model 4
0.1035
(12.85)
0.0278
(4.69)
0.1259
(12.20)
0.033
(2.50)
0.1095
(10.62)
0.0295
(2.18)
Model 5
0.1034
(13.05)
0.0243
(4.57)
0.1242
(13.29)
0.0292
(2.36)
0.1090
(11.67)
0.0256
(2.07)
Pre 2000 Post 2000 All years
Forecast Horizon of nine months (h=9)
A.P.E
pi1,t−h
A.P.E
pi2,t−h
A.P.E
pi1,t−h
A.P.E
pi2,t−h
A.P.E
pi1,t−h
A.P.E
pi2,t−h
Model 1
0.1048
(11.99)
0.0411
(6.79)
0.1190
(16.79)
0.0467
(4.36)
0.1085
(15.31)
0.0426
(3.98)
Model 2
0.1048
(12.01)
0.0411
(6.81)
0.1189
(16.98)
0.0466
(4.36)
0.1085
(15.31)
0.0425
(3.98)
Model 3
0.1027
(11.77)
0.0410
(6.36)
0.1178
(15.67)
0.0470
(4.29)
0.1066
(14.18)
0.0426
(3.88)
Model 4
0.0998
(11.20)
0.0402
(6.42)
0.1265
(21.75)
0.0509
(4.63)
0.1069
(18.38)
0.0430
(3.92)
Model 5
0.0996
(11.75)
0.0363
(6.26)
0.1260
(23.75)
0.0459
(4.63)
0.1066
(20.09)
0.0389
(3.92)
Notes: This table shows the average partial effects (A.P.E) from (1.16)
of the recession probability P1t w.r.t. the lagged probability of reces-
sion pi1,t−h and lagged probability of credit booms pi2,t−h. Standard er-
rors are in parentheses. They were computed using the delta method.
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Table 3.7: Measures of fit for the out-of-sample forecast
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
OOS Measures of Fit, h=6 months
QPS-r 0.09 0.10 0.09 0.07 0.08
QPS-c 0.38 0.38 0.40 0.40 0.40
QPS 0.47 0.48 0.49 0.47 0.47
CRR50 0.92 0.91 0.92 0.95 0.94
CRC50 0.74 0.73 0.73 0.69 0.71
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
OOS Measures of Fit, h=9 months
QPS-r 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.07 0.07
QPS-c 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.38 0.38
QPS 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.46 0.46
CRR50 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.95 0.94
CRC50 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.75 0.75
Notes: This table shows the out-of-sample measures of fit for the
prediction of the Great Recession. The parameters in model (1.8)
were estimated until December 2004 without any subsequent up-
dating. Principal components are updated recursively in the out-
of-sample window. For predictors in X1: Model 1 includes the
spread, Model 2 includes the spread and ∆FFt, Model 3 includes
the spread, ∆FFt and PC1t, Model 4 includes the spread, ∆FFt
and PC21t, Model 5 includes the spread, ∆FFt and PC1t ∗ PC2t.
Predictors in X2 are PC3t and PC4t across all models.
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Table 3.8: Measures of fit for the restricted out-of-sample forecast
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
OOS Measures of Fit, h=6 months
QPS-r 0.16 0.16 0.15 0.16 0.15
QPS-c 0.78 0.78 0.73 0.76 0.80
QPS
(unrestricted)
0.94
(0.47)
0.94
(0.48)
0.87
(0.49)
0.92
(0.47)
0.95
(0.47)
CRR50
(unrestricted)
0.86
(0.92)
0.86
(0.91)
0.88
(0.92)
0.86
(0.95)
0.86
(0.94)
CRC50 0.37 0.37 0.44 0.40 0.37
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
OOS Measures of Fit, h=9 months
QPS-r 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.13
QPS-c 0.65 0.65 0.63 0.61 0.63
QPS
(unrestricted)
0.77
(0.47)
0.77
(0.47)
0.74
(0.47)
0.74
(0.46)
0.76
(0.46)
CRR50
(unrestricted)
0.86
(0.89)
0.86
(0.89)
0.88
(0.89)
0.86
(0.95)
0.86
(0.94)
CRC50 0.46 0.46 0.49 0.49 0.46
Notes: This table shows the out-of-sample measures of fit for the restricted
models in the prediction of the Great Recession. Restricted models were
estimated by imposing A12 = 0 in model (1.8) and forcing a zero in β2
corresponding to the position of PC3t.
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Table 3.9: Measures of fit for the out-of-sample forecast - different starting dates
Model 1
Out-Of-Sample Measures of Fit Unrestricted Model, h=6 months
Estimation up until December 2003
QPS-r 0.08
QPS-c 0.38
QPS 0.46
CRR50 0.93
CRC50 0.72
Estimation up until December 2004
QPS-r 0.09
QPS-c 0.38
QPS 0.47
CRR50 0.92
CRC50 0.74
Estimation up until December 2005
QPS-r 0.10
QPS-c 0.37
QPS 0.48
CRR50 0.93
CRC50 0.77
Notes: This table shows the out-of-sample measures of fit for the prediction of
the Great Recession. The parameters in model (1.8) were estimated until Decem-
ber 2003 or December 2004 or December 2005 without any subsequent updating.
Principal components are updated recursively in the out-of-sample window. For
predictors in X1, model 1 includes the spread. Predictors in X2 are PC3t and PC4t.
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Table 3.10: Long Horizon Regressions Bank Excess Returns∑H
h=1 r
e
t+h = β0 + β1ltdt + t+H
H=4
(quarters)
H=8
(quarters)
H=12
(quarters)
H=16
(quarters)
Panel A
-full sample
ltdt
-0.05
(-2.08)**
[-0.25]**
{0.05}
-0.09
(-2.66)***
[-0.35]**
{0.10}
-0.12
(-2.72)***
[-0.41]**
{0.14}
-0.13
(-2.00)**
[-0.39]*
{0.13}
Panel B
-reduced sample-
ltdt
-0.04
(-1.59)
[-0.20]*
{0.03}
-0.06
(-2.00)**
[-0.24]
{0.05}
-0.08
(-1.68)*
[-0.26]
{0.06}
-0.08
(-1.11)
[-0.24]
{0.05}
Panel C
-alternative decomposition method-
ltdt
-0.04
(-1.77)*
[-0.21]*
{0.03}
-0.08
(-2.22)**
[-0.29]*
{0.07}
-0.10
(-2.30)***
[-0.34]*
{0.10}
-0.11
(-1.66)*
[-0.30]
{0.08}
Notes: The table below shows the effect of the aggregate loans trend de-
viation variable ltd on excess bank returns denoted by ret+h. Panel A illus-
trates the results of the full sample, Panel B limits the sample size to ex-
clude the Credit Crisis and Panel C considers an alternative decomposition
method discussed in section 2.3.1. Number of (∗) indicate statistical sig-
nificance computed in two ways. The second row are Newey-West t-stats
where standard errors were calculated with an autocorrelation lag order H
for each forecasting horizon considered. The third row are Valkanov (2003)
t-stats described in section 2.3.1. Adjusted R2s are in curly brackets.
TABLES 130
Table 3.11: Long Horizon Regressions - Other Macro Predictors∑H
h=1 r
e
t+h = β0 + β1ltdt + β2Controlst + t+h
H=4
(quarters)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ltdt
-0.05
(-2.08)**
-0.06
(-2.52)**
-0.05
(-2.39)***
-0.06
(-2.40)***
-0.05
(-2.17)**
-0.07
(-3.46)***
dt − pt 0.12(2.21)**
0.10
(2.00)**
cayt
3.18
(2.93)***
3.33
(3.01)***
ipgrt
-0.98
(-2.39)***
-1.1
(-3.18)***
mktrett
-0.32
(-2.41)***
-0.30
(-2.22)**
Adjusted R2 0.05 0.09 0.14 0.09 0.07 0.23
Notes: The table below shows the effect of the aggregate loans trend deviation variable
ltd on excess bank returns denoted by ret+h in addition to other popular control variables
from the asset pricing literature: dt − pt is the bank dividend yield, cayt is the deviation
measure of the consumption-wealth ratio in Lettau and Ludvigson (2001), ipgrt is industrial
production growth and mktrett is the market return proxied by the value-weighted CRSP
index. Number of (∗) indicate statistical significance of Newey-West t-stats where standard
errors were calculated with an autocorrelation lag length H.
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Table 3.12: Long Horizon Regressions Dividend Growth
(dt+H − dt) = β0 + β1ltdt + t+h
H=4
(quarters)
H=8
(quarters)
H=12
(quarters)
H=16
(quarters)
Panel A
-full sample
ltdt
-0.06
(-3.18)***
[-0.34]***
{0.10}
-0.13
(-3.21)***
[-0.55]***
{0.23}
-0.17
(-2.91)***
[-0.62]***
{0.28}
-0.19
(-2.62)***
[-0.59]***
{0.25}
Panel B
-reduced sample-
ltdt
-0.05
(-3.27)**
[-0.29]***
{0.07}
-0.11
(-5.03)***
[-0.51]***
{0.20}
-0.14
(-4.93)***
[-0.56]***
{0.23}
-0.13
(-4.16)***
[-0.49]***
{0.19}
Panel C
-alternative decomposition method-
ltdt
-0.06
(-3.25)***
[-0.34]***
{0.10}
-0.13
(-3.26)***
[-0.55]***
{0.23}
-0.17
(-2.97)***
[-0.62]***
{0.28}
-0.19
(-2.69)***
[-0.59]***
{0.25}
Notes: The table below shows the effect of the aggregate loans trend deviation
variable ltd on bank aggregate dividend growth dt+H − dt. Panel A illustrates
the results of the full sample, Panel B limits the sample size to exclude the
Credit Crisis and Panel C considers an alternative decomposition method dis-
cussed in section 2.3.1. Number of (∗) indicate statistical significance computed
in two ways. The second row are Newey-West t-stats where standard errors
were calculated with an autocorrelation lag order H for each forecasting horizon
considered. The third row are Valkanov (2003) t-stats described in section 2.3.1.
Adjusted R2s are in curly brackets.
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Table 3.13: Long Horizon Regressions Dividend Growth - Other Macro Predictors
dt+H − dt = β0 + β1ltdt + β2Controlst + t+h
H=4
(quarters)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ltdt
-0.06
(-3.18)***
-0.06
(-3.22)***
-0.06
(-3.21)***
-0.06
(-3.08)***
-0.06
(-3.25)***
-0.06
(-3.15)***
dt − pt -0.01(-0.11)
0.01
(0.18)
cayt
0.02
(0.02)
-0.10
(-0.12)
ipgrt
0.68
(2.01)**
0.72
(2.13)**
mktrett
0.12
(1.18)
0.23
(1.5)
Adjusted R2 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.13 0.11 0.12
Notes: The table below shows the effect of the aggregate loans trend deviation variable ltd
on bank dividend growth denoted by dt+H − dt in addition to other control variables shown
to predict returns. Number of (∗) indicate statistical significance of Newey-West t-stats where
standard errors were calculated with an autocorrelation lag length of H.
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Table 3.14: Bootstrap Results∑H
h=1 r
e
t+H = β0 + β1ltdt + t+H
H=4 (quarters)
β1 R
2
ltdt -0.05 0.05
95% CI [-0.028 , 0.028] [-0.005 , 0.014]
99% CI [-0.042 , 0.040] [-0.005, 0.027]
H=4 (quarters)
-Reduced Sample-
β1 R
2
ltdt -0.04 0.03
95% CI [-0.030 , 0.029] [-0.006 , 0.016]
99% CI [-0.044 , 0.045] [-0.006 , 0.032]
dt+H − dt = β0 + β1ltdt + t+H
H=4 (quarters)
β1 R
2
ltdt -0.06 0.10
95% CI [-0.02 , 0.02] [-0.005 , 0.013]
99% CI [-0.04 , 0.04] [-0.005 , 0.027]
Notes: The table below shows the confidence
intervals resulted from a bootstrap procedure
similar to Lettau and Ludvigson (2005). 10,000
artificial samples of excess returns and dividend
growth are obtained under the null of no pre-
dictability by drawing with replacement from
OLS residuals. The presumed DGP for ltd was
an AR(1). Artificial sampling distributions are
built for the slope coefficient and R2s. The mid-
dle panel illustrated the result of the procedure
for excess returns by excluding the Great Re-
cession of 2008.
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Table 3.15: Long Horizon Regressions Excess Returns of Size-Sorted Portfolios∑H
h=1 r
e
t+h = β0 + β1ltdt + t+h
H=4
(quarters)
Small Medium Large
ltdt
-0.10
(-3.47)***
{0.11}
-0.08
(-3.16)***
{0.10}
-0.05
(-2.00)**
{0.05}
H=8
(quarters)
Small Medium Large
ltdt
-0.14
(-2.94)***
{0.10}
-0.12
(-3.10)***
{0.10}
-0.09
(-2.66)***
{0.10}
Notes: I sort portfolios of commercial banks
by their size as in Fama and French (1993) into
small, medium and large banks. Small banks
represent the bottom 30%, medium banks are
the middle 40% and large banks are the top
30% of the distribution. Portfolios are created
at the end of June in year t based on size, and
value weighted returns for each portfolio are
calculated from July in year t to June in t+ 1.
The results illustrate the effect of ltd on excess
returns of size-sorted portfolios spanning the
full sample size 1960-2016.
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Table 3.16: Long Horizon Regressions Dividend Growth of Size-Sorted Portfolios
dt+H − dt = β0 + β1ltdt + t+h
H=4
(quarters)
Small Medium Large
ltdt
-0.21
(-3.60)***
{0.06}
-0.08
(-3.15)***
{0.06}
-0.03
(-1.15)
{0.01}
H=8
(quarters)
Small Medium Large
ltdt
-0.36
(-4.26)***
{0.14}
-0.16
(-3.25)***
{0.15}
-0.07
(-1.76)*
{0.07}
Notes: I sort portfolios of commercial banks
by their size as in Fama and French (1993)
into small, medium and large banks. Small
banks represent the bottom 30%, medium
banks are the middle 40% and large banks
are the top 30% of the distribution. Portfo-
lios are created at the end of June in year t
based on size, and dividends are calculated
for each portfolio from July in year t to June
in t+1. The results illustrate the effect of ltd
on dividend growth of size-sorted portfolios
spanning the full sample size 1960-2016.
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Table 3.17: Variance Decomposition Bank Excess Returns
Excess Returns
Var(DRnews) Var(CFnews) Var(RFnews)
2*Cov(DRnews,
CFnews)
-2*Cov(DRnews,
RFnews)
-2*Cov(CFnews,
RFnews)
Panel A: Value-Weighted Bank Index
Yt = [r
e
t , rf,t, termspt, dt − pt] 0.13(3.3)
0.90
(5.8)
0.07
(18.3)
-0.06
(-2.30)
0.01
(0.3)
0.03
(0.6)
Yt = [r
e
t , rf,t, ltdt, termspt, dt − pt] 0.25(3.9)
0.96
(6.1)
0.06
(14.4)
-0.06
(-2.8)
0.02
(0.4)
0.19
(2.4)
Panel B: Large Commercial Banks
Yt = [r
e
t , rf,t, termspt, dt − pt] 0.12(3.3)
0.88
(5.7)
0.07
(19.5)
-0.07
(-2.5)
0.01
(0.25)
-0.01
(-0.2)
Yt = [r
e
t , rf,t, ltdt, termspt, dt − pt] 0.23(3.9)
0.94
(6.1)
0.06
(15.0)
-0.07
(-3.2)
0.01
(0.3)
0.14
(1.9)
Panel B: Medium Commercial Banks
Yt = [r
e
t , rf,t, termspt, dt − pt] 0.39(3.3)
1.25
(5.4)
0.08
(11.5)
-0.16
(-2.8)
-0.16
(-2.9)
0.71
(4.2)
Yt = [r
e
t , rf,t, ltdt, termspt, dt − pt] 0.68(3.8)
1.31
(5.9)
0.07
(10.3)
-0.15
(-3.7)
-0.11
(-2.2)
1.02
(4.6)
Panel C: Small Commercial Banks
Yt = [r
e
t , rf,t, termspt, dt − pt] 0.41(3.3)
1.37
(5.3)
0.06
(14.0)
-0.04
(-1.2)
-0.03
(-0.7)
0.84
(5.3)
Yt = [r
e
t , rf,t, ltdt, termspt, dt − pt] 1.07(3.8)
1.65
(5.5)
0.06
(8.4)
-0.06
(-1.1)
-0.00
(-0.05)
1.73
(4.75)
Notes: The table below shows the results of a variance decomposition for excess bank returns in a baseline VAR in Panel A and a complete VAR
in Panel B. The first row of each panel gives the corresponding news shares of the total variance by excluding ltd while the second row adds the
aggregate loans trend deviation back to the information set. The difference represents the marginal contribution of ltd .
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Table 3.18: Spread of Returns of Commercial Bank Stocks
Size of Neglected Crash Risk in U.S. Bank Returns
h=1 quarter
Credit Boom Intensity
(S.D.)
E[rt+h|ltdt > k] E[rt+h|ltdt ≤ k, ltdt >= lb] Spread p-valueKS test
k = 0.7 0.022 0.043 -0.021 0.178
k = 0.8 0.018 0.044 -0.026 0.106
k = 0.9 0.021 0.042 -0.021 0.157
k = 1.0 0.032 0.038 -0.006 0.225
k = 1.1 0.018 0.041 -0.023 0.146
k = 1.2 -0.003 0.044 -0.047 0.069*
k = 1.3 -0.009 0.044 -0.053 0.048**
k = 1.4 -0.014 0.043 -0.057 0.050**
k = 1.5 -0.030 0.044 -0.074 0.030**
Mean 0.006 0.043 -0.04
Size of Neglected Crash Risk in U.S. Bank Returns
h=4 quarters
k = 0.7 0.021 0.042 -0.021 0.076*
k = 0.8 0.015 0.044 -0.029 0.045**
k = 0.9 0.026 0.039 -0.013 0.205
k = 1.0 0.018 0.041 -0.023 0.145
k = 1.1 0.014 0.041 -0.028 0.114
k = 1.2 -0.002 0.043 -0.045 0.035**
k = 1.3 -0.009 0.044 -0.052 0.068*
k = 1.4 -0.004 0.041 -0.045 0.185
k = 1.5 -0.032 0.043 -0.075 0.073*
Mean 0.005 0.042 -0.037
Notes: The table below shows the respective means of two distributions of bank returns condi-
tioned upon the previous stage of the bank loan cycle. The size of neglected crash risk is the
difference of the two conditional means where lb is a lower bound imposed to exclude credit busts.
The last column gives the result of a non-parametric KS test that statistically examines the dis-
tance of the two distributions considered. Number of (*) represent the corresponding statistical
significance.
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Table 3.19: Conditional Variances of Commercial Bank Stocks
Conditional Variances
h=1 quarter
Credit Boom Intensity
(S.D.)
V ar[rt+h|ltdt > k] V ar[rt+h|ltdt ≤ k, ltdt >= lb]
k = 0.7 0.020 0.010
k = 0.8 0.022 0.010
k = 0.9 0.022 0.010
k = 1.0 0.020 0.011
k = 1.1 0.018 0.012
k = 1.2 0.018 0.012
k = 1.3 0.018 0.012
k = 1.4 0.020 0.012
k = 1.5 0.019 0.012
Mean 0.020 0.011
Conditional Variances
h=4 quarters
k = 0.7 0.023 0.010
k = 0.8 0.024 0.010
k = 0.9 0.024 0.011
k = 1.0 0.024 0.011
k = 1.1 0.026 0.011
k = 1.2 0.030 0.011
k = 1.3 0.026 0.012
k = 1.4 0.028 0.012
k = 1.5 0.030 0.012
Mean 0.026 0.011
Notes: The table below shows the variances corresponding to two distributions
of the bank returns conditioned upon the previous stage of the bank loan cycle as
indicated by parameter k.
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Table 3.20: Model Parameters
Parameter Value Calibration & Estimation
β 0.997 Calibration
θ 2 Calibration
p00 0.9381 Estimation MS model in Div Growth
p11 0.9040 Estimation MS model in Div Growth
µ0 0.0301 Estimation MS model in Div Growth
µ1 0.0042 Estimation MS model in Div Growth
σ0 0.1069 Estimation MS model in Div Growth
σ1 0.2178 Estimation MS model in Div Growth
p 0.02 Calibration
b 0.33 Calibration
Notes: The table below shows the parameter of the theoretical
model either calibrated or estimated from data.
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Table 3.21: Data vs. Model
Moment Data Model with disasters Model without disasters
E[ret+h|ltdt > k] 0.006 0.006 0.022
E[ret+h|ltdt ≤ k, ltdt >= lb] 0.043 0.043 0.059
V ar[ret+h|ltdt > k] 0.020 0.021 0.019
V ar[ret+h|ltdt ≤ k, ltdt >= lb] 0.011 0.023 0.021
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Table 3.22: Countries available for estimation by each exogenous variable
Exogenous Variable Total Countries Developed Countries Developing Countries
TFPt 83 42 41
R∗t 106 46 60
CToTt 103 43 60
Notes: The table reports in the second column, for each exogenous variable (first column) the total amount
of countries we have available to perform country-by-country estimations of the output variance share of
the variables in the VAR explained by news shocks. The third and fourth columns break down the total
number of countries by type of country.
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Table 3.23: Cross-country mean estimates of: Ω1,2, Ω
BB
1,2 , and small sample bias (all in p.p.)
Country
Type
Exogenous
Variable
Cross-Country
Mean Ω1,2
Cross-Country
Mean ΩBB1,2
Cross-Country
Mean Small Sample Bias
Developed
TFPt 12.8 14.7 1.9
R∗ 12.2 18 5.8
CToTt 20.3 15.4 -4.9
Developing
TFPt 13 15.6 2.6
R∗ 22.1 24 2.3
CToTt 24.8 23.7 -1.1
Notes: For each type of country (first column) the table reports: In the third column, the cross-country
mean (uncorrected) share of output variance explained by news shocks to each exogenous variable in the
second column. In the fourth column, the cross-country mean of bias-corrected share of output variance
explained by news shocks to each exogenous variable in the second column. The last column shows the
respective mean small sample bias of each estimate.
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Table 3.24: Mean and median estimates of ΩBB1,2 by country type, and differences between
developing and developed countries (all in p.p.)
Exogenous
Variable
Country
Type
Cross-Country
Mean ΩBB1,2
Cross-Country
Median ΩBB1,2
TFPt
Developed 14.7 12.3
Developing 15.6 11.5
Developing-Developed 0.9 -0.8
R∗
Developed 18 13.8
Developing 24 18.5
Developing-Developed 6 4.7
CToTt
Developed 15.4 6.8
Developing 23.7 18.8
Developing-Developed 8.3 12
Notes: For both developed and developing countries, the table reports the cross-
country mean and median bias-corrected shares of output variance explained by
news shocks, ΩBB1,2 , to each exogenous variable in the first column. Within each
exogenous variable, the third row reports the difference between developing and
developed countries for the mean (third column) and median estimates of ΩBB1,2 .
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Table 3.25: Cross-country regression: ΩBB1,2 - Foreign interests rates
Dependent Variable
ΩBB,i1,2 - i = Foreign Interest Rates
Developing
Dummy
Independent Variable Z Reg 1 Reg 2 Reg 3 Reg 4 Reg 5
Developing
Dummy
5.93* 9.12** 5.20
(3.50) (3.89) (5.04)
Net foreign assets/GDP 4.84*** 4.64*** 3.62***
(1.68) (1.56) (1.33)
Domestic credit provided
by financial sector/GDP
-0.06 -0.09** -0.0061***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.0007)
R-squared 0.024 0.057 0.072 0.062 0.400
Notes: ***,** and * are are significant at, respectively, 1%, 5% and 10% levels of significance.
Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. Regressions 1 to 4 correspond to the model in
Equation 3.7. The last column regresses the Development Dummy against the Domestic
credit provided by financial sector to GDP ratio.
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Table 3.26: Cross-country regression: ΩBB1,2 - Commodity terms of trade
Dependent Variable
ΩBB,i1,2 - i = CToT
Developing
Dummy
Independent Variable Z Reg 1 Reg 2 Reg 3 Reg 4 Reg 5
Developing
Dummy
8.37** 7.30** 1.24
(3.47) (3.37) (3.63)
Commodities
total trade/GDP
0.46** 0.57*** 0.57***
(0.18) (0.17) (0.17)
Stocks
market cap/GDP
-0.14** -0.14** -0.0035**
(0.06) (0.06) (0.001)
R-squared 0.053 0.117 0.187 0.186 0.074
Notes: ***,** and * are are significant at, respectively, 1%, 5% and 10% levels of signif-
icance. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. Regressions 1 to 4 correspond to the
model in Equation 3.7. The last column regresses the Development Dummy against the
Stock market capitalization to GDP ratio.
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Table 3.27: Mean and median estimates of ΩBB1,2 for each endogenous variable in the VAR by
country type, and differences between developed and developing countries
VAR
Variable
Exogenous
Variable
Country
Type
Cross-Country
Mean ΩBB1,2
Cross-Country
Median ΩBB1,2
C
TFPt
Developed 18.1 14.7
Developing 21.0 14.3
Developing-Developed 2.89 -0.31
R∗
Developed 14.1 12.6
Developing 23.9 13.3
Developing-Developed 9.7 0.7
CToTt
Developed 18.7 13.9
Developing 23.2 15.8
Developing-Developed 4.53 1.85
H
TFPt
Developed 23.3 20.0
Developing 19.4 11.3
Developing-Developed -3.94 -8.67
R∗
Developed 17.3 11.8
Developing 14.6 13.3
Developing-Developed -2.72 1.45
CToTt
Developed 22.8 15.0
Developing 18.1 11.5
Developing-Developed -4.69 -3.52
Y
TFPt
Developed 14.7 12.3
Developing 15.6 11.5
Developing-Developed 0.9 -0.9
R∗
Developed 18.0 13.8
Developing 24.0 18.5
Developing-Developed 6 4.7
CToTt
Developed 15.4 6.8
Developing 23.7 18.8
Developing-Developed 8.3 12.1
TB
TFPt
Developed 28.43 21.58
Developing 28.41 26.48
Developing-Developed -0.02 4.90
R∗
Developed 29.29 21.95
Developing 35.01 30.50
Developing-Developed 5.72 8.55
CToTt
Developed 26.32 18.17
Developing 26.39 22.64
Developing-Developed 0.07 4.47
Notes: For both developed and developing countries, the table reports the cross-country mean
and median bias-corrected shares of the variance of each macro aggregate in the first column
explained by news shocks, ΩBB1,2 , to each exogenous variable in the second column. Within
each exogenous variable, the third row reports the difference between developing and developed
countries for the mean (third column) and median estimates of ΩBB1,2 .
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Table 3.28: Country-by-country estimates of ΩBB1,2 for TFP as exogenous variable
Country Income Class TFP C H Y TB
Burkina Faso 1 7.18 14.47 9.37 12.81 2.38
Mozambique 1 2.63 4.44 8.79 6.23 10.3
Niger 1 52.67 14.49 54.38 65.95 5.28
Senegal 1 78.23 42.41 9.19 32.56 81.95
Tanzania 1 12.38 38.03 2.15 1.34 34.59
Zimbabwe 1 13.46 10.62 7.2 11.46 49.69
Angola 2 9.14 69.23 4.13 9.5 29.76
Bolivia 2 10.49 10.53 52.57 5.53 26.64
Coˆte dIvoire 2 1.23 6.96 7.52 5.74 57.56
Cameroon 2 24.63 28.05 40.78 23.63 49.44
Egypt 2 29.38 1.38 61 3.89 10.05
Honduras 2 22.82 14.03 9.61 0.48 35.76
Indonesia 2 51.12 8.56 41.82 39.91 20.34
India 2 6.92 14.22 0.61 3.15 26.32
Kenya 2 24.34 52.96 2.1 1.64 14.25
Sri Lanka 2 12.95 10.92 61.57 4.24 13.28
Morocco 2 2.77 5.54 20.13 11.47 28.4
Nigeria 2 11.59 18.78 9.05 11.47 58.72
Philippines 2 18.2 11.97 54.38 13.64 36.87
Sudan 2 18.53 63.44 4.43 44.64 2.77
Tunisia 2 19.41 9.66 7.73 14.18 18.73
Bulgaria 3 32.86 18.88 39.39 9.15 29.68
Brazil 3 14.98 40.23 35.16 19.12 14.09
China 3 1.92 9.83 11.34 16.64 22.59
Colombia 3 23.05 30.95 20.3 28.42 22.43
Costa Rica 3 21.53 19.95 1.89 18.23 51.01
Dominican Republic 3 11.33 18.76 16.76 12.67 27.84
Ecuador 3 28.35 9.35 45.76 14.99 0.61
Guatemala 3 15.39 5.46 11.23 13.1 23.18
Iran 3 23.18 26.26 2.74 40.77 37.4
Iraq 3 9.4 4.54 13.49 7.67 27.75
Jamaica 3 11.32 16.84 3.89 1.43 9.28
Jordan 3 65.49 80.01 19.94 52.91 30.73
Mexico 3 24.74 38.44 5.09 10.1 58.58
Malaysia 3 19.26 7.76 2.96 4.01 48.53
Peru 3 31.27 21.59 18.98 19.32 71.76
Paraguay 3 25.31 7.57 15.04 14.36 4.51
Romania 3 17.77 23.78 7.88 27.24 16.01
Thailand 3 8.64 13.92 15.93 10.01 9.99
Turkey 3 6.55 13.3 43.91 5.34 5.91
Venezuela 3 1.82 18.84 1.67 1.9 3.45
South Africa 3 20.34 4.15 12.05 2.49 64.67
Argentina 4 7.1 37.1 7.26 20.43 22.9
Australia 4 10.88 5.21 0.63 6.63 49.88
Austria 4 12.04 16.13 14.04 4.83 2.86
Belgium 4 25.79 14.11 36.68 8.91 76.29
Bahrain 4 10.47 13.27 40.55 42.83 56.05
Barbados 4 23.97 0.34 18.31 6.61 34.34
Canada 4 27.82 1.67 13.02 5.61 10.41
Switzerland 4 31.59 3.65 14.68 7.81 7.54
Chile 4 26.19 38.44 14.61 2.25 65.07
Cyprus 4 20.47 12.97 20.86 7.93 28.65
Germany 4 6.93 13.46 20.21 13.73 7.62
Denmark 4 25.15 19.84 44.57 3.34 26.24
Spain 4 34.13 7.34 30.19 18.17 42.01
Finland 4 17.56 7.72 23.42 16.5 85.54
France 4 34.72 10.19 22.82 6.43 50.9
United Kingdom 4 17.19 17.87 22.97 22.91 68.85
Greece 4 9.75 10.22 13.73 19.44 12.99
China, Hong Kong SAR 4 9.5 16.72 13.61 12.01 17.5
Hungary 4 27.82 6.81 40 2.59 2.04
Ireland 4 3.2 1.43 10.51 2.98 9.87
Iceland 4 15.76 16.53 27.34 15.03 5.72
Israel 4 10.31 10.97 2.62 12.74 11.85
Italy 4 53.03 26.66 74.62 25.52 28.33
Japan 4 15.36 28.88 11.82 22.29 62.01
Republic of Korea 4 13.71 14.65 53.72 11.89 4.56
Kuwait 4 53.99 40.46 10.53 54.42 54.25
Luxembourg 4 9.21 3.71 3.58 3.55 13.09
Malta 4 21.62 25.04 5.31 19.46 13.52
Netherlands 4 43.37 41.35 10.28 17.42 10.81
Norway 4 10.43 33.87 24.93 13.37 6.76
New Zealand 4 57.43 63.61 7 43.2 5.31
Panama 4 12.94 31.09 23.11 16.48 5.59
Poland 4 25.39 18.76 47.08 6.83 42.83
Portugal 4 6.01 5.16 4.88 3.07 58.1
Qatar 4 23.66 23.81 19.95 34.59 8.35
Saudi Arabia 4 8.58 23.19 16.47 28.03 40.47
Singapore 4 5.3 24.6 16.13 12.33 23.65
Sweden 4 6.69 7.15 67.18 2.74 35.91
Trinidad and Tobago 4 2.62 5.52 22.36 4.68 18.78
Taiwan 4 6.84 0.64 24.11 6.46 16.67
Uruguay 4 32.3 41.54 60.37 17.72 21.58
Notes: For each country, the table reports the bias-corrected estimates of the share of variance
of each variable in the VAR system (TFP, consumption, labor, output and trade balance to
GDP ratio) explained by news shocks to TFP. Developed countries are those with an income
classification class in the second column equal to 4 (high income). The rest are classified as
developing countries.
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Table 3.29: Country-by-country estimates of ΩBB1,2 for foreign interest rate as exogenous
variable
Country Income Class Foreign Interest Rate C H Y TB
Burkina Faso 1 11 29.54 10.68 24.35 27.65
D.R. of the Congo 1 4.4 54 20.22 33.34 41.19
Ethiopia 1 7.35 0.5 2.37 5.31 90.16
Haiti 1 4.19 9.12 49.58 19.28 7.69
Madagascar 1 21.97 63.07 5.28 15.92 15.91
Mali 1 6.96 0.82 0.32 24.86 8.78
Mozambique 1 10.9 1.32 1.24 37.03 66.58
Malawi 1 13.62 47.86 13.4 9.15 53.05
Niger 1 20.74 17.35 0.99 10.65 37.68
Senegal 1 21.47 8.49 14.01 14.34 24.62
Syrian Arab Republic 1 22.79 84.06 14.32 10.96 23.03
Tanzania 1 3.61 32.49 4.2 19.21 61.35
Uganda 1 22.89 24.36 0.48 80.68 22.15
Zimbabwe 1 12.74 10.56 26.05 7.63 29
Angola 2 4.85 78.5 0.7 34.34 0.7
Bangladesh 2 12.32 10.29 26.43 1.55 30.5
Bolivia 2 11.26 9.95 25.72 2.42 3.5
Coˆte dIvoire 2 41.58 69.06 20.64 38.9 29.13
Cameroon 2 21.08 70.16 4.2 43.08 9.31
Egypt 2 4.31 0.92 46.32 0.99 22.53
Ghana 2 26.73 34.02 17.61 63.85 26.13
Honduras 2 6.95 9.58 29.86 2.87 20.2
Indonesia 2 4.65 20.04 36.18 3.73 33.74
India 2 7.92 48.98 20.19 28.56 58.11
Kenya 2 12.07 12.9 2.15 62.37 41.68
Cambodia 2 3.63 1.48 8.82 4.84 3.32
Sri Lanka 2 25.42 13.44 0.79 2.67 83.16
Morocco 2 4.93 0.78 22.55 4.51 39.12
Myanmar 2 1.77 7.11 3.44 10.49 49.56
Nigeria 2 6.46 85.9 1.06 50.54 2.9
Pakistan 2 22.26 3.04 11.42 4.46 31.73
Philippines 2 8.33 3.53 12.58 37.93 27.16
Sudan 2 17.74 25.34 32.77 28.89 31.66
Tunisia 2 11.96 33.25 5.01 9.43 2.02
Vietnam 2 11.72 13.25 23.57 27.06 21.73
Zambia 2 12.45 40.61 0.97 23.35 2.22
Albania 3 20.85 17.8 83.53 11.49 42.11
Bulgaria 3 1.18 66.44 38.61 56.63 89.61
Brazil 3 3.79 5.24 5.64 10.44 17.67
China 3 6.55 23.21 20.17 50.59 38.1
Colombia 3 8.07 5.24 0.81 5.3 49.8
Costa Rica 3 1.37 25.96 1.14 18.5 53.58
Dominican Republic 3 27.93 2.03 5.47 70.92 52.07
Algeria 3 8.18 2.78 1.84 21.45 15.39
Ecuador 3 14.41 4.02 1.61 12.47 93.51
Guatemala 3 6.47 8.19 13.91 4.46 1.17
Iran 3 19.75 71.49 2.32 74.7 49.62
Iraq 3 7.39 8.66 17.12 66.95 53.27
Jamaica 3 19.74 81.94 10.67 30.59 65.42
Jordan 3 3.06 28.25 17.63 28.29 52.66
Saint Lucia 3 18.15 13.49 8.71 27.7 2.57
Mexico 3 0.45 4.27 1.43 11.35 28.21
Malaysia 3 22.79 10.66 15.35 13.95 66.39
Peru 3 20.46 12.82 27.49 6.71 8.75
Paraguay 3 49.77 13.43 3.99 38.46 89.06
Romania 3 12.7 21.44 2.35 22.07 10.23
Suriname 3 20.42 3.43 11.45 1.15 28.78
Thailand 3 29.55 7.21 48.53 1.27 44.83
Turkey 3 12.61 2.75 1.45 10.48 60.05
Venezuela 3 4.12 9.13 1.94 9.37 36.98
South Africa 3 1.61 30.37 32.38 56.28 6.86
United Arab Emirates 4 20.35 13.68 16.2 23.12 23.27
Argentina 4 12.51 9.23 1.87 6.76 19.33
Australia 4 6.41 23.73 30.5 44.22 11.54
Austria 4 8.5 16.79 38.58 18.56 61.75
Belgium 4 18.5 6.02 23.26 8.34 32.27
Bahrain 4 16.68 51.57 32.55 61.98 19.31
Bahamas 4 7.53 12.61 1.13 24.86 64.19
Barbados 4 17.46 14.88 2.05 2.09 17.98
Canada 4 4.68 19.51 2.49 30.88 0.64
Switzerland 4 9.49 2.18 15.46 15.65 45.51
Chile 4 8.41 38.16 0.74 50.9 2.3
Cyprus 4 17.82 6.27 11.8 29.7 21.13
Germany 4 5.87 6.69 8.28 13.83 66.39
Denmark 4 4.63 9.91 40.29 9.33 36.81
Spain 4 9.18 30.03 77.56 20.09 37.69
Finland 4 4.47 1.63 52.75 2.97 21.95
France 4 5.8 12.58 17.84 12.13 13.73
United Kingdom 4 25.68 3.32 39.92 1.74 34.05
Greece 4 2.81 13.5 7.57 16.92 37.19
China, Hong Kong SAR 4 21.67 19.54 15.16 9.95 24.32
Hungary 4 27.99 7.12 9.68 1.54 3.42
Ireland 4 14.7 8.19 30.88 15.31 48.24
Iceland 4 15.64 8.72 6.41 21.63 20.62
Israel 4 30.66 2.74 19.86 3.09 60.13
Italy 4 30.37 5.29 12.97 7.32 71.81
Japan 4 23 11.18 16.81 19.34 36.2
Republic of Korea 4 12.72 11.18 2.2 4.38 19.6
Kuwait 4 29.19 15.07 3.11 38.06 18.78
Luxembourg 4 21.69 19.15 8.79 11.53 14.78
Malta 4 18.74 35.03 50.72 9.09 4.93
Netherlands 4 6.2 3.36 12.93 6.39 19.23
Norway 4 5.2 1.5 2.4 4.89 44.73
New Zealand 4 9.64 21.81 5.94 26.42 5.13
Oman 4 9.47 4 6.1 3.23 72.58
Panama 4 12.46 1.52 2.97 1.83 32.63
Poland 4 15.86 1.58 5.08 6.59 24.55
Portugal 4 32.72 31.33 14.33 6.3 18.68
Qatar 4 11.19 25.76 17.97 48.3 7.83
Saudi Arabia 4 12.49 4.79 2.33 32.67 41.6
Singapore 4 33.68 17.39 5.47 30.78 84.44
Sweden 4 7.42 3.55 9.2 22.65 5.31
Trinidad and Tobago 4 25.15 26.59 10.32 24.34 45.76
Taiwan 4 9.75 20.48 21.08 11.95 19.11
Uruguay 4 8.28 21.44 0.74 7.89 4.47
United States 4 28.71 15.21 65.74 41.39 2.22
Notes: For each country, the table reports the bias-corrected estimates of the share of variance
of each variable in the VAR system (foreign interest rate, consumption, labor, output and trade
balance to GDP ratio) explained by news shocks to foreign interest rates. Developed countries
are those with an income classification class in the second column equal to 4 (high income). The
rest are developing countries.
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Table 3.30: Country-by-country estimates of ΩBB1,2 for CToT as exogenous variable
Country Income Class CToT C H Y TB
Burkina Faso 1 26.1 47.09 12.89 58.02 32.4
D.R. of the Congo 1 13.23 11.2 1.72 3.73 52.09
Ethiopia 1 3.52 15.75 1.18 43.65 6.78
Haiti 1 12.3 12.36 13.66 2.07 3.72
Madagascar 1 7.37 4.01 1.56 18.06 26.6
Mali 1 17.39 12.4 16.14 1.96 39.18
Mozambique 1 2.85 7.31 3.49 12.98 44.54
Malawi 1 23.61 36.73 2.7 6.16 27.52
Niger 1 33.64 15.28 10.49 61.83 15.14
Senegal 1 5.75 3.32 28.02 12.38 4.57
Syrian Arab Republic 1 44.75 36.69 3.25 56 1.55
Tanzania 1 3.63 53.28 9.95 35.48 18.88
Uganda 1 16.52 32.08 4.12 44.94 61.16
Zimbabwe 1 8.47 15.3 21.12 13.61 13.15
Angola 2 4.08 15.48 9.09 12.28 47.3
Bangladesh 2 1.6 9.27 32.49 2.77 4.36
Bolivia 2 9.32 3.48 24.24 23.08 11.49
Coˆte dIvoire 2 2.32 3.77 8.28 25.35 1.62
Cameroon 2 36.45 73.88 2.62 55.57 16.67
Egypt 2 22.68 21.17 2.81 2.77 11.9
Ghana 2 41.98 44.38 6.99 19.75 64.62
Honduras 2 8.49 68.41 4.62 38.81 6.04
Indonesia 2 14.74 2.83 6.85 16.53 45.28
India 2 34.57 0.56 0.96 5.41 16.12
Kenya 2 19.9 36.08 0.32 9.01 52.39
Cambodia 2 12.98 39.83 6.33 19.64 23.85
Sri Lanka 2 29.76 32.86 37.88 18.37 59.83
Morocco 2 21.45 6.98 45.27 11.29 1.29
Myanmar 2 17.78 54.6 24.6 30.56 20.33
Nigeria 2 12.42 26.18 17.01 27.91 64.13
Pakistan 2 11.97 1.16 39.16 2.99 19.48
Philippines 2 45.14 45.39 60.48 60.94 44.72
Sudan 2 5.27 2.25 2.37 33.44 65.86
Tunisia 2 47.69 48.67 22.28 42.91 15.03
Vietnam 2 37.78 52.72 21.89 24.72 19.83
Zambia 2 44.02 59.54 11.52 20.32 2.85
Albania 3 20.91 16.39 34.09 6.95 28.15
Bulgaria 3 24.22 12.27 68.68 15.46 15.57
Brazil 3 13.5 7.77 6.12 18.82 24.23
China 3 23.24 22.7 30.65 21.18 38.56
Colombia 3 15.35 14.13 5.86 34.57 19.74
Costa Rica 3 17.34 18.5 62.73 5.8 35.63
Dominican Republic 3 4.86 2.63 13.4 0.88 31.46
Algeria 3 33.11 31.22 7.34 67.38 11.37
Ecuador 3 28.13 45.56 10.63 41.31 3.56
Guatemala 3 7.04 18.4 21.02 35.99 36.13
Iran 3 11.4 4.96 1.78 4.49 40.53
Iraq 3 24.21 26.64 13.87 51.06 44.31
Jamaica 3 1.31 3.99 3.59 17.66 24.34
Jordan 3 3.42 8.96 17.67 13.83 22.64
Saint Lucia 3 9.82 8.34 7.01 40.78 18.31
Mexico 3 33.11 45.83 1.23 27.31 69.13
Malaysia 3 25.47 30.24 25.74 28.7 26.67
Peru 3 47.1 30.79 23.62 16.39 38.27
Paraguay 3 11.53 8.59 30.85 8.26 25.04
Romania 3 10.38 3.12 76.89 2.36 21.1
Suriname 3 16.35 19.15 65.8 46.93 10.32
Thailand 3 18.63 4.26 23.6 8.09 3.99
Turkey 3 0.71 4.54 22.41 4.53 7.29
Venezuela 3 8.54 60.85 0.53 38.45 3.96
South Africa 3 5.5 13.94 8.19 14.94 47.11
United Arab Emirates 4 31 18.01 32.28 39.4 15.36
Argentina 4 6.56 12.57 9.74 1.36 73.64
Australia 4 4.44 7.87 33.21 6.52 13.52
Austria 4 7.47 11.17 13.31 9.27 2.49
Bahrain 4 34.3 16.99 11.07 3.92 53.37
Bahamas 4 13.94 11.21 1.9 1.38 6.82
Barbados 4 32.11 38.08 17.32 62.46 84.61
Canada 4 19.26 7.04 15.04 6.28 9.59
Switzerland 4 24.01 1.91 24.12 1.12 18.21
Chile 4 27.56 15.78 15.49 13.84 3.41
Cyprus 4 18.11 3.5 4.96 4.7 66.78
Germany 4 1.54 2.6 34.68 9.76 5.02
Denmark 4 7.45 34.37 5.22 6.38 18.13
Spain 4 11.42 3.7 4.49 2.55 6.13
Finland 4 1.21 14.95 4.39 5 54.7
France 4 13.56 7.66 14.29 14.06 15.09
United Kingdom 4 26.2 7.59 74.05 6.54 2.15
Greece 4 6.31 2.56 42.7 6.04 19.91
China, Hong Kong SAR 4 24.22 34.47 15.04 13.04 23.21
Hungary 4 20.85 25.89 82.62 6.67 56.34
Ireland 4 16.1 18.75 11.05 12.45 25.77
Iceland 4 26.4 66.18 34.75 49.91 32.66
Israel 4 14.41 19.49 25.95 2.88 13.73
Italy 4 0.81 10.35 56.42 16.31 31.19
Japan 4 38.26 3.7 60.73 4.98 10.08
Republic of Korea 4 17.21 2.63 4.9 3.36 52.94
Kuwait 4 13.43 50.27 20.78 62.63 20.43
Malta 4 1.73 12.86 13.58 47.13 46.06
Netherlands 4 8.14 31.46 4.74 9.64 3.49
Norway 4 42.22 61.71 16.91 38.23 39.98
New Zealand 4 9.76 2.31 59.97 12.72 24.02
Oman 4 22.73 17.27 9.19 30.88 9.14
Panama 4 14.66 51.41 0.6 29.01 10.44
Poland 4 9.87 17.8 5.8 6.85 44.71
Portugal 4 11.1 20.65 53.18 5.52 6.28
Qatar 4 18.59 23.12 72.55 33.04 15.73
Saudi Arabia 4 17.93 6.31 15.08 4.15 24.67
Singapore 4 49.2 46.27 9.43 32.96 64.42
Sweden 4 8.28 6.15 16.05 8.13 43.48
Trinidad and Tobago 4 13.94 32.62 1.56 4.55 16.14
Uruguay 4 2.93 3.1 5.92 6.64 15.11
United States 4 6.18 2.5 0.48 2.7 6.4
Notes: For each country, the table reports the bias-corrected estimates of the share of variance
of each variable in the VAR system (CToT, consumption, labor, output and trade balance to
GDP ratio) explained by news shocks to CToT. Developed countries are those with an income
classification class in the second column equal to 4 (high income). The rest are developing
countries.
